



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL  
ANDOVER-HARVARD THEOLOGICAL  
LIBRARY



From the collection  
of the  
UNIVERSALIST HISTORICAL  
SOCIETY












7

The American Universal  
Historical Society's  
from  
The author.

Liverpool 15. June,  
1838.



**THREE QUESTIONS**  
**PROPOSED & ANSWERED,**  
 CONCERNING  
**THE LIFE FORFEITED BY ADAM,**  
**THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD,**  
 AND  
**ETERNAL PUNISHMENT,**

BY  
 THE REV. DAVID THOM.

---

*Εγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀναστάσις; καὶ ἡ ζωὴ.*

---

LIVERPOOL:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, BY R. RIDDICK, 46, LORD-STREET.  
 PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY ROCKLIFF AND DUCKWORTH, ALSO SOLD BY  
 ROBINSONS', CRUICKSHANK, GRAPEL, TAYLOR, EVANS, CHEGWIN, AND  
 HALL, AND GRAY; LONGMAN, REES, ORME, AND CO., LONDON; WOOD  
 AND YATES, DUBLIN; [REDACTED], WM. WHITE AND CO., AND  
 WM. OLIPHANT, EDINBURGH; J. BRASH AND CO., MAURICE OGLE, AND  
 WM. M'PHUN, GLASGOW.

---

1828.

BT  
821  
·T4

TO  
SAMUEL M'CULLOCH, ESQ.,  
ANDREW WATSON, ESQ.,  
PETER MACINTYRE, M.D.,  
AND  
THE OTHER FRIENDS OF FREE DISCUSSION  
IN MATTERS OF RELIGION,  
BY  
WHOM HE WAS SUPPORTED  
IN HIS  
LATE ARDUOUS STRUGGLE  
WITH THE  
PRESBYTERY OF GLASGOW,  
THESE PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED  
BY

THE AUTHOR.





1

## THREE QUESTIONS

### PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.

**T**HERE are three questions, growing out of the information, with which we are furnished by the scriptures, that have often struck me, as demanding more than ordinary attention, viz,

I. What was the death threatened to, and incurred by Adam, as the consequence, and punishment of his first transgression?

II. What is the cause of the resurrection of the dead?

III. Is there any authority in scripture, or in reasonings legitimately derived from scripture, for the ordinary doctrine that the wicked shall be eternally punished, in a state of existence succeeding the present?

It is impossible for any sober minded and reflecting individual to deny, that these are questions of the last importance. They do not, like those barren and unprofitable speculations, which, in every age, have occupied the minds, and engaged the attention of theologians by profession, turn upon trifling cobweb distinctions, make a cold appeal to the understanding, or afford an opportunity for learned leisure, to while

away the tedium of a vacant hour, but lead at once and inevitably to practical and glorious results. If, in the prosecution of them, I shall be able to demonstrate, that sentiments, with which, in infancy, our minds are imbued, and which advancing years in general tend but to strengthen and confirm, are, in reality, the offspring of ignorance and superstition, fostered and nourished by tyranny and self-interest, and that, instead of illustrating and commending, they obscure, and are at variance with the character of the God of Revelation, representing *him* as a gloomy Despot, whom scripture declares to be LOVE itself, I shall enjoy the supreme happiness of being instrumental in relieving such as are convinced by my arguments from a state of most degrading and painful thralldom, and of seeing the hideous fabric which, for eighteen centuries at least, men have been engaged in raising and consolidating, crumble into atoms, at the touch of divine truth. Nor let it be imagined, that there is any part of the argument, that might have been spared. A candid, and enlightened attention, to what I have written, will, I trust, suffice to show, that all the statements, and inquiries, which precede, are indispensably requisite to bring out, in its full lustre, the conclusion that follows. So close, I should rather say inseparable, is the connexion subsisting among all the questions proposed for examination, that without understanding the grounds, and principles of the answers, which I return to the first and second of them, it is impossible to perceive, and apprehend, the full force of the answer returned to the last. In order to prevent disappointment, however, let it be observed, that in what follows, it is very far from being the intention of the writer to present his readers, with a regular and systematic treatise ; all that they have to expect from him

being a few scriptural statements, and reasonings, which will, he hopes, serve as hints, and form a basis, for ulterior investigations of their own.

I. What was the death threatened to, and incurred by Adam, as the consequence and punishment of his first transgression ?

As the fall of man is a fact which we learn exclusively from the sacred writings, so likewise the nature of it, the circumstances connected with it, and the consequences involved in it can be derived only from the same infallible source. *What, then, saith the scripture* in reference to this subject ?

Were it not that the minds of men are preoccupied from the very cradle, with nursery tales concerning the fall,\* and that the impressions made by these are afterwards strengthened by systems of divinity almost as decidedly romantic, this is a question which might be speedily answered. The narrative contained in the three first chapters of Genesis, although brief, is so explicit, and the arguments and conclusions of the apostle Paul, in the 5th and 6th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and the 15th chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, are so clearly founded upon, and deduced from, that narrative, literally understood, that nothing but the most perverse ingenuity, and a disposition to seek for mysteries, and metaphors, where all is plain and obvious, could ever have involved the subject in darkness or perplexity.

When we inquire, what are the declarations of the book of Genesis, concerning the creation and fall of man, the few following simple, and intelligible facts

\* May not many individuals, in this country, trace their views of the fall to the impression made upon them, at an early period of life, by Milton's *Paradise Lost* ?

present themselves to our notice :—That God formed and organized the body of the first man *of the dust of the ground*, or of materials common to it, with the earth, upon which it was to tread,—that the body so formed was animated by him, with a principle of life, **Genesis ii. 7.**—that this life was not *absolutely* but *conditionally* bestowed, **16. 17.**—that the condition of its tenure was violated, **iii. 6.**—and that thus the forfeiture threatened, viz, the loss of the life originally bestowed, and the returning of the body to its primitive elements, was incurred, **19.** If words have any meaning at all, and if scripture is not to be made a mere nose-of-wax, what can be gathered from the inspired narrative, concerning the fall, and its consequences, more than I have now stated ?

Nor are the apostolic testimony and reasonings, already alluded to, at variance in the remotest degree with Moses' narrative. When Paul, in the 5th and 6th of the Romans, and the 15th of first Corinthians, speaks of death, as the consequence of *Adam's one transgression*, he connects with the word *death* no qualifying epithet, nor does he furnish his readers with the slightest hint, that it was to be understood by them in any other than its ordinary and current acceptance.\* In a matter of such importance as this, had it been the apostle's intention to speak of death, in a sense different from that of the termination of this present life, is it once to be supposed, that writing, as he did, under divine direction, he would have adopted, and employed terms, in their very nature, calculated to deceive ?

Warranted by the declarations, and reasonings of scripture, therefore, for I acknowledge no other, or

\* See *Romans* v. 12 to the end, vi. 23. 1st *Corinth.* xv. 21, &c.

higher authority, I thus answer the first question :— The death, with which Adam was menaced, in case of disobedience, and which he actually incurred, was death in the ordinary acceptation of the term, that is, the termination of the animal existence, which God, at his creation, had conferred on him, followed by the dissolution of his body.

Clear, however, as the matter appears to me, and must do to all who take a plain, scriptural, and impartial view of it, there have not been wanting men, dignified with the title of theologians, who have fancied, and written treatises to prove, that besides the loss of natural life, Adam was threatened with, and actually incurred spiritual and eternal death. Without inquiring what is the exact meaning attached to this phraseology by those who employ it, it is sufficient to observe, that the arguments by which the doctrine of spiritual and eternal death is supported, are of a *negative*, rather than of a *positive* kind, and may with propriety be stated in the form of so many objections to the view which I have just shown to be derived from a perusal of the inspired narrative itself.

In the first place it may be objected, that it exposes God to the charge of having uttered a threat, which he did not actually carry into effect. The divine declaration was, *IN THE DAY that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die*,—but Adam did not die in the day that he transgressed the divine command, having lived for many centuries afterwards,—therefore some other death must have been intended, besides the loss of this present life. To this I answer, that I consider God, in this, as well as in all cases, to be the best interpreter of his own meaning, and perceive, that he has furnished

us with an interpretation of his meaning in this particular case, by the event. In the day, or time, or moment, that thou eatest thereof, i. e. *of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil*, thou shalt become mortal, or obnoxious to the stroke of death, I have no hesitation in proposing, as God's own solution of the difficulty.\*

In the second place it may be objected, that Adam's possession of a *soul*, Genesis ii. 7. implies his having been originally endowed with something superior to natural life, or an immaterial and immortal principle. In answer to this, and without stopping to inquire into the meaning of the English word *soul*, I observe, what indeed must be obvious to every reflecting person, that the life, or whatever it was, that Adam originally possessed, is to be determined, not by turning over the musty pages, or annoying ourselves with the vague and discordant theories of divines, but by a reference to the signification of the Hebrew word נֶפֶשׁ here translated *soul*, as well as to that of the corresponding Greek word ψυχή by which it is rendered in the septuagint version, and the New Testament. This

\* In the view taken by me of this passage, viz, that it was intended to intimate not the exact time of the *execution* of the threatening, but the *certainty* of death being deserved and incurred, the moment that the transgression should take place, I happen to coincide with a great number of expositors. Such of my readers as are inclined to prosecute their researches into this matter further may consult Le Clerc's Commentary and Paraphrase, L. Howel's complete history of the Bible, Stackhouse's history of the Bible, Poole's synop. crit. ap. loc., Bishop Patrick's Commentary on the historical books of the Old Testament, &c. Some of these authors in illustration and confirmation of their view, refer to the case of Shemei 1. Kings ii, who did not suffer death on the very day on which his transgression took place, although Solomon's menace literally interpreted imported as much, verse 37. S. Castellio and Dr. Geddes, in their respective translations seem to have regarded the threatening, Gen. ii. 17, as having been uttered, without any reference to the time of its *actual execution*. If any of my readers have in their possession a work of the Rev. Geo. Holden, *on the fall of man*, they will find at page 20, a note, giving a very accurate view of the meaning of the passage in *question*.

signification may be ascertained in two different ways.

1. By observing that נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה in Hebrew, and ψυχή ζῶσα in Greek, which is the phrase translated *living soul* in Genesis ii. 7, is also the same phrase, in the original, which, when applied to the inferior animals, is rendered by the English words *living creature*, in Genesis i. 21. and 24, and ii. 19.\* Whence this marked difference, in rendering the same words, is of course the first question that will occur to the mind of the unlettered reader, and sorry am I to say, that it cannot be answered, without reflecting severely upon the partiality, and want of candour, evinced in this, as well as in several other instances, by the translators of the authorised version. Correct, and even slavishly literal as they are, where no party purpose is to be served, and no favourite theory is to be supported, the moment some popular dogma crosses their path, or the voice of royal authority is interposed, truth and fidelity are, without hesitation, sacrificed at their shrine. But for some bias of this kind, what could have induced men, whose claims to sense, and learning, it is impossible to dispute, to abandon the phrase *living creature*, which besides being a literal translation of the Hebrew words, had answered their purpose, and expressed their meaning, admirably, when speaking of the inferior animals, and to substitute in its place, when applied to man, *living soul*, a term ambiguous in its very nature, and calculated to suggest a difference, where no difference exists? If in doing so, they were influenced by the consideration, that as man is possessed of a nature or life superior to that of the other animals, therefore the term expressive of life, when

\* See also Genesis i. 20 and 30, where the same phrase occurs in the original, with a similar application, although somewhat differently translated.



applied to him, ought to be translated differently from what it is, when applied to them, they were assuming the very thing to be proved, and instead of confining themselves to a fair and faithful and simple exhibition of what the inspired writers have said, which is the sole business of the translator, leaving it to others to explain difficulties, and reconcile apparent incongruities, they were guilty of usurping the province of the commentator, and the controversialist, and of betraying the confidence reposed in them, by rendering their translation a vehicle for the advancement of their own private views and prejudices.\* And yet never was a departure from those maxims, which should invariably regulate the conduct of translators, more ill judged, or uncalled for than this. If it be admitted, as it must be, that the same words are employed in the original Hebrew, to denote the life of the inferior animals that are employed to denote the life of man, and if it be admitted also, as it must be, if our opponents deal candidly, that there is nothing on the face of the texts themselves to justify a diversity of translation, it clearly follows, that if in Genesis ii. 7. the phrase נפש חיה is rendered *living soul*, it is capable of being rendered in the same way in verse 19th of the same chapter, and in the 20th, 21st, 24th, and 30th verses of the preceding chapter,† and if they denote an immaterial and immortal principle in the one case they must denote the same in the other also. There is no way in which those who have been accustomed to defend the propriety of the reading in the authorised version

\* See some admirable remarks on the duties of a translator of the Holy Scriptures in Dr. Campbell's preliminary dissertations.

† In Revelation xvi. 3. the Greek words ψυχὴ ζῶσα are translated *living soul*, where *living creature* would have answered better, as it is evidently of the fish that the inspired writer is speaking.

can extricate themselves from the difficulty and awkwardness of the situation in which they are placed, except by candidly admitting, that the possession of a principle of life, common to man with the inferior animals, is all that is meant by the phrase translated *living soul* in Genesis ii. 7.\* 2. The signification of the Hebrew word שָׁמַיִם and of the corresponding Greek word ψυχή may be ascertained by consulting some of the most approved Lexicons. To save time and avoid a needless parade of learning, let me just refer to two works of this description, which, with all their defects, are of standard merit, and, I have reason to think, in the hands of almost every biblical scholar, I mean Parkhurst's Hebrew and Greek Lexicons. From an examination of these we find, that the grand primary meaning of both words is *breath*, and their chief secondary, and derived meanings, *a breathing frame, or the body that by breathing is sustained in life; a living creature, or a creature that lives by breathing; life considered as connected with breathing; and personality considered as connected with life.* What deserves to be remarked is, that by the confession of Parkhurst himself, who seems to have been any thing but favourable to the views which I entertain

\* As the Septuagint is uniform in translating נִשְׁמַת אָדָם by the words ψυχή ζῶσα so does the Vulgate uniformly render it by the phrase *anima vivens*. Le Clerc's paraphrase is *Homo animal factus est*. S. Castellio has it *ex quo esset animans homo effectus*. T. Beza translates the same words as quoted in 1 Corinth. xv. 45, *animal vivens*. When we turn to some of the English translations, we find Dr. Geddes rendering Genesis ii. 7. *thus man became a living person*. Archbishop Newcome, and after him the improved version, translate 1 Corinth, xv. 45, *And so it is written, the first man, Adam, became a living animal, &c.* Dr. Mac-knight leaves this latter passage as ambiguous as he finds it. His words are, "for thus it is written, the first man Adam, from whom men derive their animal body, was made a living soul, an animal whose life depended on the presence of his soul in his body." Mr. Locke, in his valuable paraphrase and notes, says, much more to the point, "And so it is written, the first man, Adam, was made a living soul, i. e. made of an animal constitution, and endowed with an animal life."

with regard to what man naturally possesses, as may be seen by consulting his Greek Lexicon at  $\psi\chi\eta$  No. 6, and  $\piνευμα$  No. 2, he was unable to meet with a single passage in the Old Testament in which he could unhesitatingly say, that  $\psi\chi\eta$  has the sense which we commonly attach to the English word *soul*. I have given his own words in a note.\* It is of no avail to object that  $\psi\chi\eta$  in classical writers, means frequently the *mind*, or *thinking principle in man*, because, as Dr. Campbell has shown, with invincible power of argument, it is not by classical, but hellenistical usage, or by the way in which Greek words are employed in the Septuagint and New Testament, that their scriptural signification, in doubtful cases, is to be ascertained. But if it still be insisted, that classical authority is entitled to some deference, let be observed, that in the classics themselves  $\psi\chi\eta$  is perhaps as often used in the sense of *life*, or *animal life*, as in any other, and that even though I admit the fact of its also signifying *the mind*, or *thinking principle*, or *intellectual part of man*, this is merely a secondary meaning, like that of *personality*, derived from the former, and which, from the disputes

\* "As a noun  $\psi\chi\eta$  hath been supposed to signify the *spiritual part* of man, or what we commonly call his *soul*: I must for myself confess, that I can find no passage where it hath *undoubtedly* this meaning. Genesis xxxv. 18, 1 Kings xvii. 21. 22, Ps. xvi. 10, seem fairest for this signification. But may not  $\psi\chi\eta$  in the three former passages be most properly rendered *breath*, and in the last a *breathing* or *animal frame*?"

Bate, in his *Critica Hebræa*, is of the same mind with Parkhurst. After having defined the meaning of  $\psi\chi\eta$  to be, *To breathe out, respire, take breath; the animal frame, that which lives by breathing; it is the animal part of all creatures; the person in rational creatures*; Gen. xxxv. 18, *merely of the breath going out*; he adds, " $\psi\chi\eta$  is never, that I know of, the *rational soul*. It is no more the soul than the brain is the understanding, or the heart the will," &c. "They who leave the S.S. and reason from the nature of *matter* to prove we have a soul, and that it is naturally *immortal*, are paving the way to a disbelief of both points." It is the *vital frame*, whether alive or dead, the thing that once breathed, though not then, Isaiah liii. 10,  $\psi\chi\eta$ , his vital frame, life, or he himself, shall make the *atonement*, and not by sacrifice."

relative to the subject, existing among the different sects of philosophers, it is clear, did not necessarily imply *immateriality*, or *immortality*. Fortified by the authorities which I have produced, and by others which, if necessary, I have still in reserve, I have no hesitation in maintaining, that when, in Genesis ii. 7, and in the corresponding passage 1 Corinth. xv. 45, Adam is declared in our translation to have *become a living soul*, nothing more is meant, than that *God having breathed into his nostrils the breath of life he became a living creature, or a creature that lives by breathing*. Perhaps all that I have been stating will be better understood, by the unlearned reader, if the verse itself, Genesis ii. 7, be analysed, and the several steps of the process there enumerated be pointed out. 1. God formed the body of Adam. *The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground*. 2. God conferred life on this body by enabling it to breathe. *And breathed into his nostrils the breath of life*. 3. In consequence of this, that which had formerly been an inanimate lump, or mass, became a creature endowed with a principle of life, evinced by and connected with breathing. *And man became a living soul*, or a living breathing creature. In the whole process I can discover, from the text itself, nothing more than this.\*

\* To those who are desirous of inquiring farther, I would mention the following works, as throwing light upon the subject: Buxtorf's *Lexicon*; in which שָׁדַל is translated *anima, animus, mens, vita, corpus animatum, halitus*; item, *anima concupiscens, concupiscentia, appetitus, cadaver, corpus exanime*. As a verb, *respirare*. The high authority of Buxtorf will, of course, have due respect paid to it by all Hebrew scholars. E. Castellus' *Lexicon Heptaglotton*; where, by the way, after rendering שָׁדַל *halitus, breath, or breathing*, without producing any authority or reason for the difference, he translates that word in Gen. i. 20, *anima sensitiva*, and in Gen. ii. 7, *anima rationalis*. J. C. Biel, in his *Novus Thesaurus Philologicus, sive Lexicon in LXX et alios interpretes*, translates ψυχή, *anima, animans, mens, voluntas, vita, halitus, homo, animal, corpus exanime, cadaver*.

In the third, and last place, it may be objected, that as Adam is declared in Genesis i. 26. 27. to have been created *in the image*, and *after the likeness of God*, it is impossible to understand these phrases in any other sense than as intimating that he was originally possessed of an immaterial and immortal principle. But even this objection, with whatever force it may have struck the minds of some, is answered and removed with the utmost ease. Indeed wherever it is broached, or entertained, it argues dreadful ignorance of scripture, and is a mere begging of the question. It admits of a threefold answer:—

1. Although Adam is declared to have been made *in, or after the image, or likeness of God*, he is no where declared to be *God's image or likeness*.
2. Adam's likeness to God, or his possession of the divine image is explained by Genesis i. 28, in which he is invested by God himself, with absolute dominion over the earth, and every living thing upon it, in this respect, faintly, but obviously resembling him, to whose sovereign control all things are subject.
3. The complete answer to the objection is found in Romans v. 14. in which Adam is declared to have been *the figure or type of him that was to come*, viz, the Messiah. A very slender acquaintance with scripture is sufficient to show us that the Lord Jesus, as the Messiah, and not Adam, is *the image, likeness, or representative, of the invisible God*, Coloss. i. 15, John xiv. 9, Heb. i. 3. Now as God himself never was

*ego ipse, tu ipse, ille ipse*, but not *spiritus*. Dr. Campbell's note on Matthew xxvii. 50 is worth perusing. It is impossible to understand Gen. xxxv. 18. in any other sense than *as her life, or breath, was in departing, or as she was dying*. So 1 Kings xvii. 21. 22, *The child's breath, or life*, is clearly meant. In Ps. xvi. 10 the translation I conceive to be neither more nor less than this, *thou wilt not leave my body, formerly animated by a principle of life, or thou wilt not leave me, or me myself, in the grave*.

seen at any time, and must indeed from his very nature be invisible to his creatures, it is from *his image*, or from him *as revealed to us*, that we can form any conceptions of his nature or character at all, and therefore to be *like God*, or to be created, *in, after, or according to his image*, which are synonymous expressions, is to be like him whom he has authoritatively declared to be *his image*. This was exactly the case with Adam. He was made *according to the image or likeness of God*, (see the Septuagint version of Gen. i. 26 27.) because he was made *according to, or the figure of him*, Rom. v. 14, who is God's image, that is the Messiah. The 8th Psalm, in which the 28th verse of the 1st chapter of Genesis is clearly referred to, and in which that universal empire, or dominion, which had been *figuratively* assigned to our natural progenitor, is *in its highest sense, and really* assigned to the Messiah, puts this beyond a doubt. If any reader is dissatisfied with this scriptural explanation of the matter, I cannot help it.\*

In these objections, to which I have given their full weight, and importance, lies the strength of the hypothesis, that the death which Adam, in consequence

\* Without pledging myself to support the unscriptural theories and vagaries, which Osiander and others may have entertained, I have no hesitation in saying, that the justly celebrated Calvin, in his Institutes, book 1. chap. 15. sect. 3, and book 2. chap. 12. sect. 6, &c. has completely failed, in his attempts to overturn the position that Adam was created *after or according to the image of God*, because he was created *like to the future Messiah, who is God's only authorised image*, which he ascribes to them. That Osiander, and those who coincided with him in opinion, held sentiments at variance with this plain and scriptural view of matters, which afforded their redoubtable antagonist a handle against them, upon the supposition of their language being fairly quoted, I allow; but when Calvin is stripped of the advantage which he derives from their concessions, and when his own concessions are taken into account, the arguments by which he attempts to confute their doctrine, relative to the point in question, will be found to be extremely futile.

of his first transgression, incurred, was not merely *natural*, but also *spiritual and eternal*. Here I might stop, but that nothing may be left unstated that has a tendency to establish the validity of my own position, and by way of turning the tables upon my opponents, I now proceed to show, that the idea of Adam's having incurred, by the fall, spiritual and eternal death is liable to objections, absolutely insurmountable, on the supposition of scripture being true and consistent with itself. These objections, for the sake of brevity, I shall reduce to three, which I shall illustrate, and upon which I shall dwell at some length.

In the first place, death, in common parlance, as well as according to scriptural usage, signifies, not *want* or *destitution of life*, but *the loss of it*; in other words, it always implies, that *life has been previously possessed*. That it does so in common parlance, without recurring to the sovereign authority of Dr. Johnson, I at once assume. That this is its meaning in scripture, whether employed literally or metaphorically, may be sufficiently established by observing, that when in Rom. vi. 2, and vii. 4, believers are spoken of, as being *dead to sin* and *dead to the law*, their having been previously *alive to sin* and *alive to the law*, is clearly implied in the phrases themselves, independently even of this being the manifest scope of the apostle's reasoning. Life and death, it thus appears, are relative terms, not in the sense of the one being simply *the negation* of the other, but in the sense of the one implying *the deprivation* or *loss* of the other. If then, it be supposed, that Adam when he transgressed incurred spiritual and eternal death, as natural death implies the loss of natural life, so must spiritual and eternal death imply the loss of spiritual

and eternal life. But this supposition is inadmissible because,

1. What is spiritual and eternal cannot be lost, or forfeited. *Spiritual* and *eternal* are terms evidently of the same import with *divine*. As God is defined by Jesus in John iv. 24, to be a *spirit*, or rather *spirit itself*, *spiritual* therefore is that which belongs to, or can be predicated of God; and as to *eternal*, eternity is too obviously a divine attribute to admit of any dispute with regard to the being to whom it is solely, and properly applicable. *Spiritual* and *eternal life* is, then, *the life of God*, or *the divine nature*, and as wherever spiritual and eternal life is enjoyed by any creature, it must be in consequence of the divine nature being possessed by that creature,\* to maintain that such a life may terminate, or be forfeited, would be to maintain that the divine nature may come to an end, a proposition too absurd and extravagant to be for a single moment listened to. The indefeasibility of spiritual and eternal life may be shown likewise in another way. *Spiritual life* is that which proceeds from the *spirit of God*, or that which the *spirit of God* communicates, John iii. 6. and vi. 63. But as this spirit, which is also the spirit of Jesus, John xv. 26. and Gal. iv. 6, was unquestionably neither revealed nor bestowed *till after the fall*, therefore, nothing either proceeding from, or connected with the spirit, whether life, or knowledge, could have been forfeited *by the fall*. Besides if Adam, originally possessed the spirit, it must *have abode with him for ever* according to John xiv. 16, and must have produced in him love to God, and confidence in him, Galat. v. 22, 1 John iv. 8, 9, 10, 19, instead

\* That believers possess *the divine nature* is proved by 2 Peter i. 4.



of being productive of terror, as it clearly was, Genesis ii. 16, 17, compared with 1 John iv. 18. *Eternal life* stands exactly in the same predicament. There is no mention made of it in scripture, except in connexion with a state of things which succeeded the fall, nay, further, a state of things which was not introduced till the period of the Messiah. But independently of all this, the very phrase *eternal life* signifies *life that cannot terminate*; and, consequently, was not the life which Adam originally possessed, and which by his transgression he forfeited. It will not detract from the force of this remark to say, that at first he had eternal life, *conditionally* bestowed on him, for a *conditional eternity*, like a *conditional infinity* of any kind, is a perfect solecism in terms. Let it be supposed, however, for the sake of argument, that Adam did forfeit spiritual and eternal life, and the security of the people of God is at once completely subverted and overturned. For, as it is not pretended by any one, that believers, at the present day, possess more than spiritual and eternal life,—according to the supposition in question, they merely possess that which has been once already forfeited, and which, for aught they know, may be liable to be forfeited again. The mind, therefore, at once rejects the supposition. Thus, let the subject be viewed in whatever light we will, it appears clear, that spiritual and eternal life, if once possessed, cannot be forfeited, and that the notion of spiritual and eternal death is anomalous and absurd.

2. The hypothesis of Adam having incurred by the fall spiritual and eternal death, implying his previous possession of spiritual and eternal life, cannot be maintained without confounding the nature and character of Adam, with the nature and character of

the Lord Jesus. It is, as I have already shown, the express declaration of holy writ, Rom. v. 14, that *Adam was the type or figure of him that was to come*. The meaning of this phraseology is explained by the apostle, at considerable length, both in the immediate context and in the xvth of 1 Corinthians. From these passages taken in connexion with each other, and illustrated by the whole analogy of scripture, it appears that Adam, as the Lord of the old or natural creation, Gen. i. 28, was the type of Jesus as the Lord of the new, or spiritual creation, Ps. 8, with Matt. xxviii. 18, 1 Corinth. xv. 27, Coloss. i. 15, 16, 17, Heb. ii. 8—that Adam, as the head of a natural posterity, was the type of Jesus as the head of a spiritual posterity—that Adam, as the source of natural life, was the type of Jesus as the source of spiritual and eternal life—and that Adam, as having by his one transgression introduced death, was the type of Jesus as having by his one righteousness introduced the resurrection from the dead, Rom. v. 12 downwards, 1 Corinth. xv. throughout. Those who are desirous of tracing the analogy further, will find abundant matter for the gratification of their laudable curiosity, not merely in the passages referred to, but scattered throughout the pages of inspiration. But while Adam is uniformly represented as Christ's type, figure, image, or shadow, it never once entered into the minds of the apostles, or of the other sacred writers, to confound *the type* with *the antitype*. What, however, is the consequence of declaring Adam to have possessed spiritual and eternal life previous to his first transgression? Why, that if the Lord Jesus possessed no more than spiritual and eternal life, then instead of Adam being the type or figure of Jesus, the distinc-

tion between the type and the antitype is completely done away with, and the figure, and the thing figured or denoted thereby, are confounded with each other. Not so spoke and reasoned the apostle, when in 1 Corin. xv. 46, he declared *howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural* or animal *and afterward that which is spiritual*; and not so speaks and reasons any man, who is capable of comprehending the difference between *shadow* and *substance*, *figure* and *reality*, *type* and *antitype*. Every such person will at once scout the idea of Adam, at his creation, having possessed spiritual and eternal life, knowing that unless the life which he originally possessed had been merely natural, it could not have been the type or figure of, but strange as the expression may appear, must have been the same with another and a more glorious life, afterwards, and otherwise to be bestowed.

3. If Adam originally possessed spiritual and eternal life, and lost it by the fall, then is the Gospel represented as a mere remedial, or restorative scheme. It is impossible to gainsay this, for if, as is uniformly allowed, Jesus bestows spiritual and eternal life upon his people, and if Adam enjoyed this in his state of innocence, then Jesus merely restores what Adam lost. Nay without having recourse to inferences at all, proof positive of the view of the matter taken by divines, may be easily obtained from their ordinary and current phraseology. *The restoration of our primitive dignity and integrity by Jesus—our recovery by Jesus—our regaining through Jesus the divine image lost by Adam*—and many other expressions of similar import, abound in the pages of Calvin, and others distinguished in the walks of theological literature.

Little, alas! have such persons been aware of the gross manner in which they have misrepresented, nay, even libelled the divine character. To speak of God as *restoring any thing* is at once to impeach his wisdom. The necessity of reverting to original plans, or beginning anew any particular course of procedure, can only be accounted for and justified among mankind, on the ground of the limited nature of their faculties, and their constant liability to be thwarted in their best concerted schemes by unexpected and insurmountable obstacles. Nothing, however, could save the reputation of that man, for wisdom, whatever might be thought of his ingenuity, who without any pressing cause, and merely to shew the dexterity with which he could restore matters to their original footing, should involve himself and others in temporary difficulties and embarrassments. And yet this is the very part, which those who maintain that Adam lost spiritual and eternal life, and that it is recovered and restored by Jesus, represent God as acting, and the very character, which in the ignorance of their minds, they endeavour to fasten upon him. They exhibit him, either as foiled and disappointed in his expectations from Adam, thereby paying a miserable compliment to his foreknowledge, and reducing him to a level with his creatures; or as having so arranged and overruled his scheme of providence and grace, that—after the lapse of many thousand years, the appearance upon the stage of patriarchs, and prophets, and judges, and kings, and apostles, and martyrs, and confessors, and even of his own Son, and the occurrence of events the most extraordinary—the magnificent drama ends exactly where it began, Jesus merely restoring matters to

the same condition in which they were when Adam was created! Can this be true? Is God, with reverence be it spoken, to be represented as acting the part of a bungling artificer, who first mars his work and then mends it, or of a foolish eccentric tradesman, who destroys his whole stock of goods, merely to have the pleasure of replacing it with a stock in all respects similar? Is there not a something in every well regulated and reflecting mind, which revolts with abhorrence from such an idea? But the most surprising part of the matter is, that there is nothing on the face of the inspired records to warrant a view of the Supreme Being so false, calumnious, and blasphemous. In the scriptures, instead of going back and recommencing his work anew, as is commonly supposed, God appears advancing from one step, and one manifestation of his character to another, always and uninterruptedly going forward in his glorious career, and subordinating every event that happens, to the attainment of some ulterior object. Instead of permitting what is spiritual and eternal to be lost, that he may afterwards recover it, he employs the forfeiture of what is *natural*, *earthly*, and *inferior*, as the means of conferring what is *spiritual*, *heavenly*, and *superior*. He brings the natural creation state of Adam to an end, not that he may restore it, or any thing like it, but that by its termination, he may open up a way for the advancement of his people to a state spiritual and eternal. The fact is then, that the loss of what is *spiritual* is not followed by its recovery, but the loss of what is *natural* is the cause, by affording the opportunity of bestowing what is *spiritual*. Agreeably to this, says the apostle, *Sin hath reigned unto DEATH*, that *grace*

*might reign through righteousness unto ETERNAL LIFE by Jesus Christ our Lord*, or in other words, *the limited reign* of the one, is in God's adorable purpose and providence, subservient to *the unlimited reign* of the other. I am well aware that on some occasions, those who hold the restoration scheme, affect to speak of the state to which, through Jesus, believers in the gospel are exalted, as more glorious than that which Adam forfeited; but as this is merely one of the proofs, as well as consequences, of the inconsistency and self contradictoriness of their system, they must pardon me if I demur to allowing them the benefit of the concession, until that part of their system, which is inconsistent with it, shall have been abandoned. If they continue to maintain, that Adam *lost spiritual and eternal life*, and that through Jesus *spiritual and eternal life is again bestowed*, as in this case they continue to hold the *restoration* scheme, their concession amounts to nothing; on the other hand, if they perceive and hold in reality, that *the life which Jesus bestows* is infinitely more valuable than *that which Adam lost*, (as taught by common sense, independently of scripture altogether, they cannot fail to perceive) then to apply the term *restoration*, or any similar one, to a case like this, is a gross and palpable absurdity. If, therefore, they coincide in opinion with me, they must cease to be at variance with themselves. Let me observe further, before closing my remarks under this head, that it is not without reason, that I wage interminable war with the restoration scheme, for to it clearly falls to be traced the unscriptural and widely spread doctrine of the amendment and improvement of *human nature* by the belief of the truth, a doctrine which even the consciences of those

who hold it, if not blinded by pride and self conceit, might tell them to be false, as well as one which exposes religion and its professors, to the merited ridicule and suspicion of shrewd discerning worldly men. Human nature, as all who know the truth, are well aware, neither undergoes, nor is susceptible of any change—it continues in the believer exactly what it is in the unbeliever—the knowledge of God's character, which the former possesses, and which is a divine principle, being able indeed to subdue and control, but in no respect whatever to alter or modify it.

The only way in which even an attempt can be made to overturn the force and validity of the preceding argument, is by alleging, that although *death* does ordinarily signify *the loss of life*, *eternal death* does not imply *the loss of eternal life*, but *eternal punishment*. In adverting to this cavil, for in reality it is no more, I shall be obliged to anticipate some of the statements and reasonings, which I shall have occasion to introduce and insist upon afterwards, but as it is continually in the mouths of those who advocate the unscriptural system which I am opposing, and appears to be regarded by them, as one of the strongholds of their cause, it becomes necessary for me, even in this present stage of matters, to dispose of it. I observe then, that the man who holds the doctrine of *eternal* or *everlasting death*, and maintains that there is implied in the phrase, *everlasting punishment*, or *the everlasting loss of God's favour*, and *endurance of his displeasure*, in a state of existence succeeding the present, brings himself under certain obligations, and must satisfactorily answer certain queries. 1. He must prove that the phrase *eternal*, or *everlasting death* occurs

in scripture\*. 2. Supposing it to be found he must prove by the same infallible authority, that *eternal death*, is declared to be synonymous with *eternal punishment*. 3. As upon the hypothesis in question, persons who are to be *everlastingly punished* in a future state, must be *everlastingly alive* to undergo that punishment, how is it that they can be said to be *everlastingly dead* and *everlastingly alive* at one and the same time? And what authority is there in scripture for such a monstrous supposition? 4. Is eternal life spoken of in the sacred writings except in connexion with, and as the privilege of God's people? 5. If, with a view to extricate himself from the dilemma, he shall be pleased to allege, that *everlasting existence* and *everlasting life* are two distinct things, he is respectfully asked, what foundation there is in scripture, common sense, or the ordinary use of language, for such a distinction? 6. If constrained by the irresistible force of truth, he shall admit that *life*, and *existence*

\* The celebrated critic and commentator, Dr. Macknight, in his notes on Rom. vi. 23, after having decided with considerable *force of words*, at least, "that the death which is the wages of sin *must be* eternal," is compelled to make the following rather curious admission, "It is observable that although in scripture the expression eternal life is often to be met with, *we nowhere find eternal joined with death.*" Why truly it would be wonderful if we should. Were such an expression, or even such an idea, to be found in the writings of the inspired penmen, it would be better to infidels than a score of their ordinary arguments, for, (I speak reverently,) it would convict the Holy Ghost of having uttered arrant nonsense. *Eternal life*, as every person whose mind has not been vitiated and sophisticated by school divinity knows, is *life that cannot end or cannot be lost*, and, therefore, as *eternal death*, if it has any meaning at all, must signify *the loss of eternal life*, it is like every other contradiction in terms entirely out of the question. Curiously enough, in his comment on the same verse, the learned Dr. without any authority, as appears by his own admission, says, "*For the wages*, which sin gives to its slaves *is eternal death.*" I thought that the Dr. would at least have been consistent with himself, in his commentary on Rom. v. 21, but on turning to it, I discovered, to my great surprise, the following paraphrase, "*that as sin*, both original and actual, *hath tyrannised* over mankind *by* introducing and continuing *death* in the world, with its train of sorrows and miseries," &c.



are synonymous terms, he is asked, how it is that if God bestowed eternal life upon Adam, our progenitor could lose it—or if he did not lose it, what it is we are indebted for to the Lord Jesus, for, according to this latter alternative, we derive eternal life from Adam, not from Jesus, 7. If *eternal death*, that is *eternal punishment* was incurred by Adam, and his natural posterity, it is asked, upon what principle, consistently with the veracity of the Supreme Being, Adam and his posterity can escape that punishment? As soon as the foregoing obligations and queries shall have been satisfactorily discharged and answered, but not till then, I will frankly admit, that the objection to my statement, of *death* always in scripture signifying *the loss of life*, derived from the alleged fact, of *eternal death* signifying *eternal punishment*, does not deserve the appellation of a cavil. Since I am treating of this subject, I would just remark further, by the way, that the phrase *spiritual death* stands in the same predicament with *eternal death*, having no existence that I have yet been able to discover, except in the writings and reasonings of divines.—But of this hereafter.

In the second place. Another objection, to the ordinary doctrine, of Adam having died spiritually and eternally in consequence of his first transgression, is thus stated. The death which Adam *actually incurred* by the fall must have been exactly commensurate, or of the same extent, with the death *previously threatened*. It is impossible for any person to dispute this plain and self-evident proposition, without being prepared to maintain the monstrous anomaly in judicial procedure, that a different and a severer punishment may, by the sentence of a court, be inflicted than the laws have previously sanctioned and denounced, and

without bringing a stain upon the veracity of God. If, therefore, spiritual and eternal death was the result of Adam's disobedience, it was so, because spiritual and eternal death was the import of the menace or threatening previously held out to him. That threat, however, cannot have implied so much for the following reasons.

1. No such meaning appears on the face of the record itself. I must here enter my solemn and decided protest against all assumptions in this matter. The notion of spiritual and eternal death having been the amount of God's threatening to Adam, if not proved, either from the Mosaic narrative itself, or from some other source of equal and infallible authority, falls at once to the ground. I have already shown, from an examination of the meaning of Genesis ii. 7, that the life conferred on Adam, as he came from the hands of God was *life connected with breathing, or such a life as we now possess*, and a few verses further down I find Adam threatened eventually with death, or the loss of life; now as there is no other kind of life, besides that originally conferred, treated of in the intermediate verses, I am obliged to conclude, that *the death threatened* was the loss of *the life possessed*, unless I can bring myself to suppose, either, on the one hand, that a creature may lose more than it has, or, on the other, that the Supreme Being is chargeable with deceit, employing terms which denote one thing, when in reality he is speaking of another. Both these suppositions being inadmissible, I cannot help understanding the terms life, and death, in Genesis ii. 7. 17, in their plain, obvious, and literal signification, and relation to each other, the former as denoting an existence such as we now have, and the latter, the loss or forfeiture of it.

2. The threat in Genesis ii. 17, cannot imply spiritual and eternal death, because Adam, in his creation state, was incapable of understanding it in this sense. The force of my present argument lies in this, that it is inconsistent with every idea of justice to regard those who are unable to apprehend the import of a prohibition as amenable to punishment for violating it. No man, and no legislature, in the exercise of a sound and discreet authority, ever attempted to inflict punishment upon individuals who were ignorant of the demerit of their conduct. From this plain and incontrovertible fact, I am clearly entitled to argue, that unless Adam, in his creation state, was capable of comprehending what was meant by spiritual and eternal death, it is impossible, without violating all our notions of justice, and without casting a most injurious reflection upon the Supreme Being, to suppose spiritual and eternal death to have been the import of the threat in Genesis ii. 17. Here let me put it to any man of common sense and common honesty, believing in the truth of scripture, if with the utmost stretch and license of imagination, he can suppose, that Adam, previous to the fall, was able to apprehend in any measure, or degree, the meaning of terms so complex, sophistical, and metaphysical, as *spiritual and eternal death*? If any shall be fool-hardy enough, in the face of this appeal to their understandings, and consciences, to answer in the affirmative, grounding their answer, perhaps, on an alleged intimate communion with God, which they are pleased gratuitously to ascribe to Adam, in his state of innocence, I then inquire how they contrive to reconcile this notion of theirs with the Mosaic narrative, and the analogy of scripture? When I turn to Gen. iii. 1—7 I find that Adam had no knowledge

of evil, or sin, previous to the fall, all his acquaintance with it having been derived from the fall itself—but as upon the principles, and by the showing of our adversaries, an acquaintance with the nature, magnitude, and demerit of evil is requisite to the understanding of spiritual and eternal death—how was it possible for Adam, in his state of purity and innocence, to speculate concerning that, of which, as the Holy Ghost informs us, he was entirely ignorant? Besides, in what part of scripture is communion with God ascribed to Adam, or even to Old Testament saints? From 2 Corinth. xiii. 14, compared with John xiv. 16, &c. and 1 John i. 3, it appears, that this communion is a privilege confined to New Testament believers, and enjoyed by them, in virtue of their connexion with the Lord Jesus. As it thus appears, that Adam, in his creation state, was ignorant of evil, and incapable, consequently, of understanding the import of spiritual and eternal death, it follows, that spiritual and eternal death was not implied in the menace, Genesis ii. 17, and was not the death which by his disobedience he incurred.

In the third place. My last objection to the notion of spiritual and eternal death being the amount of the punishment with which Adam was menaced, and which he incurred, is exactly the converse of the preceding one, and requires only to be stated in order to carry home conviction to every candid, considerate, and unprejudiced mind. If spiritual and eternal death was threatened to Adam, and incurred by him, for himself and his posterity, then either spiritual and eternal death is executed upon him and them, or the Supreme Being stands convicted of falsehood. As spiritual and eternal death, according to those who espouse the dogma, signifies *eternal exclusion from God's presence*,

*and the eternal endurance of his displeasure, in a future state of existence*, how, I ask, in the event of the whole human race having rendered themselves obnoxious to this dreadful doom, can the execution of it—and executed it must be if God be true—be reconciled with the fact of any of them enjoying happiness hereafter? I should like to know on what principles, and in what way, the supporters of the hypothesis which I am now engaged in confuting, will be able to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which this question involves them.

It will not serve their purpose to have recourse to the doctrine of the atonement, and say, that God has received from the Lord Jesus an equivalent for the everlasting misery of the righteous, because this explanation, besides leaving God under the charge of not having executed what he threatened, leaves also unexplained and unaccounted for, the fact of natural death being still inflicted. When it is alleged, that the punishment due to the transgressions of God's people, has been completely laid upon and undergone by their exalted head, a plain, and unlettered, but sensible man, will be apt to propose the pinching and puzzling query, why then are they, in common with the rest of the human race, still exposed to the stroke of death? You acknowledge, he may add, that natural, or temporal death, is at least *a part of* the punishment deserved by sin, for your language is, that *Adam, by the fall, incurred death temporal, spiritual, and eternal*, why then does that, or any part of the punishment remain, when, according to your own statement, sin has been atoned for, or in other words, the punishment due to it has been undergone? Were it to be alleged, in order to parry this home thrust, that the

temporal death of believers is no longer a punishment, but is by the death of Jesus converted into a blessing, those who should attempt this evasion would at once involve themselves in the following difficulties. 1. Self-contradiction, for, by their own admission, temporal death is at least a part of the punishment incurred by Adam. 2. In what is called a *petitio principii*, or in English, *a begging of the question*, for, when they say that temporal death is no longer a curse or punishment, but a blessing, they are guilty of assuming the very thing to be proved. 3. In contradiction of scripture, for it declares broadly, and explicitly, that death is at once *the boundary of sin's reign*, and *sin's wages*; Rom. v. 21, and vi. 23. Do our antagonists still refuse to surrender—in that case, close at their heels, let us track them to their last lurking-place, and observe the shifts to which they have recourse to keep us a little longer at bay. “Jesus,” they may say, “has made atonement for the spiritual and eternal part of the punishment due to sin, but the temporal part of it still remains to be endured.” This distinction I flatly deny, and demand to have pointed out to me, the scriptural authority upon which it rests. Will our opponents venture to say, that a single passage can be produced from the sacred writings in which it is laid down, or do they expect us to receive it out of deference to their own lordly and magisterial assertions? Nay, laying scripture out of the question altogether, and viewing the matter in the light of plain common sense, what can be thought of a hypothesis which pretends so nicely to mete out and adjust the deserts of sin, as to assign such of them as are spiritual and eternal to God's Son, and such of them as are temporal to his people? Does not the metaphysical

subtily, or rather, the arrant nonsense to which the advocates of the system find themselves obliged to have recourse, throw an air of suspicion over the whole in the eyes even of the most careless and superficial ?

To the objection now urged against the ordinary doctrine of Adam and his posterity having incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural death, by the fall, the force of which objection every candid mind must admit, the view which I hold, and which I have endeavoured by so many strong and substantial arguments to support, is in no respect whatever obnoxious. The sum of my present reasonings is, that *whatever God threatens he executes*. When he menaced Adam with death, he menaced him with that, which, in case of transgression, he intended to carry into full and irremediable effect. Is not this clearly established by the result ? Sin has been committed—the loss of this present life has been incurred—and this loss has been, and will, to the end of time, continue to be sustained by every individual of Adam's posterity. But if spiritual and eternal death had been the amount of the threatening, how could it have been executed consistently with the future happiness of any of the human race ? Which of the two systems then deserves the preference—that which represents God as threatening what he does not actually execute—or that which shows his veracity to be as untainted in the execution of his threatenings as in the fulfilment of his promises ?

Such then, briefly, but I hope intelligibly and conclusively stated, are my leading objections to the ordinary doctrine, of Adam, by the fall, having incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural death. *Spiritual and eternal death implies an impossibility—*

*God can execute only what he threatens—and what he threatens he behoves to execute.* Perhaps, in other words, the whole of the preceding arguments may be thus summed up, and stated—Adam was threatened, in the event of transgression, with the loss of *all that he possessed*, but it was impossible for him to lose *more than he possessed*. My answer to the first question proposed—that natural death, meaning thereby the loss of this present life, was the amount, and the whole amount of the forfeiture, or punishment incurred by Adam, in consequence of his original transgression—so far from being invalidated stands thus confirmed and established, by a consideration and examination of all the reasonings that can be adduced, both in opposition to it, and in opposition to the theory commonly maintained. But as there still remain, one or two ways, in which my antagonists may endeavour to turn aside the force of the remarks already made, it may be proper to bestow a little passing attention upon these, before proceeding to the second question.

1. It may be alleged, that although Adam, according to the hypothesis in question, was possessed of spiritual and eternal life, previous to the fall, the words *spiritual* and *eternal*, when applied to him, are used in a sense different from that in which they are applied to the Lord Jesus. In what different sense pray? As signifying that which, throughout the whole of these reasonings, I have expressed by the term *natural*? If this were admitted, who does not perceive, that it would be, on the part of my opponents, a virtual, and yet entire abandonment of their cause? That it would be equivalent to an admission of the correctness of my statements, with regard to the life which Adam originally possessed, and by transgression forfeited, as well



as of the blundering and absurd character of the ordinary system? But perhaps it is not the intention of those who are supposed to make the above concession, to admit the accuracy of my statements. In what sense then, I again ask, do they allow a difference between the application of the terms *spiritual* and *eternal* to Adam and to Jesus? Will they venture to assert, that there is a nature intermediate between the *creaturely* nature of the former, and the *divine* nature of the latter? If so, in what part of scripture is it revealed? If not, in what other sense can they hold the difference in question, except in that, in which the apostle Paul states it, 1 Cor. xv. 45—49. viz, the difference between what is *natural*, or *animal*, and what is *spiritual*, the very difference for which I have all along contended? Let me then, for the sake of argument, allow my opponents the benefit of meaning by *spiritual* and *eternal life*, as enjoyed by Adam previous to the fall, no more than I myself mean, by the employment of a different, and a more correct phraseology, even then, I must protest, in the most decided manner, against the idea of scripture lending the slightest sanction, or countenance, to so dreadful a perversion, and misapplication of terms, as that of which they are guilty. So far indeed from this being the case, in all those parts of the sacred writings, where Adam and Jesus are treated of, and contrasted, the utmost care is taken to distinguish between the former as a *creature*, and the latter as *the creator*—between the former as the source of all that is *natural*, and the latter as the source of all that is *spiritual* and *eternal*. There is no such thing in the Bible as the application of the phrases *spiritual*, and *eternal*, to the life which Adam possessed previous to the fall. Let it be understood then, that if my

opponents feel any inclination to abandon their unscriptural notions concerning the life forfeited by Adam, in order to take off from their concession the aspect of duplicity, and to render it of any value, they must likewise consent to abandon the ambiguous, unscriptural, and inappropriate language by which they have been accustomed hitherto to express these notions.

2. I may be asked, is it not positively declared in scripture, that men as they come into the world, are *dead in trespasses and sins*, Ephesians ii. 1, and does not this, upon your own principle of death implying the loss of life, signify that they are *spiritually dead*? Without inquiring into, or discussing the exact meaning and merits of the passage quoted, and assuming it, as my antagonists imagine, to be applicable to the natural state of the whole Gentile world, I observe, that upon the system which I advocate, any apparent difficulty that may be involved in it is with the utmost ease disposed of. It must be abundantly clear, even to the most superficial thinker, that a man may be *destitute*, or *in want of* that, to which he is not *dead*, or which he has not *lost*. I am *destitute* of kingly power, and of the rank of nobility in Great Britain, but I am certainly not *dead* either to the one or to the other, because I have *lost* neither. Let the foregoing plain remark and illustration be applied to the case and circumstances of mankind naturally. As *death* uniformly implies *loss*, I can perceive that the whole human race are *dead* to the creature purity, and other advantages, which their first progenitor enjoyed while in the *Garden of Eden*, for these they *lost* in him—but *dead* to spiritual and eternal life they cannot be, for as it has been, I trust, satisfactorily proved, that Adam did not originally *possess* it, so neither could he *lose* it. It

is not denied, that, as Adam's descendants, mankind are naturally *destitute* of spiritual and eternal life, as Adam himself was previous to the fall, and that they must continue *destitute* of it, until, or unless God, in the course of his adorable providence, shall be pleased to bestow it upon them; but who sees not, after the explanation just given, that to be *destitute* of spiritual and eternal life is a very different thing from being *dead* to it? This then, is the plain state of the case, (as we gather it from the inspired records themselves,) that we come into the world *dead* to Adam's original creature purity, and *destitute* of any higher principle. Of course, on the supposition of the passage in Ephesians, being applicable to the natural state and circumstances of the Gentile world, or of mankind in general, it cannot signify that they are *spiritually dead*, but that they have *lost* certain *natural* privileges, and advantages, which were once possessed. \*

II. I now advance to the consideration of the second question proposed—

What is the cause of the resurrection of the dead?

Here I remark, that the resurrection of the dead is assumed as a fact which cannot be controverted by those who give credit to the testimony of scripture. If any person chooses to call it in question, of course he has no more ado with my arguments than he has with the inspired writings themselves.

It is proper also to remark, that throughout the present inquiry, I do not forget, that the grand *origi-*

\*As my argument is sufficiently strong without it, I have here abstained from insisting upon the fact, that *spiritual death*—like *eternal death*, and *dead to God*—is a mode of speech never to be met with in the sacred writings.

*nating* cause of the resurrection from the dead, as well as of every other phenomenon natural and spiritual, is *the will of the Supreme Being*. The matter now to be investigated, however, is, what is the *proximate instrumental* or *immediate* cause of the resurrection, or in perhaps plainer language, what is the *medium*, or *channel*, through which God accomplishes his purpose, that the dead shall rise again? This inquiry resolves itself into two points. First. Do the dead rise again in virtue of a connexion with Adam, or the Lord Jesus? Secondly. If in virtue of a connexion with the latter, in what particular way is this glorious consummation accomplished?

First. In answer to the former of these questions I deny in the most marked and positive terms, that the resurrection of the dead is the result of, or in any respect whatever to be ascribed to the connexion subsisting between mankind and the first Adam. This denial it will not be difficult to substantiate by a great variety of arguments. Let the following suffice:

1. Adam, both in the Old and New Testaments, is uniformly represented and spoken of, as the author and source of *death*. This is the leading feature or circumstance, by which he is distinguished from the Lord Jesus, and one which the inspired writers, in a variety of ways insist upon and illustrate. On the other hand, there is not a single sentence or passage, in the sacred records, in which the resurrection of the dead, either in one point of view or another, is directly or indirectly ascribed to Adam. Indeed what ground would there have been for instituting a contrast between Adam and Jesus, as is done by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, and his

first Epistle to the Corinthians, if the former, by being the author of the resurrection, had been the author of *life*, as well as of *death* ? This whole matter is so obvious, that I should consider myself guilty, not only of abusing the time and patience of my readers, but of insulting their understandings, were I to insist upon it further. Those who are desirous to see the argument in its full force should consult Rom. v. 12. to the end, and 1 Corinth. xv. throughout.

2. As it is to eternal life, or immortality, that, by the admission of all, the dead are raised, if eternal life, or immortality, be the divine nature, it will obviously follow, that Adam cannot be the source, origin, or author of the resurrection of the dead, without being also the source, origin, or author, of the divine nature. That *eternal life* is the life of God, or the divine nature, will only be disputed by him who has never reflected on the meaning of the terms, or who is capable of comprehending a distinction between *eternal existence* and *eternal life*, which I confess I am not. That *immortality* is the life of God, or the divine nature, and consequently of synonymous import with *eternal life*, is equally obvious, besides being the express declaration of scripture, 1 Timothy vi. 16, where speaking of God, the inspired writer lays it down as an incontrovertible position, that *he only hath immortality*. To possess *eternal life*, or *immortality*, is then to possess the divine nature, and when God bestows eternal life, or immortality upon any creature, it is clear that he bestows upon that creature his own existence, or makes it one with himself. If then Adam, by being the author of the resurrection, transmits to his posterity eternal life, or immortality, as he thus transmits to them the *divine nature*, the following consequences

ensue. 1. He appears in a totally different character from that in which scripture exhibits him, viz, as the source or author of *human nature* only. 2. The whole work and undertaking of the Lord Jesus is superseded and rendered nugatory, and he is represented as having come into this world, on a bootless errand, for if Adam bestows *divine*, as well as *human nature*, what is left for the Lord Jesus to bestow? 3. As Adam was but a creature, and as eternal life is the life of the Creator, if Adam is the source of eternal life, or immortality, we have *the creature* transmitting to his posterity what is *uncreated* and *divine*! But enough. Such monstrous consequences cannot be admitted, and Adam therefore, cannot be the author or source of the resurrection.

3. If the resurrection of the dead take place in virtue of any connexion subsisting between mankind and Adam, the declarations of the Lord Jesus concerning himself are expressly contradicted. This is so clear and obvious, that my only difficulty, amidst the rich abundance of proofs and illustrations that present themselves to my notice, is to make a selection of a few. Jesus declares himself to be the author and source of *eternal life*, in these memorable words, *My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give unto them eternal life*, John x. 27, 28. Also in his intercessory prayer, *As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life*, &c. John 17. 2. See also the following passages: John iii. 15, iv. 14, v. 26. 39, vi. throughout, particularly verses 27. 35. 40. 47. 48. 50. 51. 53—58. 68, x. 10, xiv. 19. Jesus likewise declares himself to be the author *of the resurrection*, in language which cannot be misinterpreted or misunderstood. I am the

*resurrection and the life*, John xi. 25. 26. See also John v. 25—29, vi. 39. 40. 44. 54. &c. If the resurrection of the dead, or the possession of immortality by the human race sprung from their connexion with Adam, would it not demonstrate the whole of these statements and declarations to be false and delusive ?

Thus then do I prove my first position, *that the dead rise again, not in virtue of any connexion subsisting between the human race and Adam, but solely in virtue of a connexion with the Lord Jesus*, by a direct appeal to scripture itself, without having recourse to conclusions already established when discussing the first question proposed. I was certainly, and fairly entitled, by all the rules of dialectics, to have availed myself of these conclusions, as the basis and principles of ulterior reasonings, but in declining the use of them hitherto, I wanted to show, that I was completely independent of them. Let me now, however, assume it as demonstrated, which, I am satisfied it is, that the life originally conferred on Adam, as the head of his natural posterity, was a creature life only, then I ask, how it was possible that he, who himself had but a *creature existence here*, could be the author or source of the resurrection of the dead, to *an uncreated and immortal existence hereafter* ? Can any being confer upon another *more* than he himself possesses ? Can any creature communicate by generation to its posterity, a nature different from or superior to its own ? Nay, let me take up my antagonists even upon their own principles. Adam, according to them, although originally possessed of spiritual and eternal life, forfeited it by his *one* transgression. Suppose that, for the sake of argument, I accede to all this, what then follows ? Why *that Adam after losing spiritual and*

*eternal life, had not spiritual and eternal life to bestow.* His children having been begotten posterior to the fall, that is after the forfeiture of what he originally possessed, could not derive from their parent, that of which, by their own showing, he was already utterly despoiled. If he had ceased to be *spiritually and eternally alive himself* he could not impart *spiritual and eternal life to others.* How is it possible for this argument to be legitimately got over, or even controverted? Thus then stands the matter. Adam must be supposed to have been immortal himself, or possessed of the divine nature, 1 Tim. vi. 16, even posterior to the fall, at the expense of all the self-contradictions and absurdities in which the supporters of such a hypothesis would land themselves, before he can be supposed to be the source of immortality to his descendants. But, as it has been proved that the life which Adam, even in his state of innocence possessed, was but *the life of a creature, or a life connected with breathing*—and as it is admitted by our opponents, that the spiritual and eternal life which they are so fond of ascribing to him, while he continued obedient, had been forfeited by him, before any of his posterity were begotten—it therefore incontestibly follows, that Adam might be to his posterity the source of a life similar to that which he himself possessed, and also the occasion of that life being forfeited, but the source of immortality, or the resurrection of the dead to eternal life, it was absolutely impossible that he could be.

Perhaps, in the opinion of some, particularly of that numerous class of *thinkers*, who, content with viewing the surface of things, never trouble themselves about consequences, I have laboured the preceding point too much, and have indulged in a useless display of



subtily, or rather, the arrant nonsense to which the advocates of the system find themselves obliged to have recourse, throw an air of suspicion over the whole in the eyes even of the most careless and superficial ?

To the objection now urged against the ordinary doctrine of Adam and his posterity having incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural death, by the fall, the force of which objection every candid mind must admit, the view which I hold, and which I have endeavoured by so many strong and substantial arguments to support, is in no respect whatever obnoxious. The sum of my present reasonings is, that *whatever God threatens he executes*. When he menaced Adam with death, he menaced him with that, which, in case of transgression, he intended to carry into full and irremediable effect. Is not this clearly established by the result ? Sin has been committed—the loss of this present life has been incurred—and this loss has been, and will, to the end of time, continue to be sustained by every individual of Adam's posterity. But if spiritual and eternal death had been the amount of the threatening, how could it have been executed consistently with the future happiness of any of the human race ? Which of the two systems then deserves the preference—that which represents God as threatening what he does not actually execute—or that which shows his veracity to be as untainted in the execution of his threatenings as in the fulfilment of his promises ?

Such then, briefly, but I hope intelligibly and conclusively stated, are my leading objections to the ordinary doctrine, of Adam, by the fall, having incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural death. *Spiritual and eternal death implies an impossibility—*

*God can execute only what he threatens—and what he threatens he behoves to execute.* Perhaps, in other words, the whole of the preceding arguments may be thus summed up, and stated—Adam was threatened, in the event of transgression, with the loss of *all that he possessed*, but it was impossible for him to lose *more than he possessed*. My answer to the first question proposed—that natural death, meaning thereby the loss of this present life, was the amount, and the whole amount of the forfeiture, or punishment incurred by Adam, in consequence of his original transgression—so far from being invalidated stands thus confirmed and established, by a consideration and examination of all the reasonings that can be adduced, both in opposition to it, and in opposition to the theory commonly maintained. But as there still remain, one or two ways, in which my antagonists may endeavour to turn aside the force of the remarks already made, it may be proper to bestow a little passing attention upon these, before proceeding to the second question.

1. It may be alleged, that although Adam, according to the hypothesis in question, was possessed of spiritual and eternal life, previous to the fall, the words *spiritual* and *eternal*, when applied to him, are used in a sense different from that in which they are applied to the Lord Jesus. In what different sense pray? As signifying that which, throughout the whole of these reasonings, I have expressed by the term *natural*? If this were admitted, who does not perceive, that it would be, on the part of my opponents, a virtual, and yet entire abandonment of their cause? That it would be equivalent to an admission of the correctness of my statements, with regard to the life which Adam originally possessed, and by transgression forfeited, as well

as of the blundering and absurd character of the ordinary system? But perhaps it is not the intention of those who are supposed to make the above concession, to admit the accuracy of my statements. In what sense then, I again ask, do they allow a difference between the application of the terms *spiritual* and *eternal* to Adam and to Jesus? Will they venture to assert, that there is a nature intermediate between the *creaturely* nature of the former, and the *divine* nature of the latter? If so, in what part of scripture is it revealed? If not, in what other sense can they hold the difference in question, except in that, in which the apostle Paul states it, 1 Cor. xv. 45—49. viz, the difference between what is *natural*, or *animal*, and what is *spiritual*, the very difference for which I have all along contended? Let me then, for the sake of argument, allow my opponents the benefit of meaning by *spiritual* and *eternal life*, as enjoyed by Adam previous to the fall, no more than I myself mean, by the employment of a different, and a more correct phraseology, even then, I must protest, in the most decided manner, against the idea of scripture lending the slightest sanction, or countenance, to so dreadful a perversion, and misapplication of terms, as that of which they are guilty. So far indeed from this being the case, in all those parts of the sacred writings, where Adam and Jesus are treated of, and contrasted, the utmost care is taken to distinguish between the former as a *creature*, and the latter as *the creator*—between the former as the source of all that is *natural*, and the latter as the source of all that is *spiritual* and *eternal*. There is no such thing in the Bible as the application of the phrases *spiritual*, and *eternal*, to the life which Adam possessed previous to the fall. Let it be understood then, that if my

opponents feel any inclination to abandon their unscriptural notions concerning the life forfeited by Adam, in order to take off from their concession the aspect of duplicity, and to render it of any value, they must likewise consent to abandon the ambiguous, unscriptural, and inappropriate language by which they have been accustomed hitherto to express these notions.

2. I may be asked, is it not positively declared in scripture, that men as they come into the world, are *dead in trespasses and sins*, Ephesians ii. 1, and does not this, upon your own principle of death implying the loss of life, signify that they are *spiritually dead*? Without inquiring into, or discussing the exact meaning and merits of the passage quoted, and assuming it, as my antagonists imagine, to be applicable to the natural state of the whole Gentile world, I observe, that upon the system which I advocate, any apparent difficulty that may be involved in it is with the utmost ease disposed of. It must be abundantly clear, even to the most superficial thinker, that a man may be *destitute*, or *in want of* that, to which he is not *dead*, or which he has not *lost*. I am *destitute* of kingly power, and of the rank of nobility in Great Britain, but I am certainly not *dead* either to the one or to the other, because I have *lost* neither. Let the foregoing plain remark and illustration be applied to the case and circumstances of mankind naturally. As *death* uniformly implies *loss*, I can perceive that the whole human race are *dead* to the creature purity, and other advantages, which their first progenitor enjoyed while in the *Garden of Eden*, for these they *lost* in him—but *dead* to spiritual and eternal life they cannot be, for as it has been, I trust, satisfactorily proved, that Adam did not originally *possess* it, so neither could he *lose* it. It

is not denied, that, as Adam's descendants, mankind are naturally *destitute* of spiritual and eternal life, as Adam himself was previous to the fall, and that they must continue *destitute* of it, until, or unless God, in the course of his adorable providence, shall be pleased to bestow it upon them; but who sees not, after the explanation just given, that to be *destitute* of spiritual and eternal life is a very different thing from being *dead* to it? This then, is the plain state of the case, (as we gather it from the inspired records themselves,) that we come into the world *dead* to Adam's original creature purity, and *destitute* of any higher principle. Of course, on the supposition of the passage in Ephesians, being applicable to the natural state and circumstances of the Gentile world, or of mankind in general, it cannot signify that they are *spiritually dead*, but that they have *lost* certain *natural* privileges, and advantages, which were once possessed. \*

II. I now advance to the consideration of the second question proposed—

What is the cause of the resurrection of the dead?

Here I remark, that the resurrection of the dead is assumed as a fact which cannot be controverted by those who give credit to the testimony of scripture. If any person chooses to call it in question, of course he has no more ado with my arguments than he has with the inspired writings themselves.

It is proper also to remark, that throughout the present inquiry, I do not forget, that the grand *origi-*

\*As my argument is sufficiently strong without it, I have here abstained from insisting upon the fact, that *spiritual death*—like *eternal death*, and *dead to God*—is a mode of speech never to be met with in the sacred writings.

*nating* cause of the resurrection from the dead, as well as of every other phenomenon natural and spiritual, is *the will of the Supreme Being*. The matter now to be investigated, however, is, what is the *proximate instrumental* or *immediate* cause of the resurrection, or in perhaps plainer language, what is the *medium*, or *channel*, through which God accomplishes his purpose, that the dead shall rise again? This inquiry resolves itself into two points. First. Do the dead rise again in virtue of a connexion with Adam, or the Lord Jesus? Secondly. If in virtue of a connexion with the latter, in what particular way is this glorious consummation accomplished?

First. In answer to the former of these questions I deny in the most marked and positive terms, that the resurrection of the dead is the result of, or in any respect whatever to be ascribed to the connexion subsisting between mankind and the first Adam. This denial it will not be difficult to substantiate by a great variety of arguments. Let the following suffice:

1. Adam, both in the Old and New Testaments, is uniformly represented and spoken of, as the author and source of *death*. This is the leading feature or circumstance, by which he is distinguished from the Lord Jesus, and one which the inspired writers, in a variety of ways insist upon and illustrate. On the other hand, there is not a single sentence or passage, in the sacred records, in which the resurrection of the dead, either in one point of view or another, is directly or indirectly ascribed to Adam. Indeed what ground would there have been for instituting a contrast between Adam and Jesus, as is done by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, and his

the Gospel, and that is, that the Lord Jesus during his personal ministry speaks more frequently, and with more distinctness, of the resurrection of the dead being derived from *himself in general*, than of its being derived from *his own resurrection in particular*. This is easily accounted for. By turning to John xx. 9, we discover, that the resurrection of Jesus himself was not understood by his disciples, notwithstanding all the hints of it which he had given them, until after that event had taken place. From this it obviously results, that, except in an obscure and indirect way, it was impossible for the Lord Jesus, during his personal ministry, to allude to any connexion subsisting between the resurrection of the dead, and an event of which his disciples knew nothing.

2dly. When, from the Evangelists, we proceed to the Acts of the Apostles, we find, that as soon as the Lord Jesus had ascended on high, and had, by the outpouring of his Spirit, given his disciples to understand the import and significancy of his resurrection, they began to speak out, boldly and distinctly connecting that event with the resurrection of the dead. What was it that stirred up the resentment of the Sadducees against the Apostles? Acts iv. 2. It was not surely their preaching the resurrection of the dead, for in so far as respected that doctrine, the Pharisees held it as firmly and maintained it as strenuously as the Apostles themselves did, but it was that the latter preached it *through Jesus*, that is, as appears from the context, ascribed it, as well as all the miracles which they performed, to *the power of his resurrection*. What was it that induced Paul in the presence of the Jewish High Priest and Council, Acts xxiii. 6. to declare, that *he was a Pharisee, the*

son of a Pharisee, and that, of the hope and resurrection of the dead he was called in question, and afterwards before Felix, Acts xxiv. 14. 15, to reiterate a similar declaration? Why, evidently to suggest to their minds, that the true ground of his difference with them respected not *the resurrection of the dead*, but *the cause of that event*, and to show them, that by denying the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, they subverted the foundation of the very doctrine which they professed to hold. In one word, it is only by understanding the fact, that the apostles preached the resurrection of the Lord Jesus as the cause of the resurrection of the dead, as well as of all the miracles which they wrought in his name, that we can understand such passages as Acts iv. 33, *with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus*, or see what peculiar emphasis and importance attach to that event.

3dly. If any doubt remain with regard to this subject, it will be effectually and completely removed, by a reference to the Epistles. From a variety of proofs I select the following. In Romans viii. 11, the argument of the Apostle connects together inseparably, Christ's resurrection and the resurrection of the dead. *If the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you.* The exertion of divine power, in the one case, being thus represented as a medium, or channel through which it is necessarily exerted in the other, what language almost could express more strongly the fact, that the one effect is the cause, the *instrumental cause* if the term be preferred, but still the cause of the other. But the matter is set at rest by a perusal



of Corinthians xv. from the 12th. verse to the 23d. In this remarkable passage the Apostle shows, by a train of reasoning which it is impossible to misapprehend, and which, as inspired, it is impossible to controvert, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is necessarily and inseparably connected with, and followed by, the resurrection of the dead, the only sense in which, as I have already stated, I contend for the one event being the cause of the other. To the passage itself, which is rather too long for insertion here, I refer the inquiring reader. He will there find the Apostle, first proving *negatively*, that if the dead do not rise, it is virtually a denial of the Lord Jesus himself having risen, and then maintaining *positively*, that the Lord Jesus having risen, has thereby *become the first fruits of them that slept*. In the prosecution of this latter part of his argument, the inspired writer observes, *since by man (Adam) came (or was) death, by man (Jesus) came also (or was also) the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive*. Can such language, can such reasonings be perverted or misunderstood? If it is not their scope to show, that Christ, not Adam, is the source, author, or cause of the resurrection, and this, through the medium of his own resurrection, I know not what phraseology could have been devised to express it more plainly.

Thus have I, it is hoped, proved satisfactorily, to every person actuated solely and simply by a regard to the testimony of the *Most High*, that the dead rise again, not in virtue of any connexion which they have with the first Adam, but of that which they have with the second, and that the resurrection of the Lord

Jesus is the cause of the resurrection. Indeed where lies, or in what way is exhibited, that *power* which the apostle ascribes to *the resurrection of Jesus*, Phil. iii. 10, if not in an effect so glorious and transforming? I am not ignorant, as has been already noticed, that to establish the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, as the cause of the resurrection of the dead, is to aim a fatal blow at the ordinary doctrine of *the immortality of the soul*, or of *our being immortal as descendants of Adam*. But why stumble at this, if it has been evinced, by a train of legitimate and conclusive argumentation, that *natural or creature immortality* has no foundation in scripture, besides implying a gross contradiction in terms? Has it never struck the supporters of the ordinary doctrine, that although its claims to antiquity cannot be disputed, the authority upon which it rests is somewhat questionable, the prospect of immortality being the very argument by the insinuation of which the Devil seduced Eve from her allegiance. *Ye shall not surely die*, said the old serpent to the mother of mankind, and to his suggestion she lent a willing ear. *Ye shall not surely die*, whispers the foul fiend to Eve's descendants, and from them obtains the same easy credence. The immortality promised to the one differs in some respects, it is true, from the immortality promised to the other, but as they are both opposed to scripture, by this kindred feature, they betray their common origin, and fall to be traced to the same *authentic* source. But I will not tease myself, nor can I be persuaded to tease my readers, by arguing the matter farther, with men who remain proof against the testimony of the Holy Ghost; and I would therefore as a sort of summary of what

has gone before, conclude my answer to the second question proposed, by observing, that whoever will maintain, that *the human soul is immortal*,\* or that *an immortal principle is transmitted to mankind by their descent from Adam*, must also be prepared to maintain the following, among other positions :

1. That we rise from the dead, and possess immortality, independently of the Lord Jesus, or of any power, or virtue, derived from him. But is such an idea reconcilable with our Lord's numerous and explicit declarations, that *he is the resurrection and the life*, that *by him the dead are raised*, &c. &c.

2. That we derive the divine nature from Adam. This necessarily follows, the moment it is perceived, that *immortality or eternal life is the life of God*. But is it consistent either with scripture or with common sense, that such a life should be derived from Adam? I do not attempt to disguise or deny, that some little progress might be made, towards subverting my conclusions, if it could be proved, that *eternal existence* and *eternal life* were two distinct things—the former having been possessed by Adam, and by him being transmitted to his posterity—the latter only being derived from the Lord Jesus. But who, without any countenance, or support from scripture, and at the risk of

\* Which, when analyzed and stripped of verbiage, is just in other words to say, that *human nature* or *human life* is immortal. This certainly is not the dictate of common sense, nor is it warranted by the language used by the Judge of the whole earth, when pronouncing sentence upon Adam, *In sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life*. Can words intimate more plainly than these do, that if Adam were to live in another state of existence, the future life so to be enjoyed by him, was not *his*, it not being *the same with that which he then possessed*? Can words intimate more plainly than these do, that *immortality*, or *eternal life*, is not, in any respect whatever, connected with, or derived from him? What I mean will perhaps be better understood if I observe, that eternal life, or the life enjoyed hereafter, is not a *continuation* of this present life, but a life *essentially different*.

all the absurdities, in which it would infallibly land him; would venture publicly to maintain such a distinction? Let it not be supposed that the argument for the immortality of the soul, which I have thus suggested to my opponents, is the mere offspring and coinage of my own imagination. I have heard it insisted on, and strenuously maintained, by some very sensible people, a fact which shows, to what a hopeless and pitiable state, that man must ever be reduced, who, like the fabled giants of antiquity, attempts, by dint of mere human reasonings, to overwhelm and bear down the declarations of the Almighty. \*

III. Let us now inquire, what foundation there is in scripture, or in reasonings legitimately derived from scripture, for the wicked undergoing eternal or unlimited punishment, in a future state of existence.

Were it not that I am determined to sift the subject to the bottom, and afford antagonists every opportunity of detecting flaws and fallacies in my reasonings, if they can, I might here bring the discussion to a very brief and speedy conclusion. No man who has given the requisite attention to the preceding part of the pamphlet, and has observed the line of argumentation which I have pursued, can remain long at a loss to perceive the inferences that fall to be deduced. I have

\* If any of my readers have in their possession the works of the Rev. Robert Riccaltoun, of Hobkirk, printed in 1772, they will find some interesting remarks with respect to the matters treated of under this head and the preceding one, in volume 2d., from page 52d to page 87th. I do not wish to be understood as pledging myself by this reference to an unqualified approbation of all the sentiments entertained and broached by that very original and ingenious but prolix writer, for even when speaking of the difference between *natural* and *spiritual* life, he is chargeable with some gross mistakes, but to point him out to my readers, as one of the very few, who, on the subject of religion, have ventured to think for themselves.

proved, in the first place, that Adam, when he fell, lost only natural life, and in the second place, that the resurrection of the dead to an immortal existence hereafter, is solely in virtue of their connexion with the Lord Jesus. Now what are the plain and obvious conclusions resulting from these premises? Why, 1st, That there is no life hereafter to men except through Jesus. 2dly, That as Adam transmits only a life similar to his own to his posterity here, so Jesus transmits only a life similar to his own to his posterity hereafter, that is, in other words, that the only life possessed and enjoyed hereafter, is a life similar to that of Jesus or spiritual and eternal life. 3dly, That as the life of Adam or human nature, begins and terminates with this present world, and as there is no life hereafter but the life of Jesus or the divine nature, there can, therefore, be no punishment hereafter, except upon the absurd and revolting hypothesis of the divine nature being an object of punishment, a hypothesis which of course refutes itself. Thus then does it appear to be impossible to admit the accuracy of the preceding reasonings, and at the same time to reject the conclusion to which they inevitably lead, that the idea of eternal punishment in a future state of existence, is a mere figment of the human mind, having its origin in early prejudices, or in mistaken views of the meaning of scripture.

But briefly and conclusively as the matter might be settled, by a simple reference to preceding statements and reasonings, I am far from intending in this abrupt although strictly logical way, to supersede farther discussion. On the contrary, I shall endeavour, by a series of additional views and arguments, to afford

additional conviction to the mind, staggered in some measure perhaps by the novelty of the subject, and the importance of the conclusions to which it leads. In the prosecution of this object, I shall first of all consider and refute two of the principal arguments, by which the doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter is supported. These are,

First, the infinite nature of evil.

Secondly, the necessity of eternal punishment in the moral government of God, or the necessity of preventing, among superior intelligences, the commission of crime, by the salutary dread which the everlasting punishment of the wicked is calculated to inspire.

First, the infinite nature of evil.

Here I at once join issue with the advocates and supporters of the ordinary system, by denying, in the most pointed terms, that sin or evil is infinite, and demand that the matter may be remitted to trial. The arguments for sin being infinite are,

1. That it is committed against an infinite being. But this argument, however much vaunted, is in reality a mere sophism, calculated to impose only on such as do not reflect, or are not capable of reflecting, for it is liable to objections which are completely fatal to it. 1st, If sin be infinite, it is possessed of a divine attribute or of the divine nature, infinity being an attribute of God, that is, in other words, sin, according to this scheme, is one with God. 2dly, Sin being the act of a *creature*,\* and it never yet having been pretended that *creatures* are infinite, we have, according to this rational, luminous, and consistent system, the *acts of creatures* invested with an attribute which does not belong to those by whom the acts are com-

\* Or a *quality* of creature action.

*mitted.* 3dly, If sin be infinite, it cannot in any case come to an end or be removed, the very circumstance of its termination or removal declaring it to be *finite*. 4thly, If sin be infinite, it cannot have had a beginning. But has this ever been alleged? How, I ask, are these four objections to be got over?

2. That it required an infinite atonement. This argument likewise is a mere sophism, for, 1st. was it by the human or the divine nature of the Lord Jesus that the atonement was made? If by the divine nature, then God suffered! the word atonement signifying the substitution of the sufferings of one being in the place of those of another. If by the human nature, then the atonement was not infinite. How will my opponents extricate themselves from this dilemma? Not surely by alleging, that although it was impossible for the divine nature of the Lord Jesus to suffer, it nevertheless imparted efficacy to the atonement made by his human nature, for this, besides being a barefaced *petitio principii* or begging of the question, would, after being stripped of its disguises, and of the tinsel and unmeaning language, with which it is decked, either be saying, that God himself suffered—as I am unable to comprehend any way in which an atonement can be efficacious, if the definition of the word is to be adhered to, except by adequate suffering—or it would be saying nothing at all to the purpose, by assigning to the word atonement a sense different from that which it ordinarily bears. 2dly, If it be maintained, that an *infinite atonement* has removed *evil*, which in its nature is *infinite also*, are we not then treated with the curious idea of *one infinite* bringing *another infinite* to an end? Who shall prohibit our calling this the climax of absurdity? Let any plain unlet-

tered man, endowed with common sense, ask himself calmly and deliberately, what is implied in the word *infinite* ? Is it not *absolute boundlessness of every description, a conditional or limited infinity*, like a *conditional or limited eternity*, being a perfect solecism in terms ? What then is proved by the circumstance of sin, which theologians have been pleased to style *infinite*, being *removed or coming to an end*, except the impropriety and absurdity of the epithet applied to it, and the fact of its being in reality *finite* or *bounded* ? On a point so obvious, it is needless for me to insist farther.

Secondly, Another grand argument in support of everlasting punishment hereafter, is a supposed necessity for it in the moral government of God, or a supposed necessity of preventing among pure intelligent beings the repetition of man's offence, by the salutary dread which everlasting punishment is calculated to inspire. In other words, God finds it necessary to punish the wicked everlastingly hereafter, for the purpose of restraining intelligent beings from transgression. I grant that this argument has obtained the sanction of some of the first names in the department of theology, and that it is at first sight exceedingly plausible, but when examined into, it will be found to evince the most intense, I had almost said incurable ignorance of the character of God, and of the nature and operation of divine truth. Let the following remarks be attended to, in confirmation of this.

1. God is not a wrathful or malignant being, cherishing vindictive feelings towards any of his creatures, but his nature is expressed in one word, LOVE. This we learn solely and exclusively from those lively oracles, in which he has condescended to reveal or make



known his character. *God is love, and in this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him,\** 1 John iv. 8, 9.

2 The immediate and necessary result of understanding the divine character, is the banishment of fear from the conscience—*There is no fear in love, (in other words love implies confidence,) but perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath torment, he that feareth is not made perfect in love,* 1 John iv. 18. *Being justified by faith we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.* Rom. v. i. . *But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, &c.* Gal. v. 22. Indeed we might fearlessly appeal to common sense as to the impossibility of love subsisting in union with dread, or even suspicion, of the object professed to be loved. Another necessary effect of the divine character being understood, is the formation of the same character in him that understands it. *We have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love, and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.* 1 John iv. 16. *We love him because he first loved us.* 19. In other words, to understand *the divine character* is to be possessed of *the divine nature*.

3. This understanding of the divine character, or possession of the divine nature, is the source of all the genuine and acceptable obedience of believers. *If ye love me keep my commandments.* John xiv. 15. *For the love of Christ constraineth us—that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again.* 2 Cor. v. 14. 15. It is also the grand principle to which by

\* Not through Adam. See also 1 John v. 11.

the mouth of his apostles God addresses his exhortations. *Beloved if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.* 1 John 4. 11. *I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, &c.* Rom. xii. 1.

If the foregoing remarks are duly attended to, and deliberately weighed, they will be found to overthrow the argument for eternal punishment, derived from its expediency, as a means of restraining pure intelligent beings from transgression, for,

1. It is impossible for God to manifest himself, or make himself known, in any except his true character. Hardy indeed must that man be who will venture to contradict this. If, therefore, God shall condescend to reveal himself, in another state of existence, to any class or order of beings besides glorified saints, it must be as what he really is, that is as LOVE.

2. The understanding of God's character as Love, must uniformly be attended with the effect of inspiring confidence in the being who understands it. *Love must cast out fear*, if fear in the breast of a sinless being could be supposed ever to have had a residence, but as this is of course out of the question, it must *beget love or confidence in such a being* as its necessary and inevitable result.

3. All this, it must be obvious, is perfectly inconsistent with the notion of the fear of eternal punishment constituting any part of the motive to obedience, in the case of pure intelligent beings acquainted with the divine character. For if God could employ the principle of terror, as a means of keeping such beings in a state of dependence on him and compliance with his will, it must be either in consequence of his own character, when apprehended, inspiring sentiments of alarm, or of his availing himself of opposite and

contradictory methods of arriving at the same result. But neither of these suppositions is admissible, for, on the one hand, God's character, when understood, is so completely at variance with fear, or even suspicion, in the minds of those who understand it, that it begets unqualified and unlimited confidence ; and on the other hand, God cannot contradict himself, by revealing himself to be what he is not, an object of terror or alarm. Besides, by the very terms of the hypothesis which I am combating, the beings to whom God reveals himself as an object of terror are *pure or sinless*, and how he should be an object of terror *to such* is more than I can conceive. If, therefore, God is an object of terror to any intelligent beings, either here or hereafter, it is not in consequence of his character having been revealed to them, but the reverse—it is not because they know him, but because they know him not.

The amount then of the preceding argument is this, that to suppose God to reveal himself to pure intelligent beings, as inflicting everlasting punishment upon wicked men, with a view to deter the former from transgression, is to suppose him to reveal himself to them, in a character different from and contradictory to that in which he has revealed himself to his people in his word, and is likewise to suppose him to aim at ensuring the obedience of such intelligent beings in a way exactly the reverse of that, in which he draws out and ensures the obedience of his people. As, therefore, it is not *by exciting the fear of eternal wrath*, but *by inspiring love or confidence, and thereby destroying the possibility of such fear having a place in their bosoms*, that God, according to his own declarations, ensures the obedience of beings acquainted with his character ; the idea of his revealing himself as the

eternal punisher of the wicked, in a future state of existence, for the purpose of inspiring dread and thereby restraining from transgression, is seen to be utterly untenable.

It will be observed that I employ these remarks only to show the folly of supposing eternal punishment necessary to keep *pure intelligent beings*, or *intelligent beings acquainted with the divine character*, in a state of dependence upon God and obedience to him, for this plain reason, that *impure or wicked beings*, or *beings who have already transgressed irremediably*, if such there are, of course are out of the question. It was ignorance of the divine character that produced the transgression of the latter, for the knowledge of the divine character is, as we have already seen, the divine nature, which cannot transgress ; and therefore it could not be by the eternal punishment of themselves and others—a circumstance which would still leave them ignorant of the divine character—but by the manifestation of that character to them—a blessing with which, by the terms of the supposition, they are not to be favoured—that their tendency to transgression could be counteracted or overcome.

It is vain to think of overturning these reasonings by alleging, that if God is revealed in scripture as Love, he is also revealed as a threatener or object of terror. So far from this being correct, wherever God utters threatenings, we have him not revealing, but veiling and concealing his character, or, perhaps rather more properly, God's threatenings do not constitute a revelation of his character, but are preliminary and subservient to such a revelation. God did not reveal his character to Adam when he prohibited him from *eating of the tree of the knowledge of good*

*and evil*, but laid thereby the foundation of that revelation of himself, with which our progenitor was subsequently favoured. Gen. iii. 15. God did not reveal his character to the Jews by the threatenings which he denounced from Mount Sinai, but he paved the way thereby for that manifestation of himself, which was partially and obscurely made otherwise, during the subsistence of the Mosaic dispensation, and which afterwards shone forth in all its lustre, in the person and work of his own Son. Here, however, let me take up those who have recourse to this mode of contradicting me, upon their own principles. Is it their opinion that God may reveal himself as a threatener or object of terror, for the purpose of ensuring obedience? What proof, I ask, do they afford of this? If the sacred writings be appealed to, and no inferior testimony can be admitted in a case like this, how happens it that the hypothesis in question is not only destitute of scriptural authority, but completely at variance with it? It is a fact capable of being easily verified, that God's recorded threatenings instead of having been *followed by obedience*, have been *uniformly disobeyed*—that *instead of having ensured submission, they appear, upon the face of the scriptures, only in connexion with the violations of them*. Witness the cases of Adam and the Jews already referred to. How is this fact, I again inquire, to be reconciled with the theory in question? On what scriptural principles or authority, can God be said to threaten, in order to ensure obedience, when such threatenings as are contained in scripture appear to have been disobeyed? From the circumstance of the two first covenants, entered into by God with the human race, having been violated, notwithstanding the tremendous

threatenings and sanctions with which they were accompanied, I find myself obliged to draw a conclusion directly in the teeth of the above hypothesis, viz, that it was God's purpose, by means of the violation of his prohibitions, and the disregard of his threatenings, on the part of those to whom they were addressed, in the first place, to demonstrate the impossibility of threats ever ensuring obedience, and in the second place, to introduce a principle, which without the aid of threats altogether, nay in opposition to them, should, by its very nature, effect that which threats had invariably failed in accomplishing. The language of the viiith chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, from the 6th to the 12th verse, to which I would now refer, shows that the apostle viewed the matter in the same light that I do. According to him, it was not by issuing forth laws or threatenings, but by the implantation of a new principle, that God was to ensure the attachment and obedience of his people in New Testament times. If any opponents remain unconvinced by these statements, I must still further inquire, what is the class or order of pure intelligent beings to whom, in their opinion, the menace of everlasting punishment, in the ordinary sense of the term, may be addressed? Is it to those who are in a probationary, or to those who are in a fixed and permanent state? *If to those who are in a probationary state*, as scripture alone authorizes such a supposition, we must have recourse to scripture for information relative to beings who may be so placed, and the nature of the threatenings which may be addressed to them. Adam and the nation of Israel furnish us with the only two instances of beings placed in a probationary state. But in neither of these instances was everlasting punishment, in a future

state of existence, threatened, for, in the case of Adam, when the divine record is examined, we do not find that the punishment of others, either everlasting or limited, in a future life, was proposed to him, as a motive to deter him from disobedience; nor indeed from his ignorance of good and evil, was he capable of comprehending such a threat—and in the case of the Jews, independently of the fact, that they were not pure beings, it has been proved by Bishop Warburton, with irresistible force of reasoning, in his *Divine Legation of Moses*, that punishments, beyond this present life were not among the number of the sanctions addressed to them. If then we suppose, (without any authority from scripture by the bye,) that God may address threatenings to other pure intelligent beings, in a probationary state, and if scripture is to furnish us with specimens, both of such beings themselves, and of the threats addressed to them, it clearly follows, that the everlasting punishment of wicked men can constitute no part of these threats. On the other hand, let the supposition be, that the pure intelligent beings, to whom the everlasting punishment of wicked men is proposed as a motive to deter from transgression, are *in a fixed and permanent state*, is it not apparent to the least reflecting mind, that we are at once involved in gross self-contradiction. If their state be fixed, why propose to them that which must imply, either a state of probation, or be perfectly nugatory? Thus, then, by sifting the matter to the bottom, do we discover, 1st, That when God threatens, he is not revealing, but preparing to reveal his character. 2dly, That the object and purpose of divine threatenings is not to ensure obedience, but by means of their violation, to bring out and develop something ulterior. And 3dly, That

the threat of everlasting punishment hereafter, can be addressed to no class of supposed pure intelligent beings—not to those who are in a probationary state, for we have no example of it, and it could not be understood by them—not to those who are confirmed in happiness, as glorified saints are, for threatenings suit only a preliminary and probationary dispensation, and are inconsistent with permanent and unchangeable felicity. Thus does an examination of the supposed objection, confirm the preceding reasonings.

Having thus shown that the principal arguments on which the doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter rests, the *Jachin* and *Boaz* of the system, are worthless and inconclusive, instead of acting any longer on the defensive, I would now assume an offensive position, and ply my antagonists with a few plain objections, which are fatal to their cause. If it be maintained that the wicked undergo eternal punishment in a future state of existence, it must also be maintained, first, that they possess eternal life, and, secondly, that sin is eternal.

First. If the wicked are punished eternally, in a future state of existence, they are possessed of eternal life.

I presume that to any man who is capable of reflecting and endowed with ordinary candour, the bare statement of this proposition must evince its truth, must satisfy him of the conclusion to which it leads, and must supersede the necessity of illustration altogether. But as the dull and the prejudiced, constitute always a large portion of the human race, with a view to assist the apprehensions of such, I observe, that as by the very terms of the doctrine which I impugn, pun-



ishment is to be inflicted eternally upon certain individuals, it plainly and undeniably follows, that such individuals must eternally exist, or be eternally alive to undergo this punishment. In other words, they must possess eternal life. But such an idea is inadmissible for the following reasons:—1. Eternal life is declared by the Lord Jesus himself in passages innumerable, to be the peculiar privilege or blessing which he bestows upon his own people, whereas, according to the doctrine in question, eternal life must be maintained, without any authority from scripture, to be likewise the privilege of an unbelieving world. 2. Eternal life is the life of God, eternity being, as we have already seen, one of the divine attributes, and, therefore, to possess eternal life, is to possess the divine nature, or to be one with God. But is it intended by the advocates of the system of eternal punishment hereafter, to predicate concerning the wicked, that they possess the life of God or the divine nature? 3. If the wicked possess eternal life hereafter, wherein consists the difference between them and the people of God, and what reason can be assigned why God should feel complacency in his own nature as possessed by the one, and regard and treat as the object of his hatred, the same nature, as possessed by the other?

But this is not all, for not merely is there a manifest inconsistency between the theory of *eternal punishment hereafter*, and the declarations of scripture, with respect to *eternal life*, but the theory on this very point is at variance with itself. It is plain that those who are *eternally punished* must be *eternally alive* to undergo the punishment, but according to the advocates of the system assailed, they are *eternally*

*dead* !!! How are these notoriously conflicting statements reconcilable? Besides, it has been already shown, that as *death* implies *the loss of life*, so must *eternal death* imply *the loss of eternal life*, a consequence which, although legitimately deduced from its premises, lands my opponents in the grossest self contradiction.

The only way, in which, as I have more than once hinted, an attempt can be made to turn the edge of this objection, and get rid of it, is by denying that *eternal life* is necessarily a blessing, or rather by devising an imaginary distinction between *eternal existence* and *eternal life*. Those who have recourse, to this ingenious way of parrying an acknowledged difficulty, are pleased to bestow on *eternal existence*, by a strange perversion of terms, the appellation of *eternal death*—making *eternal life*, on the other hand, to consist in *the eternal enjoyment of the divine approbation and favour*. But, in the name of wonder, what reason do our antagonists produce for all this, except their own bare and dogmatical assertion? What foundation is there for it in scripture, or who authorised them to invent meanings for words, unknown, nay in diametrical opposition to that common usage, which is the only genuine *norma loquendi*? Where is *eternal death* spoken of in the word of God? Where is it declared to be synonymous with *eternal existence*? Where is *eternal existence* distinguished from *eternal life*? I allow that our opponents, in the bitterness and desperation of their minds, have invented a distinction which, although not worth a rush, may enable them to throw dust in the eyes of the unthinking multitude, and thus secure them from the disgrace of a total defeat. But do they expect us to be imposed on by so common and shallow a stratagem? Do they really

imagine that out of compassion, and at the expense of truth and our own consciences, we will concede to them even the *possibility* of their distinction being well founded? Tyros indeed, in such matters must they be, if they can cherish, for a single moment, expectations so ridiculous. But softly, they have at last procured something, in the shape of a scriptural argument, for the views which they hold. "*In his* i.e God's *favour is life*, according to David, Ps. xxx. 5, from which it clearly follows" say they "that there may be *existence*, which is not worthy of the name of *life*, the Psalmist expressly limiting the term *life* to the favour of God"! Now can they possibly expect an answer to such arrant trifling? Will they, with any pretensions to an acquaintance with the original Hebrew venture to deny, that the words חיים ברצון might as well have been translated, *in his favour* or will as the Septuagint has it *is existence*, as *in his favour* or will *is life*? And if so, what becomes of their argument? But laying the original Hebrew out of the question altogether, and supposing that a distinction is implied in the words quoted, what is there to warrant the idea of its being such a distinction as the one contended for? Is it not obvious, that in the event of any distinction, or contrast being intended, it must, if agreeable to the analogy of scripture, be between *this present life* or *existence*, as forfeited to divine justice, and *eternal life* or *existence*, as properly, and in the highest sense of the term, an expression of the divine favour—a distinction which is at once tangible and intelligible—and not, as is ridiculously supposed, between *eternal existence* and *eternal life* hereafter?

It is possible, however, that some advocate of the popular system, more candid, and somewhat better

informed, with regard to this point, than his brethren in general are, may admit, that the attempted distinction between *existence* and *life* is a mere chimera, and that *eternal existence*, or *eternal life*, is unquestionably a divine attribute, and yet may contend, that the possession of the divine nature in one respect, by no means necessarily implies the possession of it in others. Without attempting any lengthened exposure of the utter groundlessness of such a hypothesis, or noticing all the inconsistencies and contradictions to which it leads, it is enough to observe, that the moment a being who is possessed of eternal life or the divine nature, is supposed to undergo eternal punishment hereafter, that moment is it supposed, that the divine perfections are capable of being separated, and that the divine nature may be visited with the most signal mark of the divine displeasure ! Can this be ?

Secondly. If the wicked are punished eternally in a future state, then sin is eternal.

This consequence follows as necessarily as the preceding one. On the hypothesis of eternal punishment hereafter, the persons undergoing that punishment are either righteous or wicked. Righteous they cannot be, since to suppose God to punish persons who either are righteous, or who become so, under the influence of the discipline to which they are subjected, is an idea so horrible, so repugnant to justice, and so completely at variance with the divine character revealed in the scriptures, as to be quite inadmissible. It remains, therefore, that those who are eternally punished are wicked or sinners, and continue to be so.\* But if they are eternally sinners, then

\* It is abundantly plain to me, that if there be any punishment at all, after this life, it must be eternal punishment. For, it having been already shewn,

sin clearly is eternal, or, should the phrase be better liked, is perpetuated to eternity. This, however, cannot be, for reasons of the most substantial kind.

1. If we assume that sin is eternal, we invest it with a divine attribute. It is evident that the circumstance of having neither *beginning of days* nor *end of life*, is an attribute of the Supreme Being, and it is likewise evident, that as such it cannot be ascribed to sin. If other reasons be required they are at hand. 1st. Can we suppose that to be eternal, or possessed of a divine attribute, which is in opposition to the divine nature? 2dly. No creature, *as such*, is or can be eternal, and can we suppose then the act of a creature, which sin is, to be invested with an attribute which does not belong to the creature itself? 3dly. Can we forget that, if sin be eternal, it is impossible for it to be expiated or removed?

I am not fond of raising the cry of heresy, or of fastening consequences on an antagonist, which he himself would disavow, but it is right for the supporters of the ordinary system to be aware, that the doctrine of *eternal punishment*, which involves in it the *eternity* and *infinity* of sin, leads directly to Manicheism. The heresy of Manes, like that of the ancient Magi,

that it is not by punishment, but by the revelation of the divine character, that the views and dispositions of intelligent creatures are changed, and from being *natural* become *spiritual and divine*, it follows, that, if the wicked are punished hereafter, and if no other agent than punishment is employed to effect a change, no change can take place. Continued and increasing punishment must, in such circumstances, be attended with continued and increasing desperation and sin. Now it is not contended by the consistent advocates for limited punishment hereafter, and for the efficacy of such punishment, that any other means is resorted to in order to bring transgressors to a sense of duty, and restore them to the fold of God. This it is that, in a way of which they do not appear to me to have been aware, stamps inconsistency, and ignorance of the nature and end of punishment, upon this system, and imparts to that of their adversaries more of the appearance of truth.

is said to have consisted in the supposition of two co-eternal principles of good and evil, or, of a good and an evil Deity, who everlastingly cherish hostile feelings, and display these in overt acts, towards each other, but neither of whom is able to effect the destruction of the other. To this heresy the doctrine of everlasting punishment hereafter bears a close affinity, coinciding with it in the grand and leading circumstance of investing sin with divine attributes, and representing it consequently as the rival of Jehovah. Can it be contradicted that *infinity* and *eternity* are attributes of the Supreme Being? Besides, when it is declared that sin unless atoned for, *must exist everlastingly*, have those who use this language reflected that *necessary existence* is predicable only of God himself? Such, without any exaggeration, is the awkward predicament in which every advocate for *everlasting punishment hereafter* places himself—he makes sin *infinite* and *eternal*, and clothes it with *necessary existence*, thereby raising it to an equality with God! What did Manes ever say worse than this?

Here, however, I almost fancy my antagonists triumphantly exclaiming, “your argument, if it proves anything, proves too much—The proper inference from the fact of sin being *infinite* and *eternal*, upon your own principles, is not that sin is *God's rival* but is *God himself*—and yet if this be admitted, what becomes of the eternal life of the people of God; for if sin cannot be invested with eternity without confounding it with God, no being can be possessed of eternal life without confounding it with God.” This objection, although somewhat specious and plausible, is at bottom a mere cavil. I am willing to allow, that if sin be *infinite* and

*eternal* the proper conclusion is, that it is *one with God* or *confounded with him*—a fact which wonderfully confirms the preceding reasoning—but I deny the inference which my antagonists would draw from this. When I maintain that believers are *one with God*, I have the authority of scripture for thus expressing myself,\* and when I show that this astonishing and incomprehensible union results from the fact of their being *possessed of the divine nature*,† any understanding, however feeble and unpractised, may perceive the force, necessity, and validity of my conclusion. On the other hand, that sin cannot be *one with God*, I have these plain and incontrovertible proofs, that it is no where in the sacred writings declared to be so, and that it neither is, nor ever was pretended to be *possessed of the divine nature*, but is diametrically opposed to it. Here I might stop, resting the weight of my answer to the above cavil on the simple fact, that believers are declared in scripture to be *one with God*, whereas no such declaration is made concerning Sin. But I proceed further and observe, that although a *person* may be *one with God*, without being *confounded with him*, the case is widely different with respect to a *mere quality or attribute*, such as sin on all hands is acknowledged to be. *God's attributes*, it is well known, are *God himself*, and therefore, if sin, however monstrous the idea, were *one of these attributes*, it must be *confounded with God* or *be God himself*. Thus, then, is my argument strengthened rather than weakened by the present objection, for my opponents by making sin, which is a mere quality or attribute, *infinite and eternal*, necessarily *confound it with God himself*—if they object to allowing it to be *God's rival*—

\* John xvii. 21.

† 2 Peter i. 4.

whereas in representing believers to be *one with God* as being *partakers of the divine nature*, I do no more than scripture itself, and the circumstances of the case warrant me in doing.\*

2. If sin be eternal, then instead of being one of the means by which God displays his perfections, it becomes the end, scope, or ultimate design, of the divine procedure.

The doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter is founded on a gross mistake with regard to the nature of sin, and the purpose of its introduction into the world. By representing sin as eternal, it ascribes to it a quality, and invests it with an attribute, which can only belong to the end, object, or final cause, or to one of the ends, objects or final causes, which God aims at accomplishing, by all his providential and gracious dispensations. But that sin cannot be the end, object, or final cause of the divine procedure, nor any part of that end is plain for the following reasons :

1st. God, as a pure and holy being, can propose to himself no end or object, except what is good and worthy of himself. But if this be true, and who shall be found daring enough to gainsay it, then to give a permanent and everlasting existence *to evil*, or *to that which is the opposite of goodness*, cannot constitute any part of the end, object, or ultimate design of the divine procedure.

2dly. The idea of God making the eternity of evil or sin, the object, or any part of the object, of his procedure towards the human race, stands in opposition to the whole tenor and analogy of scripture, which

\* As to the *modus existendi* or manner of the existence of believers hereafter, farther than that it must imply a larger and more abundant manifestation and enjoyment of the divine character, than is conceded to them while here, I neither know, nor while in the body, can know any thing.



speaks of him as having but one end or object in view in all that he does, viz, the display of his own glory, or, in perhaps plainer and more intelligible language, of his own character and perfections. See, in proof of this, Psalm xix 1. Luke ii. 14. John viii. 50. Rom. xi. 36, xvi. 27. 1 Corinth. x. 31. 2 Corinth. iii. 18, iv. 6. Galatians i. 5. Ephesians i. 6. iii. 21. 2 Tim. iv. 18. Heb. xiii. 21. 1 Peter v. 11, Rev. iv. 11, v. 12. 13. In connexion with this subject, it deserves to be remarked, that the enjoyment of eternal life, by the people of God, though inseparable from the divine object or purpose, is not *directly* and *properly speaking*, that object or purpose itself, but results from the fact, that as the divine character is to be eternally manifested, there must be persons to whom the manifestation is made; the *intended manifestation* thus creating the necessity for the *persons*, and not the *persons* creating the necessity for the *manifestation*.

Seeing then that sin is not the end, object, or final cause, which God proposes to himself in his procedure towards the human race, nor any part of it—and seeing that the only end which he aims at, is his own glory or the eternal manifestation of himself—it follows, that sin, like all creatures, and all the acts of creatures, must be merely one of the means or instruments, by which he accomplishes this end. That is, in fewer and simpler words, sin is not an end, but one of the means employed for the attainment of an end. The correctness of this statement, and its inconsistency with the idea of sin being eternal, will be rendered obvious by a consideration of the few following particulars.

1st. It being abundantly manifest, that sin is not an

end or ultimate object of the Supreme Being, but one of the means or instruments which he employs for the accomplishment of an end, it must, like other means, cease or terminate, when the end for which it is employed shall have been accomplished.

This is so obvious that, like other truisms, it almost sets illustration at defiance. What architect, after having completed a sumptuous and splendid edifice, would refuse to remove the scaffolding by the assistance of which it had been erected, but which, while standing, concealed its beauties from the public gaze? What artist would insist that, along with his workmanship, there should always be preserved and exhibited the tools with which that workmanship had been executed? To generalize the principle involved in these illustrations—if it is confessedly the part of wisdom to accomplish the best ends by the most suitable and best adapted means, it is confessedly its part likewise to remove and have done with the means when the ends are accomplished. That sin is the most suitable means of accomplishing God's purposes in regard to the human race, follows, without needing to have recourse to any other mode of proof, from the mere fact of his having employed it. But shall a charge of deficiency in wisdom be brought or insinuated against him, by supposing that he will continue sin in existence, after all his purposes, in the employment of it, shall have been answered?

2ly. If the ends, objects, or purposes for which sin is employed by the Supreme Being, are answered, attained to, and accomplished in this present world or system of things, sin must cease or come to an end with it.

This follows so obviously from what precedes, and

appears so distinctly from the bare statement of the proposition itself, that I should consider myself to insult the understandings of my readers, were I to attempt any illustration or proof of it.

3dly. The ends or purposes for which sin enters into the plan of the Divine government are accomplished in this present world, and therefore it neither has nor can have any existence beyond.

Were the question put to me, what is the end or purpose that God aims at by the introduction of sin, taught by the scriptures, I could have no hesitation in answering, the introduction of something better. This, indeed, is strictly according to analogy. The world we now inhabit is, we are informed, in due time, and after having served its purposes, to be superseded by one higher and better, and it is, therefore, what might have been expected, that *if sin entered*, it should, after serving its purposes, be superseded and annihilated likewise. Plain it must be to the heaven instructed mind, that sin is merely one of the agents by which God brings out, displays, and develops the glories of his character—a part of the scaffolding by means of which he is erecting that wondrous edifice of love, which he himself is to inhabit throughout eternity. Sin being thus of the nature of a *means or instrument*, could only be employed in connexion with a system of things, which was *instrumental, subordinate, and introductory to another*. For, could we suppose the reverse and assign to sin, a place in a system that was *permanent and eternal*, this would be *to impart permanency and eternity to sin itself*, and, besides the other monstrous consequences which would follow, *to exclude it from the class of means altogether*. Hence from its very nature, sin must stand connected with a

transient world and subordinate system such as the present is, and the removal or destruction of the one must draw along with it the removal or destruction of the other. Perhaps a more popular, as well as a more intelligible mode of stating the argument, will be to observe, that the introduction of sin appears clearly to be subservient to two leading purposes, on the part of the Supreme Being. In the first place, to afford an opportunity for the conquest of it—It is by *sin entering and abounding*, that *Grace is enabled much more to abound*. In the second place, to be the means of death, by which God breaks off the connexion of his people with this present world, and brings them to that more enlarged manifestation and fuller enjoyment of himself, which has been their destined inheritance from everlasting—*Sin reigning unto death*, is the means of *Grace reigning through righteousness unto eternal life*. The purpose of God, in regard to sin, is thus fully accomplished, in its being triumphed over, and trampled under foot, by his own Son—and in *death*, which is its necessary and inseparable attendant, being *swallowed up in victory or eternal life*. But does not all this convincingly prove, that sin must be limited in its existence and operations to this present world or present system of things? Could we suppose the reverse—could we suppose that this present world was not the only scene in which the petty, transient, and gloriously overruled triumphs of sin were to be displayed, and that it was to endure and exist in another and eternal state of being—then instead of sin, according to the divine declarations, *reigning UNTO DEATH*, and expiring in the very act of executing the divine sentence upon transgression, it would *reign TO ETERNITY*, and would thus be invested

with a jurisdiction and sway, co-ordinate and co-extensive with that of Grace itself. Nay were sin thus to extend its existence and reign to eternity, then instead of having been triumphed over and rendered subservient to his purposes by the Lord Jesus, it *would for ever remain a monument of the inefficacy and incompleteness of his undertaking*—and instead of *death as the last enemy being destroyed*, it would, as the necessary consequence and inseparable attendant of sin\*—however strange the idea may appear,—be *possessed of everlasting existence and invested with everlasting authority* likewise! Such monstrous consequences, of course, cannot for a single moment be admitted, and hence it follows, that sin having entered into the world for certain specific purposes, viz. to afford the Supreme Being an opportunity of manifesting and developing his perfections in the conquest of it, and to break off the connexion of his people with this present world, must, when it has served these purposes, come to an end with the world itself which is the theatre of its operations.†

\* Romans vi. 23. *The wages of sin is death.*

† From the following passage it appears, that the celebrated Rousseau had some confused notions of the truth for which I am contending :—“ *Que m'importe ce que deviendront les méchants ? Je prends peu d'intérêt à leur sort. Toutefois j'ai peine à croire qu'ils soient condamnés à des tourments sans fin. Si la suprême Justice se venge, elle se venge dès cette vie. Vous et vos erreurs, ô nations, êtes ses ministres. Elle emploie les maux que vous vous faites à punir les crimes qui les ont attirés. C'est dans vos cœurs insatiables, rongés d'envie, d'avarice et d'ambition, qu'au sein de vos fausses prospérités les passions vengeresses punissent vos forfaits. Qu'est-il besoin d'aller chercher l'enfer dans l'autre vie ? il est dès celle-ci dans le cœur des méchants. Ou finissent nos besoins périssables, ou cessent nos desirs insensés, doivent cesser aussi nos passions et nos crimes. De quelle perversité de purs esprits seroient-ils susceptibles ?*” &c. *Emile T. 2d. pp. 253 254, edit. stereotype.*

But I have not yet exhausted my stock of proofs that sin can have no existence hereafter, derived from the fact of it being merely one of the means or instruments, by which God accomplishes his purposes. I have just shown *positively*, that the purposes for which it entered are fulfilled, during the subsistence of this present world, and now, with a view to complete the present argument and silence the voice of cavilling for ever, I proceed to show *negatively*, that no end or purpose, or at least none worthy of God, could be served, by its continuance in a future and eternal state of being.

In the first place, the eternity or eternal existence of sin hereafter, could not be intended to answer any purpose worthy of God, in the case of the wicked or those who were already undergoing eternal punishment. It could not be intended to make manifest to them the divine character, for that character being LOVE, is manifested, not as *eternally punishing* but as *freely pardoning*, 1 John iv. 8. 9. 10 &c. It could not be intended to produce in their minds, acquiescence in the justice and propriety of the divine procedure towards them, for this, it is acknowledged on all hands, eternal punishment hereafter, is neither intended nor calculated to produce; besides, if such an acquiescence could be produced, the punishment, consistently with justice, could no longer be continued, for it would then have answered its purpose. It could not be intended to prepare the sufferers for the remission of their punishment, for according to the terms of the hypothesis, that punishment is eternal. It appears then, that if sin were eternal, the knowledge of this fact could answer no purpose in the case of the damned, except that of exasperating their minds, and aggravating their torments,

and God must be supposed to punish either *for this purpose*, or *merely for punishing' sake*. But is either of these suppositions worthy of the Supreme Being? Can God reveal himself in the character of a tormentor, or as gratifying splenetic and revengeful feelings?

In the second place, God could have no end at all to answer, by the eternity of sin hereafter, in the case of pure intelligent beings. He could not intend, by making known to them the eternal punishment of the wicked, to produce terror in their minds, or to excite in them suspicions relative to the certainty, permanency, and stability of their own happiness, for by doing so, he would, as we have already seen, counteract his own purposes, which are, by the manifestation of his character, entirely to banish fear from the conscience, with every approximation to it or possibility of it, and to engender love, confidence, and obedience. Nay, without needing to have recourse to previous reasonings at all, are not pure beings whether angels or men, in a future state of existence, conceived, even by the supporters of the adverse theory, to be everlastingly confirmed and established in their respective situations and privileges, and if so, where is the necessity—where is the possibility—of any thing in the shape of exhortations or warnings being addressed to them? But still farther, God could not intend by the eternity of evil or punishment hereafter, to produce in the minds of pure intelligent beings, admiration of his *justice*, for this is effected, not by visiting the acts of creatures, which are of course *finite* like themselves, with *infinite* punishment, but by meting out and assigning to sin its *exact* reward or wages, which is death. He could not intend, by the eternity of evil, to show forth the praises of his *wisdom*, for this is accomplished,

not by bestowing permanency, eternal existence, or the divine nature upon evil, but by making its entrance and temporary reign, subservient to its own destruction and the everlasting life of his people. He could not intend by the eternity of evil, to manifest his power, for, can it be made a question, whether this attribute is more glorified, by sin being independent of God—which if possessed of necessary existence it must be,\*—or, by its being subject to his controul during the whole period of its existence, and destroyed as soon as the purposes for which it was introduced into the world are accomplished? In short there is not one of the divine attributes, which, instead of being magnified and illustrated, would not be sullied, obscured, and even annihilated by the eternity of evil, and there is not one end worthy of God, either revealed or conceivable, which would be answered by it.

Such, then, is the strong and conclusive evidence which we afford, that as sin is not an end, but merely one of the means by which God accomplishes his ends or purposes, it cannot be eternal. We have shown, first, that every means must cease or terminate when the purposes for which it is employed are accomplished—Secondly, that if the purposes for which sin is employed are accomplished in this present world, or present system of things, the one must come to an end with the other—And lastly, that as the purposes for which sin is employed, are confined to this present world, the existence and reign of sin are confined to this present world likewise. Upon this

\* If sin be eternal, it is either *one with God* or *the rival of God*. The former, of course, it is not; the above reasoning shews that it cannot be the latter.



last head, we have enlarged, pointing out, 1st, positively, what the purposes are which sin answers in this present world and how it answers them, and 2dly, negatively, that sin has and can have no end or purpose whatever to answer hereafter. From this, of course, the plain and inevitable conclusion follows, that neither sin nor punishment can be eternal, in the ordinary sense of the term.

Strong, and clearly insurmountable by any fair process of reasoning, as are the arguments which have been adduced and insisted on, in opposition to the doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter, I am far from supposing that the conflict is at an end, for I expect now to be assailed by the advocates of that popular and profitable system in another way. I shall be told, perhaps, that whatever shew of reasoning or conclusiveness, the preceding statements may possess, it is altogether delusive, and that an appeal to a few plain and easily understood passages of scripture is sufficient to dispel the mist, and remove the speciousness, with which, for a time, I may have contrived to bewilder the senses of my readers. To make an appeal to scripture, I neither have nor reasonably can have any objection. I am ready to grapple with my antagonists on this field likewise, but I must be permitted to premise, in the first place, that I am very far from pretending to understand every part of the sacred writings or to be able to explain all their difficulties. Indeed the utmost lengths to which in many cases, I can go, is to perceive what a text does not signify, without being able to see clearly and positively what its signification really is. In the second place,

that the circumstance of a passage of scripture *appearing* to be plain and intelligible, does not always or necessarily imply *that it is so*. The Jews of our Lord's time considered it very clear, that the numerous prophecies which represented the future Messiah as a conqueror and a king, were inconsistent with his occupying a mean and lowly station in this present world. *Plain and intelligible*, however, as the matter was to them, we know that this view of theirs led them into a grievous mistake, and that in adopting it, as well as in their treatment of our Lord and his apostles, they exemplified the truth of Isaiah's prophecies, that *they should not see with their eyes, nor hear with their ears, nor understand with their hearts, nor be converted and healed*. I must remark further, that, as in a work of this kind brevity is indispensable, instead of launching forth into the wide ocean of scripture, and considering and confuting every petty cavil or objection drawn from that sacred source, I shall confine my own attention, and that of my readers, to the examination of one or two, in which the whole gist of the controversy seems to lie. I advert then, first, to those scriptures, which speak of an approaching day of judgment, and secondly, to those which have been supposed, in express terms, to assert the doctrine of everlasting punishment, in a future life.

First. As to the day of Judgment.

That our Lord, and his apostles, in many parts of the New Testament, speak of *a future day of Judgment*, with an evident reference to many prophecies contained in the Old Testament, is not denied, but is, on the contrary, expressly maintained. The only question is concerning *the meaning* of such language.

That Jesus and his apostles cannot, by the phrase-

loogy in question, intend a judgment beyond this present life, or after this present system of things shall have come to an end, is abundantly clear from this, that believers of the Gospel, throughout the whole of the New Testament, are declared to be *justified or acquitted already*, John iii. 18, v. 24, Acts xiii. 39. Rom. iii. 22 &c. 28, v. 1, &c. and justified too, not on the footing of their own works or obedience, but simply and exclusively by means of their union, through faith, with the Lord Jesus. What absurdity then, nay what daring impiety is implied in the idea, that those who have been already justified or acquitted by God himself, should again be put on their trial, for the same offence ! How curious and unscriptural the consolation offered to the members of the church, that, although acquitted here *freely*, that is *not by works of righteousness which they have done*, but solely through *the divine mercy*, they cannot expect to be acquitted hereafter, except on the production and exhibition of works deserving such a privilege ! Gracious God what an idea ! Can men who broach such absurdities and inconsistencies profess to be believers in the scriptures ? Why if this precious scheme were correct, God, with reverence be it spoken, must be guilty of falsehood, for he declares those *to be already justified*, who, according to it, are *not to be justified—if justified at all—till the arrival of a period still future* ; and instead of peace and freedom from condemnation being the privileges of God's people here, Rom. v. 1. viii. 1, anxiety and despair must be their portion, because, for aught they know or can know, they may yet be the objects of God's vengeance hereafter for evermore ! An idea so revolting, and pregnant with so many absurdities, refutes itself.

The truth is, that all the statements concerning a

future Judgment, contained in the New Testament scriptures, had a reference to the approaching fate and impending destruction of the Jewish people, and to the consequences of that event. How much, alas ! is lost to ordinary readers of the Sacred Writings, by their not reflecting, that the personal mission of our Lord and the greater part of his apostles, was to *the lost sheep of the House of Israel*—and, by their not understanding or overlooking the fact, of the exalted rank and distinguished privileges, which belonged to the Jews previous to the advent of the Messiah. As the necessary result of this, the close of the former dispensation, and the exclusion of the Jewish people from the divine favour—which are in reality some of the most important events to which the Christian dispensation has given birth—are unheeded, or passed over by them, as mere common, every-day occurrences. Such, however, was not the view taken of these matters, or the interest felt in them, by the Saviour himself, and his immediate followers. The approaching fate of Abraham's descendants appears, from almost every page of the New Testament, to have been one of the chief topics of their concern. Knowing the rank which the Jews as a nation occupied\*—ardently desirous that they should retain it and continue to be objects of the divine favour†—and yet satisfied that their privileges would be forfeited, and the threatened vengeance executed upon them, unless they *hearkened to that prophet*, who was Moses superior and Lord,‡—they plied them with every argument, and urged them by every motive, which might, by any possibility, have

\* Rom. iii. 1. 2. ix. 4. 5.

† Matt. xxiii. 37, Rom. ix. 1—3, x. 1.

‡ Deuteronomy xviii. 18. 19, Acts iii. 22. 23.

averted from them a catastrophe so awful. Hence the intimations, that their sufferings *should be less tolerable than those of Sodom and Gomorrah*—that *their worm should not die, and their fire should not be quenched*—and innumerable other predictions of a similar kind—all intended and calculated to forewarn them of that fate, which, notwithstanding the anticipations of their own vain minds, and the delusive hopes cherished and fostered by their rulers, a perseverance in opposition to Jesus, as the Messiah, would inevitably bring down upon them. But all was in vain. Israel, in spite of the prophetic denunciations contained in Deuteronomy, and other parts of those writings which *were every Sabbath day read in his synagogues*—which denunciations were frequently and fearfully applied to his own case, by the Lord of Glory—rushed on blindfold in his infatuated career, *filling up the measure of his iniquities*, until, in due time, his destiny was accomplished. Then was the day of judgment.

Let it not be alleged, that the language of the New Testament concerning a future judgment, is of too strong and unqualified a nature, to admit of being applied to any event, or series of events, which could happen in this present world. To argue thus is clearly to beg the question. It does not imply a calm and dispassionate examination of the passages of the New Testament, where the disputed phrases are to be found, nor a comparison of them with those Old Testament prophecies, from which they have been taken, but the mere influence of vulgar prejudices and prepossessions. Let the 66th chapter of Isaiah, where the expressions concerning *the undying worm and the unquenchable fire* first occur, be examined, and the

calling of the Gentiles and rejection of the Jews, will be discovered to be the topics of which it treats professedly throughout. To the incredulous, the close of the 10th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, is proposed, as affording a solution of all the difficulties in the 66th, as well as in the preceding chapter of Isaiah. Should any inquire, in what respects the judgment executed upon the Jewish nation, was more awful and intolerable than that which Sodom and Gomorrah and the other cities of the plain underwent—the answer is obvious—not merely were the external sufferings of the former distinguished by peculiar intensity, at the period of Jerusalem's destruction, but their punishment has been, in some respects, of a kind quite unparalleled ; they have forfeited privileges such as no other nation ever possessed, Psalm cxlvii. 20 ; and, instead of being destroyed or blended with the inhabitants of surrounding countries, as has uniformly happened in similar cases, they have, by special divine interposition, been preserved a separate and distinct people, and shall continue to be so, that their punishment may be, and may be shown to be, coeval with time itself. Great as were the advantages which Sodom and Gomorrah, Tyre and Sidon, enjoyed, while in the height of their opulence and splendour, these advantages were merely of a temporal kind,—but it was from religious and spiritual privileges so important, as to occasion the Saviour to say concerning them, that they *exalted their possessors to heaven*, that the Jews were thrust out. Besides, Sodom and Gomorrah, Tyre and Sidon, although, for the time, signal examples of the vengeance of the Almighty, sustained the whole weight of that vengeance at once—the divine wrath in regard to them was speedily

exhausted—but the Jewish nation, while time rolls on, shall be kept in existence as monuments of the divine displeasure,—shall continue to be *an astonishment, and a proverb, and a by-word, among all nations, whither the Lord shall lead them*. Say you that punishment so signal, and so tremendous as this, does not come up to the full force, and scope, and energy of the expressions of our blessed Lord. Blind, indeed, must that man be, who seeks elsewhere for their accomplishment.

Still perhaps objectors remain unsatisfied. As the Apostle Paul, say they, in more than one passage of his writings, speaks of *our all appearing or standing at the Judgment seat of Christ*, as a circumstance which is future, how is such language to be reconciled with your theory, that judgment and punishment, are confined to this present life? Nothing can be easier. If the 45th chapter of Isaiah, from the 22d verse to the end—which clearly appears, by consulting Rom. xiv. 10—12, and Philip ii. 9—11, to be the passage of the Old Testament Scriptures from which the expression in question is derived—be examined and carefully considered, it will be perceived, that the prophet is speaking, not of what is to happen in a state of existence succeeding the present, but of *what was to occur in a then future dispensation*, that is, in New Testament times and under the reign of the Messiah. I thus most cheerfully admit, that the words of Isaiah, are expressive of futurity; but I deny—and I defy any man, from what appears on the face of the record itself, to disprove my assertion—that the futurity, of which they speak, lies beyond the boundaries of this present life. The view which I have given, of this Old Testament passage, completely accords with the Apostolic application of it.

In the first place, although Paul in the xivth of the Rom. and the vth. of 2d. Corinth. speaks of *standing at Christ's judgment seat*, as an event that was then future, he does not, in either of the passages referred to, employ a single expression, from which it can legitimately be gathered, that the tribunal or judgment seat, is to be set up, when this present world shall have come to an end. In the second place, he does not say, as careless and superficial readers, and even *grave divines* have supposed, that *the whole human race* are to stand at Christ's judgment seat ; but that *we*, or *all we*, that is, *all of us who believe*—for it is to such only he is writing, and of such only he is speaking—shall do so. In the third place, the nature and scope of the contexts in Romans, 2d Corinthians, and Philippians, lead us at once to the sense in which the apostle quotes and applies the words of the prophet. During the subsistence of the former dispensation or economy, Moses was the sole legislator of the church, or, in other words, during the whole of that period, *he occupied the judgment seat*, Matthew xxiii. 2, and to his laws and authority, the whole Israel of God was subject and amenable. The dignity thus conferred on him he was to retain, until his dispensation, which by visible and immediate divine interposition had been established, should by the same divine interposition be overturned. This latter event, however, at the time when the apostle wrote, had not taken place—it was still future—and as a large proportion of the Christian communities, then in existence, were *the descendants of Abraham according to the flesh*, their outward subjection to the Mosaic law, from which they did not find themselves yet delivered, Acts xv. throughout, xxi. 20—26, interfered, in a great measure,



with their freedom as New Testament believers—prevented their full enjoyment of those privileges, which were destined for them in common with the other members of Christ's mystical body—and caused them to groan from the burdensome and oppressive nature of the yoke, which, for a time, it behoved them to bear, Mat. xi. 28—30, Acts xv. 10, Rom. vii. 24. To the period of their emancipation from this state of thralldom, the apostle frequently encourages Jewish believers to look forward. They were then subject *externally* to the authority of Moses, but that authority was drawing near to its termination, and they were soon to become *exclusively* the subjects of the Messiah. Jerusalem, and the Jewish nation, they are often reminded, were *fast filling up the measure of their iniquities*, 1 Thess. ii. 14—16, &c.—the Mosaic dispensation which was the boast, and the idol of that stubborn and rebellious people was soon to pass away for ever—Jesus was speedily to sit down upon his throne or judgment seat\*—and after having pronounced the doom of his enemies, was thenceforward, independently of the Mosaic institutions altogether, by means of his *law of love*, to exercise unrivalled and uncontrolled authority in his church. Whenever that event occurred he was to be acknowledged sole and exclusive Lord, Ruler, or Governor, *to the Glory of God the Father*.† The result of this altered state of things was to be, that Jewish believers, who up to that time had rendered to Jesus a partial and divided homage—being *externally* bound by the Mosaic law, although *internally* free from its condemning power,

\* Matt. xxiv. 30. xxv. 31.

† It was to this period the Psalmist referred, when he declared that *God was to be judge*, that *God was coming to judge the earth*, &c.

**Romans vii.**—were thenceforward, in common with their Gentile fellow believers, to yield no obedience, except to the laws and ordinances of the Lord Jesus, their spiritual head. They were thenceforward, with the rest of the church, *to stand at Christ's judgment seat*, that is to say, *to be amenable to his jurisdiction only*.<sup>\*</sup> Can any one now be at a loss to know what is meant by Christ's judgment seat, or plead ignorance as to the time when it was set up? That I may ensure my being understood, let me here indulge in a little repetition. Christ's judgment seat signifies the authority with which, as the Lawgiver of the New Testament Church, he is invested, and which he exercises over its members; as well as points to the right which he had, as *the greater than Moses*, to bring the former dispensation to an end—to visit the Jewish nation with the punishments threatened in ancient prophecy—and to continue inflicting upon them the visible tokens of the divine displeasure.† This judgment seat, or authority, was set up when Jerulasem was destroyed, and it shall last throughout every age of the Church, the period of its duration being the period of the duration of the New Testament dispensation itself. In one word, the judgment seat of Christ does not, as theologians have dreamed, signify a tribunal to be erected in *a future state of existence*, and standing contrasted with *earthly tribunals or governments*; but one already erected in *this present world*, and standing contrasted only with *the judgment seat of Moses*—and the New Testament Israel, or body of New Testament believers, stand at Jesus' judgment seat, or are amenable to his jurisdiction *now*, as the

\* See Acts xxv. 10. *I stand at Cesar's judgment seat*, that is, I am amenable to Cesar's jurisdiction or authority.

\* Deuteronomy xviii. 18. 19. &c. Acts iii. 22. 23.

Old Testament Israel stood at Moses' judgment seat, or were amenable to his jurisdiction *formerly*. The view just hinted, and not fanciful and unwarranted notions, concerning *a future state* of the Christian Church, either here or hereafter, explains those passages in the Book of Revelation, which treat of *a Judgment*, and a *day or time of Judgment*.\* But upon this last subject I cannot afford time to enter.

Secondly. There will be objected to me those passages of scripture, in which eternal, or everlasting punishment is spoken of.

The principle, upon which difficulties arising from this and similar expressions are solved, has been so fully stated already, in my answer to the preceding objection, that it is unnecessary for me to run any risk of wearing out the patience of my readers, by dwelling upon it at great length under this head. *Everlasting punishment*, in all those passages, both of the Old Testament and of the New, where it occurs, *refers simply to the fate of the Jews, and to the fate of those believers who, during the reign of the Messiah, should be found, in any respect whatever, subjecting themselves to the authority of Moses, instead of yielding obedience to the one great commandment of their spiritual head.* John xiii. 34. xv. 12. To render this intelligible I observe,

1. That the phrases *eternal*, and *everlasting*, whenever they are employed, are relative terms, having a reference to some *test or standard of existence*, and that their signification will vary *according to the test or standard that may be assumed*. If the duration of

\* No candid and enlightened person can compare the 34th and 35th chapters of Isaiah, with the 17th and 18th of Revelation, and particularly Isaiah xxxiv. 16 with Revelation xviii. 3, without perceiving that the latter passage alludes to the former.

this present world, or present system of things, be assumed as the standard, everlasting, in that case, will signify, as long as this world lasts or endures. In this sense the hills are spoken of as *everlasting*. Genesis xlix. 26. If the period, during which the dispensation of Moses or that of Jesus shall last or continue, be assumed as the standard, then everlasting will signify, as long as either of these dispensations lasts or continues. In this sense the land of Canaan, was to be given to the descendants of Abraham according to the flesh, *for an everlasting possession*, that is to say, they were to possess it as long as the temporary covenant made at Mount Sinai was to last, or as long as they were obedient. Gen. xvii. 8. It is in this sense, likewise, that I understand the term *everlasting* to be applicable to the punishment of the Jews. It is to last or endure as long as the economy or dispensation of the Messiah. But the dispensation of the Messiah is to last during the subsistence of this present visible system of things—he *shall be feared*, or shall reign, *as long as the Sun and Moon endure*, Psalm lxxii. 5—from this then it clearly follows, that there cannot be a period assigned during the subsistence of this present world, when the punishment of the Jews shall come to an end, that is, in other words, *it shall be everlasting*. I would just add, that if the existence of God himself be assumed as the standard of everlasting duration, then and only then everlasting will imply *absolute eternity*, or *everlastingness of existence absolutely considered*, if for the sake of perspicuity, I may be allowed to coin such modes of expression.

In attaching these various senses to the word *everlasting*, I am completely borne out, both by the nature of the case, and by the meaning of the original word

commonly employed in the sacred writings to denote it. By the nature of the case, for as it is plain, that the limitation of our faculties prevents our forming any idea of *absolute duration*, except through the medium of what is *relative*, it becomes next to certain, that all the language which we apply to *eternity*, must have been language originally and properly applied to *time*. By the meaning of the original word; for *αιωνιος* is derived from *αιων*, which commonly signifies *age*, *æra*, or *dispensation*, and is compounded, according to grammarians, of *αιε* *ων*, or *that which always lasts*, *αιων* being a word which, in its primary sense, and ordinary classical usage, is applied to *what may be measured by time*, and only at the utmost in a secondary and derived sense, to *what we commonly mean by eternity*. But enough of this.

That my meaning may if possible be still better understood, let me observe further, that the everlasting punishment, threatened in scripture, in so far as it respects *the Jews*, must be strictly of a *national kind*, and since no nation as such, has any existence beyond this present world, no more can national punishment extend beyond it. On the other hand, it is also plain, that national existence may be commensurate with the duration of this present world, and that therefore national punishment may be commensurate with it likewise. As the genuine conclusion deducible from these premises, so long as the Jews exist as a body, or in a national capacity, even though their separate existence should be protracted to the end of time, so long may they continue exposed to the visible tokens of the divine displeasure. *His blood be on us and on our children*, said their ancestors, when clamorously demanding the life of the Messiah, and the awful imprecation

has been, and in every age will be fulfilled. This is *everlasting punishment*.

The view just stated is, I am well aware, completely at variance with the notions entertained by many leading religious characters at the present day. According to them, we may anticipate the speedy arrival of a period, when the Jews shall again be assembled in a national capacity, in the land of Palestine, and be distinguished by many visible tokens of the divine favour, as a preparatory step to their believing in Jesus as the Messiah. That such an expectation is unfounded in scripture, and unwarranted by any appearances that have hitherto been observed, I have no hesitation in maintaining. The Supreme Being hath pronounced upon *the rebellious and stiff-necked descendants of Abraham*, by the mouths of ancient prophets and his own Son, a sentence of righteous and everlasting exclusion from his love, and who will venture to say, that this, or any other sentence of his, can be revoked? God forbid that I should oppose, or attempt to depreciate the exertions so strenuously put forth by many at the present day, to induce the Jewish nation to peruse the New Testament scriptures. So far from this, the persons engaged in the undertaking have my best wishes, and most fervent prayers, for their success; and many Jews, profited by their pious labours, and enlightened through their instrumentality, will, I sincerely hope, be added to *the Church of the living God*. But I do oppose, with all my might, the idea that the Jews, as a body, or in a national capacity, while they continue the avowed enemies of the Messiah, shall be, in any respect whatever, the objects of the divine approbation—or that the signal vengeance denounced against them, throughout the Old

Testament scriptures, and by the Lord Jesus himself, shall ever be mitigated or repealed. I cannot help observing in the fact of their preservation hitherto, notwithstanding all the efforts made by princes and sovereign states to crush, destroy, and extirpate them, not a preparation or introduction to any change in their sentiments as a body, but a part fulfilment of those prophecies, with regard to their obstinacy and punishment, which shall continue fulfilling in every succeeding age. What evidence are those societies, which profess to have for their object the conversion of the Jews, able to produce of extensive and permanent benefits resulting from their exertions? Has any long and well authenticated list of converts ever been published? Nay, what impression have their efforts been able to make on the great bulk of the Jewish nation, except that of increasing their blasphemous and outrageous opposition to Jesus of Nazareth? Such, the supporters of these societies may depend upon it, will always be the result, for the idea of extinguishing Judaism, during the continuance of this present world, is neither more nor less than the idea, that God's purposes and threatenings may be frustrated. That, when *the fulness of the Gentiles shall have been brought in, all Israel shall be saved*, is clear, but is there a man, whose mental vision is not obscured by prejudice, who does not perceive, that *the fulness of believers, whether Jews or Gentiles, is itself the fulness of the Israel of God.* Rom. ii. 28. 29. Gal. iii. 29.

2- The phrase, *eternal punishment*, will become still more intelligible, if we consider two passages of the New Testament, which are commonly quoted, and insisted on, by the supporters of the ordinary doctrine, viz, the latter part of Matthew xxv, and of Luke xvi.

Both of these, when examined, will be found to give no countenance to the idea of punishment in a state of existence succeeding the present, but to refer to events then speedily approaching, especially the close of the Mosaic dispensation, and the ruin and desolation which were impending over the Jewish people.

No man who peruses carefully the 24th chapter of Matthew, and connects with it the latter part of the 23d, can fail to perceive, that the destruction of Jerusalem, and particular directions to the Disciples, relative to the line of conduct, which they should pursue, when that event took place—constitute the subject matter of which the Lord Jesus is treating. It is equally obvious, that the language of our Saviour, from the beginning of the xxivth chapter, to the end of the xxvth, is set down and intended to be understood as one continued discourse. Should any person then, venture to assert that *the end of the Mosaic dispensation*, and *the end of this present world or visible system of things*, are both and separately treated of, in the 24th and 25th chapters of Matthew, it will be incumbent on him to point out where the one topic ends, and the other begins; and likewise, to satisfy us of the grounds or principles on which he contends for the distinction. This, I am well aware, any one who risks the attempt, will find to be extremely puzzling, and to involve him in difficulties absolutely insurmountable. On the contrary, a very slight degree of attention will suffice to discover, that phraseology which in the 24th chapter is unquestionably applied to the destruction of Jerusalem, is introduced, repeated, and enlarged upon in all the parables contained in the 25th. Could this be, if the subjects spoken of in these two chapters were different? To be a little more particular; *the*



*coming of the Bridegroom—the return of the Lord to reckon with his servants—and the sitting down of the Son of Man on the throne of his Glory*—all evidently refer to one and the same period ; and unless that period be the same with the one when the occurrences, spoken of in the 29th, 30th, and 31st verses of the 24th chapter, were to take place, I cannot see what connexion the parables in the 25th chapter have with the contents of the preceding one, nor in what respect they contribute towards the illustration of our Lord's statements and warnings. But the 29th, 30th, and 31st verses of the 24th chap. must refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, and to the events which were to stand connected with it, because otherwise our Lord would return no answer to the query proposed to him by his disciples, *as to the time when the temple should be overthrown, and the end of the then existing age, aera, or dispensation, should take place* ; and if so, then the close of the 24th chapter, and all the parables contained in the 25th, have a reference to the same events. The truth is, that the parable in question—Matt. xxv. 31, to the end—admits of an explanation, easy, obvious, and scriptural. *The Son of Man coming in his Glory, and sitting upon the throne of his Glory*, alludes to Jesus appearing in that full development of his character, and of the righteousness of his claims, as the Messiah, which should take place, when Jerusalem was destroyed, and vengeance executed upon the Jewish nation. *He should be attended by his Holy Angels*, that is, by the prophets, who were his Angels or Messengers, to announce his future coming, under the Law, Hebrews i. 1. to the end ; and by the apostles, who were his angels or messengers to proclaim that he had come, under the Gospel, Psalm

lxxxix. 15. Matthew xxiv. 31—and *they should share with him in his Glory*, Matthew xvii. 1—9, xix. 28, that is, the truth of all their declarations concerning him should then be made fully manifest, Rev. xix. 10, at the end, every stigma which, during their lifetime, had attached to their characters on account of their adherence to his cause, being then fully removed. *All nations should be gathered before him*, that is, his authority was not, like that of Moses, to be confined to the inhabitants of any particular country or district, but was to extend to *every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation*, Psalm ii. 8. Still, however, *his kingdom not being of this world*, or of a kind similar to other monarchies, in other words, being *merely spiritual*, could only comprehend those to whom the divine character had been manifested, viz. Jews and believing Gentiles. These, therefore, are the only classes upon whom he is represented as pronouncing Judgment. Compare verse 44 with Corinth. xii. 3. The principle of his judgment, or decision, is then brought into view, verses 35, 36, 40, 42, 43, 45. He should not pronounce sentence according to *the law of Moses*, which was now finally and for ever superseded, as having been fulfilled, Rom. x. 4, but according to *his own law*, Deuter. xviii. 15, &c. John xiii. 34, xv. 12. Acts iii. 22. 23. Rom. xiii. 8—10. 1 Corinth. xiii. Gal. v. 14. 1 John ii. 7—11, even that *law of love to the Brethren*, which had been enforced by himself and his apostles. The Jews, as having rejected and violated this law of his, although promulgated to them, were to be cast out of his kingdom, or of New Testament privileges—and the same punishment was to be inflicted on believers of the Gospel, in every succeeding age, by whom this same

law should be violated. They who complied with the law of love were to enter into the enjoyment of *eternal life* in this world, for, *love* and *eternal life* being both terms expressive of the divine nature, 1 John iv. 8. 16, v. 20. to enter into the enjoyment of the one, is of course to enter into the enjoyment of the other; whilst those, whether Jewish or Gentile New Testament believers, who violated this law, were to be excluded from the enjoyment of *eternal life* in this world,\* a punishment which, as it is to last and be in force during *every age of the Church*, is therefore properly denominated *eternal punishment*. In one word, *eternal life* in this and many other passages of scripture, when predicated of New Testament believers during their abode in this present world, denotes *the privileges enjoyed by them, during the subsistence of that everlasting dispensation or economy, by which the dispensation of Moses has been superseded*; and *eternal punishment* denotes, *exclusion from these privileges*; the essence of the former being *love to the Brethren*, that of the latter, *the absence of this principle*. Matt. xix. 16 to the end, i. John 3, 10 downwards. Such then is the plain, obvious, and consistent meaning of that much abused passage of scripture, Matt. xxv. 31—46.

The story of the rich man and Lazarus, in the 16th chapter of Luke, is in the same predicament with the passage in Matthew, which we have just been considering, and falls to be explained on the same principles. Strange to tell, the greater part of those who have referred to, quoted, or commented on the former passage just mentioned, Luke xvi 19—31, have

\* That *eternal life* here cannot mean *eternal life absolutely considered*, is plain from this, that it is *conditionally bestowed*. Now the *conditional* enjoyment of blessings, is peculiar and limited to this present world.

overlooked its connexion with what precedes and follows, and have failed to perceive that *as a parable* it cannot be *literally interpreted*. Our Lord was addressing the Jews, and warning them of the awful events that were speedily approaching, but he did so in parabolical or figurative language, for a reason assigned by himself, Matt. xiii. 13, 14. 15. The parable here employed, is that of two men, one of whom is rich, and is the representative of the Jewish nation abounding in religious and civil privileges, during the existence of the Mosaic economy, Romans iii. 1. 2, ix. 4. 5; the other of whom is poor, and is the representative of the Gentiles, who, during the existence of that economy, were entirely destitute of religious privileges *directly*, and who only *indirectly* and *occasionally*, by means of the Jews scattered among them, *picked up* views of the character of *the living and true God* like *crumbs falling from a rich man's table*. Mark vii. 28. In process of time both *die*, or their respective states come to an end; the rich man is *buried*, or the Mosaic dispensation is finally and completely overturned; while the poor man *is carried by angels into Abraham's bosom*, or, Gentiles, by faith in the declarations of the apostles as Jesus' angels or messengers, become *Abraham's spiritual seed*, and partakers of the blessings promised to him. Rom. iv. Gal. iii. The rich man, however, in his new state, is *in torments*, or the Jews, still adhering to the law of Moses and their ancient worship and institutions, are subjected to awful and painful marks of the divine vengeance, not the least aggravation of which is, their perceiving the Gentiles *in Abraham's bosom*, or observing the religious privileges into the possession of which they have been introduced. They solicit from Abraham a very little

water to cool the tip of their tongues, that is, mitigation of their torments, but this he declares impossible. *Abraham now knows them not.* May, he informs them that there is now *an impassable Gulph interposed between him and them*, by which he gives them to understand, that whereas, under the former dispensation it was impossible for any man to be an object of the divine approbation who was not a Jew or a Gentile proselyte, the tables were now so completely turned, that it was impossible for any man who continued a Jew, and rejected Jesus as the Messiah, at the same time to enjoy the slightest token of the divine favour. The parable closes by hinting, in a very broad and intelligible manner, that the great bulk of the Jewish nation, who had failed to discover, from the writings of Moses and the prophets, that *Jesus was the Messiah*, during his personal ministry, would remain unconvinced even by the fact of his resurrection from the dead. What, to the attentive and spiritually instructed reader can be plainer than all this? In what part of the parable, interpreted according to the genuine principles of metaphorical language and viewed in connexion with the context, is there discoverable, the slightest foundation for the ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment in a future state of existence? Such as are desirous to prosecute their researches further, may peruse the 49th Psalm, which has a clear and manifest reference to the same subject.

Having thus completed what was originally intended, I might now bring the Essay to a close, did not two or three points, intimately connected with the subject of which I have been treating, seem to demand a little passing notice.

It may be alleged that the scope and tendency of the preceding statements and reasonings, is to do away with the existence of *evil spirits* altogether, and indeed with all such beings as those commonly denominated *angels*. To this I reply, that in nothing advanced or insisted upon by me, has it been my intention to say a single word which could be so construed, as to imply a limitation of the divine power and sovereignty. I firmly believe, taught by the scriptures themselves, that God may, whenever and in whatever way he pleases, create any intelligent being or order of intelligent beings, whether good or evil, and employ them in the execution of his purposes, whatever these may be. But I deny, and that without the slightest vestige of doubt or hesitation, that it is possible for God to invest *a wicked being as such*, or the acts of a wicked being, with his own attributes and perfections, such as *infinity, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, &c.* and this simply, because his doing so would be *inconsistent with his revealed character*.

It may be alleged further, that, entertaining the sentiments which I do, it is impossible for me to hold the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection of unbelieving and wicked men. To this I answer, that with the question, whether such persons shall or shall not rise again, I do not intermeddle, indeed I must candidly confess, nor am I ashamed to make the avowal, that I have no fixed views at all in reference to this subject. Scripture seems to observe a profound silence with regard to it. In John xi. 25. 26, the resurrection and immortality of believers alone are spoken of. So likewise in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, and the 4th chapter of 1 Thessalonians—the only two passages in the Epistles of Paul where the doctrine of the resur-

rection is discussed formally, and at any length—the inspired writer treats of the resurrection of believers, whom he divides into two classes, those who die previous to a certain event, and those who are preserved alive till it takes place. The texts commonly quoted, from the 5th of John, and the 24th of the Acts, in proof of the ordinary doctrine, and regarded by many as quite conclusive, are evidently figurative expressions, borrowed from the 12th chapter of Daniel, 1—3, and explained by Jesus in Matthew xxiii, 34—36, particularly in the last mentioned verse, as having a reference to what should happen at the close of the Mosaic Dispensation. In regard, then, to the subject of the resurrection and immortality of unbelievers in a future state of existence, I desire to imitate the conduct of the inspired writers, in the silence which they have seen meet to observe. Of *this* I am satisfied, that all to whom the divine character is manifested here, live eternally hereafter, for *the knowledge of God, and of Jesus Christ whom he has sent, is eternal life*, John xvii. 3, 1 John v. 20. That I may not, however, expose myself to the charge of exhibiting any want of candour, I allow that one of two consequences, obviously and necessarily results from the views maintained in this work, either that the unbelieving have no interest at all in the resurrection and enjoyment of immortality, or that they rise again and inherit eternal life, in virtue of power received from the Lord Jesus, and as possessed of his nature, on the same footing with the righteous. Which of these two consequences is correct, I again repeat, I know not, but in whatever way the matter may be decided, I cannot perceive that it has the slightest tendency to affect the strength and solidity of the preceding arguments.

It might be deemed an unwarrantable piece of neglect on my part, were I not to take some notice, in connexion with the subject of which I have been treating, of the doctrine of *the second coming of the Lord Jesus*. The period when this event took place has been but rarely understood. Notwithstanding our Lord's oft repeated warning, *behold I come quickly*, and his numerous exhortations to his followers, *to be prepared for his approach*, they have *not watched*, *the Son of Man has come as a thief in the night*, and his coming has not been perceived. The professed disciples of Jesus, ignorant of these important facts, that the end of the world signifies, in scripture language, the end of the Mosaic economy, Heb. ix. 26, and that the design of his second coming, was to set aside that economy visibly and entirely by *taking to himself his great power and reigning*, have feigned to themselves the notion that the second coming of Jesus is still future. and stands connected with the termination of this present visible system of things. To support them in their delusions and give to these a plausible sort of colouring, the Book of Revelation has been pressed into the service, and a work which, more clearly than almost any other part of scripture, points to the destruction of Jerusalem there denominated Babylon, and the full introduction of New Testament privileges, beautifully described in the 21st and 22d chapters, prophecies which long since received their accomplishment, has had senses the most chimerical, incongruous, and unwarranted assigned to it, by Mede and a host of subsequent commentators, and is supposed to be yet in a great measure unfulfilled. Alas! little are such persons aware, that if their theories were correct, scripture would be untrue. Our



blessed Lord has declared, Matthew v. 17. 18, that *he came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to fulfil*, and that *till heaven and earth* (figurative language for the Old Testament economy) *passed, one jot or one tittle, should in no wise pass from the law till all was fulfilled*. But the law has passed away—heaven and earth or the Mosaic economy has passed away or come to an end likewise—and as it thus appears that the law and the prophets, by which expression we are to understand all that is contained in the Old Testament scriptures were fulfilled, when Jesus executed the divine vengeance upon the Jewish nation—brought to a close the Mosaic Economy—and set up in its full lustre and glory his own long promised and long expected Kingdom—what further accomplishment of scripture in this world remains to be looked for? The law has passed away—*it must then be entirely fulfilled*. But I cannot enlarge on this subject. *Sat verbum sapienti!* Whatever may be advanced to the contrary, from the dreaming and inconsistent works of the Fathers, I am now fully satisfied, and that *from the terms in which they are couched*, that all the books of the New Testament, without a single exception, were written previous to the destruction of Jerusalem.

In conclusion, after the ample, and, I hope, satisfactory manner, in which the topics proposed for consideration have been discussed, little or nothing remains to be added. I have shown, that as, on the one hand, it was impossible for Adam to forfeit *more* than he possessed, so, on the other, the forfeiture incurred by him attached to *all* that he possessed. I have shown, that this forfeiture of his, was no unforeseen

or accidental matter, but was introductory to, and the means of developing the ulterior designs of the Supreme Being, or, in other words, that the forfeiture of this present life by Adam, opened up the way for God's bestowing immortality and eternal life through Jesus, and that the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, was both the pledge and the medium of this blessing being bestowed. I have also shown, that the everlasting punishment of unbelieving and wicked persons in a future state of existence, is a mere chimera or fiction of the human mind, deriving its origin from mistaken views of scripture, and from ignorance of the nature and consequences of sin. To sum up the whole in a few sentences, the design of this essay has been, by combating and refuting a few closely connected errors, to show, that although God applies, and, consistently with his revealed character, can apply no *remedy* to the original transgression of man, but allows it to take its full effect in the destruction of *human nature*, he renders that transgression and its consequences, the means of accomplishing his designs, in the development of *his character*, and the communication of *his nature*. There is no *restoration* or *recovery* of what Adam forfeited announced in scripture, for what he forfeited he forfeited for ever, but the substance of the divine declarations is, that through Jesus as the Lord from Heaven *all things are made new*. *This is the record that God hath given to us* originally possessed of natural life *eternal life*, and *this life is*, not in or through Adam but *in or through his Son*.\* In the course of the preceding remarks, I have shown particularly, that sin being merely one of the means or instruments which God employs for effecting his

\* See also 1 Peter i. 23.

purposes, comes to an end or is annihilated, along with this present world, as soon as these purposes are accomplished. How much more pleasing, as well as scriptural, is this view of things than that which represents sin, as having an eternal and necessary existence, and as being thus either one with or the rival of the Almighty. May the Great Head of the Church, in whose name, and for the advancement of whose Glory, this little work was undertaken, condescend to make it the vehicle of exciting in some, attention to his own most blessed word, and of emancipating them from certain antichristian errors and prejudices, by which, for ages, the followers of Jesus, from neglect or an undue deference to the opinions of others, have been enslaved,

## FINIS.

## ERRATA.

Page 12, line 26, for *they denote* read *it denotes*.

12, 27, for *they* read *it*.

13, 12, after *and* insert *are*,

24, 85 for *recommencing* read *commencing*.

39, 9, for *points* read *parts*.

46, 22, for *are some* read *is one*.

52, 3 and 4, for *misunprehend* read *misapprehend*.

72, 5, of the note, for *inccasing* read *increasing*.

81, 22, for *proceedure* read *procedure*.

I cannot allow this little work to go forth to the public, without acknowledging the obligations under which I lie, for valuable hints as to the subject matter of which it treats, to certain highly respected and much endeared members of my congregation. In particular, for the remark concerning the agency of the Devil in giving rise to the ordinary doctrine of *the immortality of the soul*, at page 53, for part of the note at page 54, and for the note at page 94, I am indebted to my friend Mr. W. J. Reade.

**SOLD ALSO BY ROCKLIFF AND DUCKWORTH,**

**and the other Booksellers,**

**Remarks, by the Rev. DAVID THOM, Minister of the Scotch Church, Rodney-street, Liverpool, on a series of charges recently preferred, against him, before the Reverend the Presbytery of Glasgow, by certain individuals connected with the management of the said Church. With a copious Appendix.**

---

**Memorial submitted by the Rev. DAVID THOM, to the Presbytery of Glasgow, regarding the Theological points of his case.**

---

**A Letter to the Rev. Richard T. P. Pope, adverting to some important mistakes committed by him in his recent controversy with the Rev. Thomas Maguire. By OBSERVER.**

RECENT  
CORRESPONDENCE  
BETWEEN THE  
PRESBYTERY OF GLASGOW  
AND THE  
REV. DAVID THOM,  
OCCASIONED BY A  
SECOND INTERFERENCE ON THEIR PART  
WITH HIM.

*"Nec tamen consumebatur."*

---

LIVERPOOL :

PRINTED BY R. RIDDICK, KELLY'S ROOMS, 46, LORD-STREET; AND SOLD BY  
ROCKLIFF & DUCKWORTH, EVANS, CHEGWIN & HALL, AND TAYLOR, CASTLE-  
STREET; GRAY, PARADISE-STREET; GRAPEL, CHURCH-STREET; AND THE  
OTHER BOOKSELLERS.

---

*Price Eightpence.*

---

1828.



TO

MR. SAMUEL PHILLIPS, TREASURER,

DR. PETER MACINTYRE, SECRETARY,

AND

Messrs. JOHN GARDENER,

SAMUEL McCULLOCH,

THOMAS ROY,

R. G. HUNT,

ANDREW WATSON,

JAMES BAIRD,

JOHN MUIR,

Messrs. JAMES FORRESTER,

DAVID RANKIN,

JOHN MILLER,

R. W. RONALD,

JOHN DOWNEY,

GEORGE BENNETT, and

D. J. KIER,

TRUSTEES OF THE CHAPEL, BOLD-STREET, LIVERPOOL,

THIS CORRESPONDENCE,

AS A SMALL TRIBUTE OF RESPECT,

IS DEDICATED

BY

THE EDITOR.





LETTER FROM THE MODERATOR OF THE PRESBYTERY  
OF GLASGOW TO MR. THOM.

SIR,

A pamphlet being circulated in this city bearing as its title "Three Questions Proposed and Answered, concerning The Life Forfeited by Adam, The Resurrection of the Dead, and Eternal Punishment," to which your name is attached as author of said Pamphlet,—I am appointed by a committee specially appointed for considering the measures which ought to be adopted by the Presbytery, in relation to the tenets avowed in the answers attached to the above questions, to request you to say whether you avow yourself to be the author, as stated in the title.

I write this accordingly in their name, expecting your answer.

JOHN LOCKHART, Moderator.

Glasgow, 14th April, 1823.

*To the Rev. David Thom, Liverpool.*

---

MR. THOM'S ANSWER TO THE ABOVE LETTER.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, bearing date the 14th current, in which you mention, that you are appointed by a Committee of the Presbytery of Glasgow to inquire, if I avow myself to be the author of a pamphlet entitled "Three Questions Proposed and Answered, concerning the Life Forfeited by Adam, The Resurrection

of the Dead, and Eternal Punishment," to which pamphlet my name is attached as author.

Were I disposed to take my stand upon that "form of process," and those "Acts of Assembly," by which you profess to be guided in your procedure, I might at once object to and protest against the course which you have adopted in regard to me as irregular and unconstitutional. By the "form of process," chapter 7, section 5, it is provided, that no minister shall be brought to a confession until a libel, that is, an indictment, specifying the ground or grounds of accusation against him, with the requisite conclusions, shall have been drawn up and considered—until a copy of it shall have been served upon him either personally or at his dwelling-house, by the officer of court—until ten free days shall have been allowed him to give in answers to the libel, and his defence and objections against witnesses—and until an interlocutor sustaining the relevancy of the libel shall, after discussion and deliberation, have been pronounced. Besides in the case of "the matters laid to the Ministers' charge" "being unsoundness and heterodoxy in doctrine," it is recommended by § 8 of the same chapter that "lenitives, admonitions, instructions, and frequent conferences should be tried to reclaim without cutting off." Now need I remark, that without paying the least regard to your own ecclesiastical statutes and constitutions—without raising a libel\*—informing me of the ground or grounds of accusation against me—or allowing me an opportunity of discussing the relevancy of your procedure—nay, without even trying the effect of a single admonition, instruction, or conference—you have called upon me *instantly* to confess or deny the commission of what has doubtlessly been already decided to be a cri-

\*The Scotch law term for an indictment.

minial act. What answer, under such circumstances, are you entitled to expect? Besides, what jurisdiction, even on your own principles, do you or can you possess over me? I do not reside within your bounds, nor have I done so since the year 1820. Or if the place where a minister resided during the last six weeks of his stay in Scotland is, in the eye of the law, to constitute his *domicilium*, then I am amenable to the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of Dumblane, of which I have the honour to be a Licentiate. Thus is it clearly impossible that, upon the acknowledged principles of Scottish jurisprudence, I can be, in any respect whatever, subject to your authority.

But waving these matters, which I merely state as deserving your consideration in any ulterior measures which you and your brethren may see meet to adopt, I beg leave to observe, that I except to your authority and decline your jurisdiction upon much higher and far different principles.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not going to annoy you with "the thrice told tale" of independency, or to read you a lecture upon what appear to me various unscriptural modes of Church Government, ranking yours, of course, among the number. I have just to say, that I object to all and every species of Church Government (as it is called) whatever, because I regard all believers of the Gospel as standing upon a footing of perfect equality and independency, in their character of *Kings and Priests unto God*, and consequently to inform the Presbytery, that I view them in no other light than as an assembly of respectable and learned individuals, whom the laws of the country have invested with certain secular privileges and immunities. You will have the goodness, therefore, to excuse me if I decline answering your question, lest by so doing

I should even appear to acknowledge your authority, but as it is not by fear, contempt, or any other unworthy motive that I am actuated in this refusal, I beg leave to add, that if you or any other member of the Presbytery, shall feel inclined to address to me a letter written in your private and individual capacity, and reiterating the question contained in your official one, you may reckon upon a direct, immediate, and satisfactory answer.

Here I might stop, but as this letter is destined for publication, and must, as the basis of your ulterior proceedings, find a place among your records, I am desirous to furnish not merely you, but also such of my contemporaries and posterity as may happen to read it, with a few hints and remarks, which, by the Divine blessing, may perhaps be useful.

Before advancing further I must advert to one charge which you may cast in my teeth, viz. that of having subscribed a Confession which I do not believe. To this I answer, that I cannot conceive it possible so to trammel and fetter the human mind, and so to circumscribe its researches, as that what appears to it to be true at the present moment, shall present to it exactly and in all respects the same aspect five years hence. If members of the Presbytery of Glasgow who have attained to sixty, seventy, or eighty years of age, and who forty or fifty years since subscribed the Westminster Confession of Faith, in all sincerity no doubt, have made no advances in theological knowledge in the interim, which, if they then understood what they subscribed and adhere to it still, it is impossible they can have done, I see no reason to congratulate them or their congregations upon such an astonishing and deplorable instance of stagnation of intellect, and must add, that I could scarcely have expected

to find among a learned body so apt an illustration of the poet's remark, that "men are but children of a larger growth."

But to proceed to other matters. It strikes me that, by their recent interference with me, the Presbytery of Glasgow have rendered themselves obnoxious to the charge of egregious folly. Laying out of view for the present the character of the individual whom they have assailed, and the lesson which they might have been taught on a former occasion, can they have overlooked the fact, that by the inquiry which they have seen meet to institute, they are giving additional publicity both to the man and his cause? Gamaliel, who appears to have been a very prudent as well as a very learned man in his day, once delivered a speech which is recorded in the 5th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and which may be advantageously recommended to your perusal. Speaking of the apostles who had been dragged to the bar of the Sanhedrim, for *preaching in the name of Jesus*, he thus gave his advice. *Refrain from these men, and let them alone, for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.* The Sanhedrim, after the lapse of a short time, chose to neglect Gamaliel's advice, and it is unnecessary to inform you of the result. You know well the old proverbial saying, occasioned by the ill success of the persecuting attempts made by heathens, to suppress Christianity in its earlier stages, "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church." But the Church of Scotland needs not to look abroad for warnings, as to the folly of endeavouring either by ecclesiastical or secular censures, to check the growth and spread of obnoxious sentiments. Her own history will

supply her with these in large abundance. What was the result of the stir which the Church of Scotland made relative to the doctrines of Mr. John Glas and the Messrs. Erskines? What was the consequence of the deposition of Mr. Gillespie in 1752, that *coup d'essai* of Principal Robertson? The existence of the numerous Glassite or Sandemanian Churches scattered throughout the Island, and of the Secession and Relief bodies, which, in point of numbers and respectability, almost rival the Established Church herself, will at once and best answer the question. Have you forgotten what followed the publication and circulation of the famous pastoral letter in 1798? If the publication of Dr. Mc Gill's work, and his subsequent trial, were not attended with similar results, and if the Socinian cause is not so strong and rampant in Scotland at the present day as might have been anticipated, for this you have to thank the meanness of spirit which prompted the Dr. to suppress or throw a veil over his peculiar views, for the sake of retaining his emoluments, and not any wisdom displayed by the ecclesiastical judicatories before which he was brought. Men were not likely to feel any deep or lasting interest in a cause which its avowed champion had thought fit to desert. The general rule thus being, a rule established by a reference to the history of your own church, that every thing like persecution for religion's sake excites inquiry, and tends to spread the doctrines against which it is directed, do you really think that my case is likely to form an exception to it? You have by one sentence of yours deprived me of my former source of income, and done what was in your power to crush the cause which I advocate, but have you by that procedure of yours in the slightest degree shaken me or shaken the affections of my friends

towards me? Has not the cause gained strength in Liverpool since your sentence was pronounced, nay, is it not a remarkable fact, that in some of the Scotch congregations here, the doctrine of the Assurance of Faith, or *the certainty which every believer of the Gospel has, that he does believe it*, that doctrine against which your anathemas were specially fulminated, is now by no means viewed with the same abhorrence that it once was? That it can be *listened to* at least from the lips of others? Are not some ministers of your own Church charged with preaching it? Another doctrine, or series of doctrines, broached in a work bearing my name, has, it seems, given you displeasure, if not even excited your alarm, and can you suppose that many will not be induced to inquire what that may be, which has thrown a learned Presbytery into such a fearful quandary? The spirit of inquiry being thus once roused can you say where it will stop, or are you so confident of every part of your standards being strictly agreeable to the volume of divine truth, that you dare subject them to a close, rigid, and searching scrutiny? Be wise in time, and take the advice of a friend. Hush up the matter if possible. Reserve the cry, Great is Diana of the Ephesians, for some more fitting occasion, and some more dignified antagonist, and take care lest by means of the torch which you are now so foolishly and unadvisedly brandishing, you light up a conflagration, in the blaze of which you yourselves are consumed.

Having hinted something about religious persecution in the last paragraph, I fancy I overhear you and your brethren exclaim, "Persecution! Mr. Thom is labouring under a most erroneous impression; there is nothing of the nature of persecution in our procedure towards him; we are not wanting to inflict upon



him any civil injury or disability, but are merely exercising a right, acknowledged to be inherent in every community, that of taking care that the rules and principles, which constitute the basis of our association, shall be preserved inviolate."

Alas, sir, this mode of self-vindication, on the part of Presbytery, however plausible, and however satisfactory to themselves, will not bear the test of examination. It is utterly hollow and delusive. I grant that it is not your intention to immure me in a dungeon for life—to impose a fine upon me—or by means of pains and penalties of any kind to force me to make a public recantation of my supposed sentiments. But besides recollecting that I owe it not to you, but to the mild and paternal nature of the government under which I live, that such extremities cannot now be resorted to, do I not hear enough of "the roaring of the lion" to satisfy me, that it is only on account of change of circumstances, and not from any change of disposition, that "he can do me no harm." Indeed, not to mince the matter, upon the supposition of your being conscientious men, a supposition which I feel exceedingly desirous to cherish, the same zeal, which dictated the question, and insinuated the threat, contained in your Moderator's letter, would, if it had been in your power,—perhaps even from love to my soul, as the judges of a certain court were wont to speak,—have induced you to call in the aid of the civil power, to enforce your meek and edifying decisions. Say I this gratuitously and under the influence of irritated and revengeful feelings, or do not circumstances completely bear me out in my assertion? Have not all of you subscribed to, and are you not, at the present moment, bound to uphold and act upon the doctrine expressed in the following passage?

“ And because the powers which God hath ordained, and the liberty which Christ hath purchased, are not intended by God to destroy, but mutually to uphold and preserve one another; they who upon pretence of christian liberty, *shall oppose any lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical*, resist the ordinance of God. And for their publishing of such opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as are contrary to the light of nature, *or to the known principles of Christianity, whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation; or to the power of Godliness, or such erroneous opinions or practices as either in their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them, are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the church; they may be lawfully called to account and proceeded against, by the censures of the church*, AND BY THE POWER OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE.” Confession of Faith, chapter 20. section 4.

What is this but to declare that, had you the power, you would, with the assistance of the civil magistrate, prosecute to the utmost, all who should obstinately persevere in differing from you as to their religious sentiments? Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that the above, although subscribed by you, and declared “to be the confession of your faith,” is, from the liberal spirit of the age, in many respects, a dead letter, what, let me ask you, was the native tendency, and what, but for the divine interposition, might have been the consequences of your former sentence against me? Was it not to fix an indelible stigma on my character, to destroy my usefulness, to degrade me in the estimation of society, and to reduce me to beggary? Did you not, in fact, by depriving me of my only source of income, leave me in a state of des-

titution? Now, instead of supposing it possible, that the Church of Scotland should adopt a different course, in the case of *delinquent* Ministers, or that, when such are charged with immoral practices, they should, according to almost invariable practice, have a portion of their stipend allotted to them for their maintenance, let me inquire, was not your depriving me of my living productive in my case of a civil injury? Were the other circumstances which I have enumerated less decidedly the effects of your sentence, because flowing indirectly from it, and were not they of the nature of civil injuries likewise? And after all this, can you expect me to believe, that it is not the object, or at all events, that it may not be the consequence of your present proceedings to do me still further mischief? What is your object? Unquestionably to inflict upon me, if in your estimation guilty, ecclesiastical censures, perhaps even to depose me from, what is commonly called, the office of the Holy Ministry. Now, of the civil consequences of this last step, supposing you to take it, you cannot plead ignorance. I am degraded still farther in the scale of society—I am, upon the supposition of my still cherishing some lurking desire after such things, shut out from all prospect of preferment in your Church, and from all the emoluments connected therewith—and I am, in so far as in you lies, pointed out as an object of scorn and aversion to my friends and fellow citizens. Will you pretend, that this is not to visit me with civil disabilities, or can you expect me to shut my eyes to the fact, that as this is the extreme point to which, under existing circumstances, you can go—as, to use your own phraseology, it would be *ultra vires* to proceed farther—the same spirit which leads you to advance to the full extent of

your chain, would, if that chain were lengthened, lead you to avail yourselves to the utmost of its protracted limits?

And for what may all these civil injuries and disabilities be inflicted? Is it for immorality or irregularity of conduct—is it for fornication, adultery, drunkenness, or for any crime cognisable by the ordinary tribunals, that the supposed culprit is again to be brought to the bar of the Presbytery? No: the only crime alleged against him is, that he differs in his religious sentiments from those who constitute themselves his Judges, these Judges professing to be servants, and to act in the name of the meek and lowly Jesus! Were it not for the inveterate strength of prejudice, and the chilling influence of customary associations, astounding facts like these might well draw forth an exclamation of horror and amaze from every reflecting reader,—“What, has it come to this, that in the nineteenth century, that boasted era of freedom of investigation, men may think and express themselves as they please on all subjects except that, which is by common consent, the most important of all? Must man still prescribe to his fellow man the measure and limits of his religious belief? But still more awful and astonishing, shall the name of him who declared that he came upon earth, *not to destroy men's lives but to save them*\*—of him who refused, even when specially entreated, to become *a Judge and a Divider*†—of him who declared that *his kingdom was not of this world*‡—of him who would not sanction the slightest personal injury done to an adversary§—shall his name be prostituted as the medium of inflicting punishment either directly or indirectly upon a professing fellow

\* Luke ix. 56. † Luke xii. 14. § John xviii. 36. ‡ Matt. xxvi. 51—54.

Luke xxii. 50, 51.

disciple?" Such a burst of virtuous indignation however I am not entitled to expect. The sympathies of men, drenched in superstition and false religion, and, although ignorant of the fact, labouring under that most galling and ignominious of all slaveries, the slavery of the understanding, are arrayed on your side, and, therefore, instead of your procedure encountering reprobation, or being viewed with disgust, you may count with certainty upon the approving voice of the great bulk of society being lifted up in your favour. Perhaps a very long interval, even centuries may elapse, before the inhabitants of Scotland shall be sensible of the unscriptural nature of prosecutions for conscience' sake, instituted either by civil or ecclesiastical judicatories—before they shall perceive, that in summoning men to answer for their religious sentiments, you are merely treading in the footsteps of your illustrious predecessor the church of Rome—but a period, I trust, will arrive—perhaps even now is nearer than some of us are aware—when the idea of controlling mere opinions by pains and penalties of any description, and that in the name of Jesus, will be scouted at as one of the most monstrous, of the many monstrous anomalies and absurdities, which, in different ages of the world, have disgraced the human intellect.

Is it my intention to argue, from what precedes, that error should be permitted to stalk abroad unheeded, unchecked, and uncontrolled? God forbid, for if we made no attempt to counteract it, or stop its progress, when we had it in our power to do so, then indeed, should we be chargeable with all the destructive and desolating consequences of which it might be productive. Let error be met—met promptly and met decidedly—but then, let it be met with the only

weapons which the follower of Jesus is authorised to employ. Need I inform you what these are ? Scriptural argument and persuasion. *The weapons of our warfare*, observes a very high authority whom we are all of us bound to respect, *are not carnal, but mighty, through God, to the pulling down of strongholds*. It is remarkable, that the cause of the singular might and efficacy which the apostle here ascribes to his weapons is simply, their differing essentially from those commonly wielded by mankind. They are not carnal, and *therefore* mighty. Supposing me then, for the sake of argument, to be the author of the work entitled, *Three Questions Proposed and Answered*, &c. and supposing that work to contain many dangerous and destructive errors, what, upon Christian principles, should be your conduct ? Certainly, in the spirit of love and brotherly meekness, to endeavour, by appeals to scripture, and thereby refuting me, to convince me of my mistakes ; and, in the same way, to guard others against being led astray by them. Besides, as the author himself has appealed to scripture, to scripture you should go. If you foil him at that weapon not merely is your cause gained, and your church deservedly exalted and strengthened in the estimation of all, but you may perhaps also, on your own principles, be the honoured instruments of winning his soul, for he professes to keep himself open to conviction from scripture, and to be willing to abide by its decisions. If, however, rejecting this plain and obvious Christian course of procedure, and availing yourselves of your secular prerogatives, you try the method of force, and attempt to bear down the author by the weight of ecclesiastical censures, pray what do you gain ? Not only may he himself and his friends disregard your anathemas as a mere *brutum fulmen*,

because not flowing from competent authority, but the question still remains where it was. The Scriptures have been appealed to, and the appeal has not been entertained—nay, as if from conscious weakness, spiritual weapons have been neglected by you—have been allowed to rust “in the armoury of God,”—while mere carnal weapons, a mode of warfare disdained and disclaimed by the inspired apostle, have been employed to effect the subjugation of your antagonist. And do you really expect, in this way, to prosper and prevail? Would to God that you were wise in time, and that of all such unholy and unauthorised methods of vindicating your cause, you could say with Hecuba,

*Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,*

— *Eget.*

As the Jews, when clamouring for the death of Jesus, exclaimed, *We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God,* so I expect you here to turn upon me and say, “Whatever you may be able to plead from Scripture, we have a law, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and Catechisms larger and shorter, and these too sanctioned by acts of parliament of King William and Queen Anne, which, on the supposition of your being the author of the work in question, you have infringed, and according to which you ought to be expelled from the bosom of our community.” I will not dwell upon the singular admission, which such a mode of arguing would imply, that scripture and your standards may chance to be at variance with each other, and that, under such circumstances, the decisions of the latter fall to be preferred to those of the former, because it will be obvious to every one, but I must take leave to direct your attention to the fact, that however much a pretence of adhering to fundamental principles and

regulations, might justify other religious associations, in pursuing a line of conduct similar to that which you have adopted, it will not avail you. According to the Westminster Confession of Faith, upon which your church is founded, and which all of you have subscribed, it is declared, chapter i. § 9 and 10. "The infallible rule of interpretation of scripture, is scripture itself; and, therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture, (which is not manifold, but one) it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly. The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture." In the sentiments thus so clearly and so admirably expressed I fully acquiesce. Now is the Westminster Confession of Faith consistent with itself or is it not? If you admit that it is not, and yet are determined to abide by and pronounce sentence according to its averments, then I would, at once, if the author of the pamphlet in question, plead guilty of having contradicted an inconsistent confession, and there would be an end of the matter. But if the Confession of Faith be consistent with itself, then you cannot, upon your own principles, subscribed and adhered to, try any view or supposed view of mine by it as the standard. Have we not heard it pronouncing a loud and decided reprobation of any such practice? Besides as it does not pretend to be an inspired composition—as it is acknowledged by all, even by yourselves, to be, notwithstanding its numerous excellencies, the production of mere fallible men—how can that, which is confessedly, the



work of erring mortals, become the test or standard of infallible truth? If, then, you are genuine believers in the doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and if "any strange things should be brought to your ears," what, according to that very confession itself, is your bounden duty? Not, surely, to condemn such novelties, on the ground of their being opposed to your previously acquired notions—nay, not even to condemn them, because they are at variance with the Confession itself, for the latter pretends to no higher a rank than merely that of being one among the numerous "Decrees of Councils," which it disclaims and disavows as Judges in religious controversy,—but to refer the matter to and to listen to the voice of "the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture." Now, is not this what the author of the "Three Questions Proposed and Answered" calls upon you to do, and if so, how is he inconsistent with your own standards, and upon what grounds can you condemn him? If scripture is, by your own confession, the ultimate Judge of all religious controversies, and if to this Judge the author has appealed, why, even upon your own principles, until he shall be convicted of being erroneous from scripture itself, *what evil hath he done?* Let me not then be told, that the present procedure has been instituted, and the deposition of the supposed author is sought for, in vindication of your fundamental rules and principles, when it appears from the acknowledged, and no doubt consistent standards of your Church, that to whatever lengths a preacher or writer within its bosom may go, in propounding new views and statements, it is impossible for him to be convicted of violating the terms of your association, unless he shall be proved to be inconsistent with scripture itself.

But perhaps, after all, I am fortunate enough to address myself to men who, convinced by their own standards, if not by my arguments, are willing that a reference of the whole points in dispute should be made to "God himself speaking in the Scriptures" as the supreme and ultimate Judge. Upon this supposition I would, in the name of the Author of the work impugned, venture to propose to the Presbytery the three following questions, as containing the gist of the controversy, and would, for his satisfaction as well as that of others, respectfully request from that Reverend Body a solution of them :—1. *In what part of Scripture is it declared, that Adam, by the fall, incurred spiritual and eternal death ?* 2. *In what part of Scripture is Adam declared to be the source or medium of spiritual and eternal life ?* 3. *In what part of Scripture is it declared that a being possessed of eternal life is or can be a subject of punishment ?* You perceive that the appeal is limited to the scriptures, and I have no doubt that the author is willing to forego every argument and advantage derived from other sources. Can any thing, even upon your principles, be fairer than this ? Or is the cause of the Church of Scotland considered by you so desperate, that you find it necessary, for your own safety, to adhere to the *dogmata* of the *Confession of Faith*, at the expense of throwing scripture overboard altogether ?

I have brought against you the charge of exhibiting, in your present proceedings, a persecuting spirit, a charge which I have endeavoured to substantiate by a considerable variety of proofs and arguments, but I am far, very far indeed, from either saying or insinuating, that it is your intention to persecute me. I beg leave to repeat what I observed when you formerly condemned me, that I believe you to be consci-

entious men, acting under the influence of erroneous views and principles. Deeming my supposed sentiments to be pernicious, you consider yourselves bound by all means in your power, *per fas et nefas*, to repress and destroy them. *I wot that through ignorance you do it.\** You are merely verifying a remark made by very high authority, *the time cometh that whosoever killeth you*, that is, inflicteth upon you any injury for your Religion's sake, *will think that he doth God service*. In these circumstances, what right have I to be displeased or angry with you? You are endeavouring to serve God, according to the views which you have, and what can you do more? I doubtlessly feel myself called upon to combat and expose your mistakes, but I desire to make use of no weapons for this purpose except those of argument and persuasion. Your errors are those of the system with which you are connected, and which you are engaged in upholding—*idola Theatri*, as Lord Bacon styles them—the mantle of the persecuting fathers of the Church of Scotland has descended to you,† and although, from your greater liberality of sentiment, it is felt to be, in many respects, an annoyance and an encumbrance, you cannot help wearing it. Were it not for the calmness and forgiving spirit which this view of your character and situation inspires, could I, without indignation, contemplate the undisguised insult to the Lord Jesus offered by your present proceedings? You

\* Ignorance, not of human systems of Theology, but of the scriptures themselves.

† Let me not be misunderstood. No man respects more highly than I do the noble, uncompromising, and in many points of view, truly Christian spirit exhibited by the Presbyterians of the reigns of Charles and James II. or appreciates more highly the blessings of civil and religious liberty which we owe under God mainly to their exertions. Although truth compels me to call the Fathers of the Church of Scotland persecuting, I charge that circumstance not so much to the account of the men, as to that of the age in which they lived.

consider the work in question as dangerous to the interests of Religion, and yourselves as called upon to stand forward in their defence. Pray, Sir, what is the opinion entertained by your body concerning the Lord Jesus? I am well aware that you pay him the compliment of being possessed of *all power both in heaven and on earth*, but do you really believe that he is so? If possessed of omnipotent sovereignty, he is surely, with reverence be it spoken, capable of avenging his own wrongs, and if he should see meet to leave the blasphemer of his character and dignity unpunished, pray who are you that so officiously take upon yourselves to usurp his place and redress his grievances? In the cases of Ananias and Sapphira, Elymas the sorcerer, and a variety of others, he gave manifest and incontrovertible tokens that *his arm was not shortened*, but when you step forward with all the weight of your secular and ecclesiastical authority, to crush, what you are pleased to regard as error, and consequently as injurious to his cause, *who hath required this at your hands?* Could not Jesus, if consistent with his purposes, have checked at once the growing mischief, and if it seem meet neither to his wisdom nor his power to do so, are you wiser or more powerful than he? Can you plead any secret delegated authority from him to make up for his deficiencies? Who hath authorised you thus to insult to his face the Great Head of the Church? How many evils, if one may be permitted to use a heathen simile, have sprung from puny mortals, striving to wield the thunderbolts of Jove. Read carefully, I entreat you, the parable of the tares and the wheat, as well as the language of Jesus to his Disciples when entreated by them to consume by fire from heaven a village of the Samaritans. There you will see beautifully pour-

trayed the spirit of genuine Christianity. The atheistic Epicurus, who did not find it convenient to deny, in so many words, the existence of the gods, accomplished his purpose equally well, by representing them as perpetually reclining on couches, quaffing nectar, and enjoying agreeable converse with each other, regardless altogether of the concerns of this nether world. When I hear men speaking of the blessed Jesus as invested with sovereign and unlimited authority, and yet the next moment perceive them acting as if they themselves were the governors, and as if every thing depended on their vigilance, skill, and activity, I am forcibly reminded of the analogy. See 1 Kings xviii. 26, 27.

I am very far from wishing to deny, that there *may be* something dangerous in the work in question.—Not dangerous to the cause of truth, for truth to however rigid a scrutiny it may be subjected, will come off truth still, but to the cause of error, which has every thing to fear, and nothing to gain from minute and prying investigation. If, therefore, your concern be occasioned by the interest which you take in the former, *be of good cheer*, it has stood the brunt of many an assault already, and is capable of standing many more without sustaining injury; but if you dread the exposure and destruction of some of the weak points of your cause, I do most sincerely sympathize with you, for scriptural reasoning, it cannot be denied, is a most deadly and unsparing antagonist.

It is impossible for you now, consistently, to think or speak of me with contempt. Your considering it necessary to institute a second inquiry into the religious tenets of a man who has been *virtually* excluded from your body, and *to all intents and purposes* shut out of your pulpits, for the last two or three years,

proves, if it does any thing, that you consider him to be a person of *some* importance. The proper expression of contempt, is neglect, and so long as you persevered in treating me after that fashion, the world, I doubt not, gave you credit for cherishing such a feeling towards me, but now that you are acting upon the principle of "thrice to slay the slain," you have forfeited all claims to be believed, however strongly, in future, you may assert that you despise me. Nor will it do to allege, as the editor of the Christian Herald charitably does, that I am labouring under "mental aberration," for besides that this has often been the last resort of a weak and desperate cause,\* it has often happened, as you are well aware, that a man has displayed provoking "method in his madness."

I would scarcely recommend you to hurl your anathemas against me. My opinion of these, as well as the opinion I suspect of many others, has been thus admirably expressed by one of the ablest champions of the Presbyterian cause, and one, of whom the Church of Scotland has just reason to be proud,—  
*"When a man's mind is darkened with error, at the same time his temper is soured, and because he cannot reason others into the same opinion with himself, he essays to fright them into it with the argument of damnation."*†

\* John x. 20. Acts xxvi. 24. See also Corinth: iii. 18—20. iv. 10. 2 Corinth: xi. 16. The charge of dogmatism, or decision in speaking relative to what we know on the authority of God himself, comes with a very bad grace from those who profess to believe, that boldness or decision constituted one of the leading features both of our Lord himself and his Apostles. John viii. 55. *Yet ye have not known him; but I know him: and if I should say, I know him not, I shall be a liar like unto you: but I know him, and keep his saying.* See also John vii. 26. x. 34—39. Mark xiv. 62. John xviii. 37. Acts iv. 13, 19, 20. v. 29—32. ix. 20, &c.

† Anderson's Defence of Presbyterian Church Government agt. Rhind, page 218. Edit. 1820.

As a small testimony of my respect for many of the individuals composing your body, as well as a proof that my views, in regard to the glorious doctrine of the assurance of faith remain unchanged, I in soon, God willing, dedicating to you a little treatise on that subject.

And now, Gentlemen, in sorrow, not in anger, I take my leave of you. May the Lord enable you to receive in good part, and profit by the hints which I have given you. You will of course understand, that the import of this letter is to intimate to you, the connexion with you *as a body* is henceforward to end.

Requesting you to accept personally of the assurance of my high and undiminished respect,

I am,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

D. THC

Liverpool, 21st April, 1828.

*To the Rev. John Lockhart, D. D.,*

*Moderator of the Presbytery of Glasgow*

*(To be communicated.)*

**SOLD ALSO BY ROCKLIFF AND DUCKWORTH, W. GRAPEL, C. GRAY,**

**and the other Booksellers,**

**Remarks, by the Rev. DAVID THOM, Minister of the Scotch Church, Rodney-street, Liverpool, on a series of charges recently preferred against him, before the Reverend the Presbytery of Glasgow, by certain individuals connected with the management of the said Church. With a copious Appendix.**

---

**Memorial submitted by the Rev. DAVID THOM, to the Presbytery of Glasgow, regarding the Theological points of his case.**

---

**A Letter to the Rev. Richard T. P. Pope, adverting to some important mistakes committed by him in his recent controversy with the Rev. Thomas Maguire. By ONSERVER.**

---

**Three Questions Proposed and Answered, concerning the Life Forfeited by Adam, the Resurrection of the Dead, and Eternal Punishment, by the Rev. DAVID THOM.**

---

**Also may be had**

**Remarks on the Paraphrases of Passages of Scripture, used in Public Worship by the Church of Scotland, having been originally intended as a preface to the edition of these recently published with notes, by the Berean Society in Edinburgh, by EDWARD SANG, Kirkcaldy, Fife.**

---

**Brief Observations by way of Reply to Certain Remarks, privately circulated, in reference to Mr. Thom's Recent Publication, By ALIQUIS.**





**THREE QUESTIONS**  
**PROPOSED AND ANSWERED,**  
**CONCERNING**  
**THE LIFE FORFEITED BY ADAM,**  
**THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD,**  
**AND**  
**ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.**

BY THE REV. DAVID THOM,  
MINISTER, FORMERLY OF THE SCOTCH CHURCH, RODNEY STREET, NOW OF  
BOLD STREET CHAPEL, LIVERPOOL; AUTHOR OF THE ASSURANCE  
OF FAITH, OR CALVINISM IDENTIFIED WITH UNIVERSALISM.

SECOND EDITION,  
ALTERED, ENLARGED, AND IMPROVED.

---

Εγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωή.  
IHCOYΣ.

---

LONDON:  
SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL.  
MDCCCXXXV.

---

**LIVERPOOL:**  
**Printed by RIDDICK & KERR,**  
**Brunswick Street.**

---

TO

SAMUEL M'CULLOCH, ESQ.

ANDREW WATSON, ESQ.

PETER MACINTYRE, ESQ. M.D.

AND

THOSE OTHER FRIENDS OF

THE FREE DISCUSSION OF MATTERS OF RELIGION

ON SCRIPTURAL PRINCIPLES,

BY WHOM HE WAS SUPPORTED

IN HIS

LATE ARDUOUS STRUGGLE

WITH

THE PRESBYTERY OF GLASGOW,

THESE PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY

THE AUTHOR.



## PREFACE.

---

WHEN I published the former edition of this work in the Spring of 1828, the subjects of which it treats had not particularly occupied my mind for more than two years. Other topics of equal, one of them certainly of paramount, importance had, during the period of my residing over the Rodney Street Congregation, engaged my attention. Besides, after my expulsion from my former charge, shunned by those commonly denominated the serious, and opposed on principle to men of latitudinarian sentiments, I had none to confer with, none to consult, in the progress of my enquiries, and the formation of a scriptural creed. Is it surprising, under such circumstances, I should, in the original composition of the present work, have committed some mistakes?

My first information respecting the principal truths brought out and illustrated in the following pages,

was derived from the word of God itself. The fifteenth chapter of the former of Paul's two epistles to the Corinthians, or rather that portion of it which lies between the forty-second and the fiftieth verses, was the means of originally suggesting those views, and causing me to engage in that train of investigation, which have resulted in the theory now propounded. At first, it was but a rough sketch. By degrees, the outline was filled up. The former edition of this work first brought it before the public : and, afterwards combining in my mind with the all-important scriptural and experimental doctrine of *the assurance of faith*, the system appeared in a still more mature shape in the two octavo volumes which I published in 1833.

In struggling with the difficulties of my subject, for difficulties it had, there were two leading topics which for many years occasioned me uneasiness. These were, the exact amount of Adam's original forfeiture, and the nature of eternal punishment. On both subjects, strange to tell ! I saw through the popular fallacies, long before I was enabled to grasp the simple truth. Eight years since, it was made clear to my mind, from the scriptures themselves, that Adam could not have forfeited spiritual and eternal life, and that there could be no eternal punishment of the nature of never ending torments.

The grounds of these conclusions will be found amply stated in the subsequent treatise. But seeing no intermediate scheme at that time, between the forfeiture of spiritual and eternal life on the one hand, and the forfeiture of the life of the body merely on the other, the absurdity of the former alternative forced me on adopting and asserting the latter. And, as I was acquainted then with no other eternal punishment than eternal punishment by means of torments, the evidently unscriptural nature of such an idea constituted my reason for throwing the doctrine overboard altogether. More enlarged divine teaching has brought to light views of which at the period of the original publication of this essay I was ignorant. I have in the interim discovered the death of pure soul or natural mind, and have been satisfied that of this the death of natural body is merely the consequence; and I have also discovered, that the family of man, as possessed of Adam's nature or the wicked, undergo eternal punishment. In the corrected edition of my *Three Questions* now published, the Christian world has the benefit of these discoveries.

The conduct of critics, in regard to the former edition of this treatise, was what might have been anticipated. It was too contemptible a production to attract the notice of the larger reviews. The Churchmen looked at it,



and, either from despising its author, or from inability to grapple with its statements, passed it over in silence. The liberal periodicals were pleased to speak of it in a friendly tone. Some of the Evangelical dissenting journals conceived that it afforded them a capital opportunity for having a fling at the author and his sentiments. In proof of this, witness the brief and contemptuous notices by the Imperial Magazine for April, and the Congregational Magazine for July, 1828. The Christian Herald, for April, 1828, was flippant, dogmatical, and condescendingly compassionate—the Edinburgh Theological Magazine, for June and July of the same year, after giving its readers to understand that it despised the author, was pleased to devote two long, and rather well-written, but, so far as theology is concerned, exceedingly superficial, articles to the consideration of his sentiments—and the Gospel Magazine, for June of the same year, in by far the most honest and intentionally candid of all the reviews which my work drew forth, after exhibiting feelings the most friendly towards me, condemned my statements *in toto* as a mass of “futile reasoning and vain babbling,” and expressed a decided preference to those views in which the good folks calling themselves Christians have for so long a time seen meet to acquiesce. Such was the

reception which the former edition of this Essay met with at the hands of those *Dii majores gentium* the reviewers. It would not have been amiss if certain Editors of periodicals, who were pleased to accept of copies of a more expensive work, had honoured it with a little of that contempt with which its precursor was so copiously besprinkled.

One important consequence followed from the publication of the former edition of this Essay, and of the criticisms to which it gave birth—it rendered the necessity for the appearance and inculcation of the doctrines which I advocate strikingly manifest. Although aware that I was treating of topics of stirring interest, and that in what I was propounding I stood opposed to the sentiments of the great majority of religionists, I had actually no conception, until some time after my work was in the hands of the public, of the deep-rooted and powerful hold which the errors and delusions combated by me had taken of the minds of professing Christians. Previous to publishing, I had to a certain degree flattered myself, that all that was requisite to enable the Church to throw aside her trammels, and advance in the path of scriptural discovery, was simply to place the truth before her. Alas! I had not calculated sufficiently on that innate ignorance of divine things which

is characteristic of the human mind, nor on those disengenuous habits which long perseverance in deceit necessarily terminates in creating. My dream of clearer views of divine truth being welcomed with avidity by the professed followers of the Lamb, was but of short duration. The experience of a few months sufficed to dispel it. The anathemas of ecclesiastics, mingling their deep-toned thunders with the carpings of critics, told me, in language which it was impossible to misunderstand, that from bodies of the religious as at present constituted I had nothing but opposition to look for. It is for this reason, that, although now convinced more than ever of the necessity for its appearance, and therefore impelled by a sense of duty, I again obtrude this work in an improved form upon public notice, I confess that I do so with no very sanguine hopes of success. The few whom my dear Lord hath enlightened will read it with candour, and compare its statements and reasonings with those of scripture: the rest—will take their own course.

Am I wrong, in conceiving it to be necessary to urge my leading views on the notice of the Christian world, or in cherishing feelings of despondency as to the result, when I find the accredited organs of some of the largest bodies of *evangelical* professors re-iterating, in unmea-

sured and intentionally offensive terms, the most obnoxious of the errors which I have been labouring to expose and subvert? Thus speaks the Editor of one of these periodicals, in the name of the English Independents:—"We, however, have adopted a more romantic system of divinity, and are content to rank among that class of men dignified with the title of theologians, who have fancied, and written treatises to prove, that, *besides the loss of natural life, Adam was threatened with, and actually incurred, SPIRITUAL AND ETERNAL DEATH.*" Congregational Magazine, for July 1828, page 379.—The mouth-piece of a still larger body of dissenters, the Scotch Seceders, I find thus deliberately chaunting, at greater length, but in a similar strain:—"Man was originally formed a rational and accountable being, and *was endued with a SPIRITUAL and IMMORTAL part, which is designated his SOUL.*" "If Adam had not eaten of the forbidden fruit, he would not have died; and, therefore, must have lived,—lived *in the contemplation of the divine character, in the admiration of the divine works, IN CONFORMITY TO THE DIVINE LAW, IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE;\** and, consequently, *in the enjoyment of the divine favour, which is life to*

\* In direct and palpable contradiction to Romans viii. 3, which asserts, that this conformity was competent only to God manifest in flesh.

*the rational creature, in the highest sense of the expression ; and THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY SPIRITUAL LIFE.*”—“If Adam had continued in innocence, he must have continued in the enjoyment of the divine favour ; in other words, *he must have lived for ever ; and THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY ETERNAL LIFE.*”—“Man was originally made capable of enjoying happiness, *by having given him AN IMMORTAL SOUL created after the image of God.* While we contend for *the original IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL*,—it is to the scriptures alone that we are indebted for *the certainty of this doctrine.*—If man had not eaten of the forbidden fruit, he would not have died, that is, *would have existed ETERNALLY in the possession of that rational, SPIRITUAL, and IMMORTAL happiness, which is PROPERLY THE LIFE OF MAN.* THIS most assuredly is *THE IMMORTALITY OF A CREATURE.*”—“If God, for wise and holy purposes, permitted sin to enter and to operate in *this* world, that all might be overruled for the *manifestation* of His glory, *where is the inconsistency of its EXISTING THROUGHOUT ETERNITY, and of its BEING PUNISHED FOR EVER, in the persons of those WHO HAVE DIED IN THE LOVE AND PRACTICE OF INIQUITY ?*” *Edinburgh Theological Magazine*, for June and July 1828. Pp. 329, 331, 406, 408. It appears, then, according to both

these large bodies of professing Christians, the English Independents and the Scotch Seceders, that *Adam originally possessed spiritual and eternal life, which he forfeited by transgression*: and, according to the latter of them, that he was *naturally and originally immortal*!—*forfeited this immortality by transgression*!!—and yet, nevertheless, contrives to *impart this FORFEITED immortality to his descendants, as the basis and principle of* THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THEM BEING TORMENTED FOR EVER!!! When persons, pretending to be rational beings, nay, glorying in their rationality, can thus, not merely confound the soulical nature of Adam the creature, with the spiritual nature of Jesus the Creator, and swallow the absurdities of creature immortality, immortality coming to an end, and immortality although forfeited nevertheless existing,—but also deliberately persevere in maintaining these dogmas, after their falsehood, inconsistency, and unscriptural character, have been exposed, their case may be fairly given up as hopeless. Surely, however, an attempt may with propriety be made, to put the younger and the more candid on their guard against such delusions.

To those who, after honouring my Essay with their perusal, may deem it worthy of public animadversion, if such there shall be, I would respectfully suggest, that

its main statements and arguments are not to be demolished by mere skirmishing and by-attacks. The proving of some minor observations to be incorrect, whatever credit it may reflect on the ingenuity of the assailant, will not in the slightest degree damage or endanger my citadel. Nay, such a mode of attack, as being a practical confession of weakness on the part of antagonists, I shall consider myself entitled to regard as the highest possible compliment which can be paid to my work. Let all those, who after perusing the following pages feel inclined to be pugnacious, and who yet can discover no way of reaching me except by means of a side-wind, allow themselves, before commencing hostilities and exposing themselves to the risque of being ranked among petty cavillers, to "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest," the following admirable and appropriate observations of that acute and ingenious writer, Andrew Baxter of Aberdeen, with which I conclude:—

"We may observe in general, that there are few truths, except those seen intuitively, against which objections, founded on seeming probability and old prejudices, may not be raised; if we suffer the reasons to slip out of our mind from which they were concluded, and retain in view only our former way of thinking about them. It is an easy, but a fallacious method,

to run away with a flux of words: we may draw up such a specious shew of *probabilities*, supported by *prejudices*, as shall make a dreadful appearance taken all together; and yet turn to nothing at last when *examined* and sifted separately.—If we can find no fault in the reasons which establish the conclusion on the contrary side, *we should suspect our own objections*. Those are the most promising objections that attack directly the reasons on which the thing is founded; but *if they leave these standing, and turn to by-considerations, much is not to be expected from them.*" *Enquiry into the nature of the human soul.* Vol. 2d, pp. 115. 116. 3d Edition.

Liverpool, 27th June, 1835.



I cannot allow this work to go forth to the public, without acknowledging the obligations under which I lie, for valuable hints as to the subject matter of which it treats, to certain highly respected and much endeared members of my congregation. For the remark concerning the agency of the Devil in giving rise to the ordinary doctrine of *the immortality of the soul* at page 85, for part of the note at page 86, and for the note at page 176, I am indebted to the suggestions of my friend, Mr. W. J. Reade.

## THREE QUESTIONS

### PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.

---

There are three questions, growing out of the information with which we are furnished by the scriptures, that have often struck me as demanding more than ordinary attention. These are:—

I. What was the death threatened to and incurred by Adam, as the consequence and punishment of his first transgression?

II. What is the cause of the resurrection of the dead?

III. Is there any authority in scripture, or in reasonings legitimately derived from scripture, for the ordinary doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked in a state of existence succeeding the present?

It is impossible for any sober-minded and reflecting individual to deny, that these are questions of the last importance. They do not, like those barren and unprofitable speculations which in every age have engaged

the attention and constituted the studies of theologians by profession, turn upon trifling cob-web distinctions, make a cold appeal to the understanding, or afford an opportunity for learned leisure to while away the tedium of a vacant hour; but lead at once and inevitably to valuable because practical results. If, in the prosecution of my inquiries, I shall be able to demonstrate, that sentiments with which in infancy our minds are imbued, and which advancing years generally tend but to deepen and strengthen, are in reality the offspring of ignorance and superstition, fostered and matured by tyranny and self-interest, or both; and that such sentiments, instead of illustrating and commending, are at variance with the character of the God of Revelation, representing Him as a gloomy despot, whom the scriptures declare to be LOVE itself; I shall, in that case, enjoy the enviable distinction of having been instrumental in relieving such as may be convinced by my arguments from a state of the most painful and degrading thralldom; and the unspeakable happiness of seeing the hideous fabric which, for eighteen centuries at least, men have been employed in raising and consolidating, ready to crumble into atoms at the touch of divine truth.—To accomplish these most desirable objects, it is not to *carnal reasonings* that I shall have recourse. To the *lively oracles*, and to them alone, shall my appeal be made. In what respects religion, God only is competent to decide; and as I disclaim the aids of mere human authority on my own part, so do I reject, and treat with disdain, every

attempt to confute me, and overturn my statements, by a reference to the opinions of fallible man on the part of others. I stand at God's, not man's, judgment seat; and by the divine law and testimony, therefore, must the matters in controversy between my opponents and myself be determined.—Let it not be supposed by the reader, taking a superficial glance at the subject, that any part of the following argument could have been spared. A candid and enlightened attention to what I have written will, I trust, suffice to shew, that all the enquiries, and statements, and reasonings, which precede, are indispensibly requisite to bring out in its full lustre the conclusion that follows. So close, I should rather say inseparable, is the connection subsisting among all the questions proposed for examination, that, without understanding the grounds and principles of the answers which I return to the first and second of them, it is impossible to perceive and appreciate the full force of the solution given to the last.—In order to prevent disappointment, however, be it observed, that, in what follows, it is very far from being the author's intention to present his readers with a thoroughly digested and systematic treatise: all that they have a right to expect from him being a few scriptural statements and reasonings, which will, he hopes, serve as hints, and form a basis, for ulterior investigations of their own.



## FIRST QUESTION.

What was the death threatened to and incurred by Adam, as the consequence and punishment of his first transgression?

As the fall of man is a fact for the knowledge of which we are indebted to the sacred writings, so for the nature of it, the circumstances connected with it, and the consequences involved in it, we must consult the same infallible guide. *What then saith the scripture* in reference to this subject?

Were it not that the minds of men are pre-occupied from the very cradle with nursery tales concerning the fall,\* and that the impressions made by these are afterwards strengthened by systems of divinity almost as decidedly romantic, this is a question which might be easily answered. The narrative contained in the three first chapters of Genesis, although brief, is so explicit,—and the arguments and conclusions of the

\* May not many individuals, in this Country, trace their views of the fall to the impressions made upon their minds, at an early period of life, by Milton's *Paradise Lost*? Even the shrewd and sagacious Sandeman, unable to get rid of his nursery and educational prejudices on the subject, has contented himself with serving up to his readers, in the form of plain prose, the same ideas concerning Satan and the fall of man, which the Prince of modern Epic Poets had already presented and invested with all the charms of his glowing imagination. See Sandeman's observations on *Spirit*, in the 4th of his letters on *Hervey's Dialogues*.

Apostle Paul, in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and the fifteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, are so obviously founded on, and so strikingly illustrate, that narrative, —that nothing but the most perverse ingenuity, rather, let me say, nothing but the natural inability of the human mind by dint of its own boasted faculties to comprehend and relish divine truth, could ever have involved the subject in darkness and perplexity.

When we enquire, what are the declarations of the book of Genesis concerning the creation and fall of man? a few simple and intelligible facts, such as the following, present themselves to our notice:—That God formed and organized the body of the first man *of the dust of the ground*, or of materials common to it with the earth upon which it was to tread; Gen. ii. 7; that the body so formed was animated by Him with a principle of life; *ibid*; that this life was not *absolutely* but *conditionally* bestowed; *ib.* 16, 17; that *the condition* of its tenure *was violated*; iii. 6; and that thus *the forfeiture threatened*, namely, the loss of the life originally bestowed and the returning of the body to its primitive elements, *was incurred*; *ib.* 19. Thus far all is plain sailing. But here, of course, it will occur to the reflecting mind to ask, do the circumstances just enumerated exhaust all that the scriptures make us acquainted with respecting man's original state, and the loss which by transgression he incurred?

No, undoubtedly; for there is one important additional circumstance, recorded by the pen of inspiration

likewise, which arrests attention, and demands a very particular explanation. *Adam did not die in the day that he transgressed.* On the contrary, *he lived several hundred years after the fall.* Therefore, either God's threatening was falsified by the result; or we must admit, that *life* and *death* in the sacred volume have, occasionally at least, some farther meaning, than *merely the possession of the vital principle and the forfeiture of it.*

At this point it is proper to mention, that theologians, in regard to the discrepancy between the menace to Adam and the fulfilment of it, are divided into two great classes. One of these maintains, that the difference in question is merely apparent; that natural death is all that by the threat was intended; and that any difficulty arising from the fact of the execution of the sentence having been delayed is removed by understanding, that the moment Adam transgressed he *became mortal or obnoxious to the stroke of death.* In opposition to this the other class maintains, that as *death*, not *liability to death*, in the day of transgression, was the language of the menace, it can be reconciled with fact only on the supposition of Adam, in addition to his *animal existence*, having possessed naturally *spiritual and eternal life*; and having forfeited *this* in the very act and at the very instant of transgression.

Did no middle path between these two extremes suggest itself to the mind, the idea of being able to effect a thorough and satisfactory reconciliation of scripture with itself, in regard to this matter, would require



to be abandoned. By adopting the former hypothesis, we must, in violation of all the proprieties of language, understand *mortality* to be synonymous with *death*! By adopting the latter, we merely avoid one species of solecism to run ourselves upon another: for as, upon this supposition, *spiritual life* is both *the life of Adam* and *the life of Christ*, it is a life both *capable*, and, strange contradiction! *incapable*, of *being lost*! and, although *eternal*, it is nevertheless *capable of coming to an end*!

With what ease are we enabled to steer clear of all these errors and absurdities when we allow ourselves, with meekness and docility, to be guided by the teaching of the Holy Ghost. In addition to *the animal existence* which he had in common with the brutes, Adam it is evident possessed *a something* which rendered him their superior. This higher and additional advantage was connected with *his mind*. But as he was at the best merely *a creature, of the earth, earthy*,—and *as such* distinguished from Him whose image he was, even Jesus the Creator, the Lord from Heaven,—we must beware of falling into the error of the popular theologians, who, in the language which they have held respecting Adam as he existed in his paradisiacal state, have evidently confounded *his mind* with *the mind of Christ*. While in *the mind* of Adam we seek for that which really constituted his superiority over the brutes, let us remember, that his was a privilege which *was liable to be forfeited*; and that *as such* it must stand essentially contrasted with *the unforfeitable nature and*

*dignity of the Son of God.* Wherein, then, are we to seek for *the superiority* which Adam originally possessed; and *the life* which, in the very moment of transgression, he forfeited? To this I answer without hesitation: his *essential superiority* consisted, in the capacity which he had of receiving a divine prohibition; and his *life*, in the non-violation of that prohibition. The knowledge of the former, I derive from the narrative concerning the difference between God's procedure towards him and the inferior animals; the knowledge of the latter, from the divine threatening combined with the divine veracity. Continued abstinence from disobedience to God, then, constituted *the life*—disobedience to God, *the death*—of the pure intelligent creature. In one word, sin, as it was *the loss*, so may it also fitly be denominated *the death*, of Adam's original state. This death, or forfeiture of creature purity of mind and creature righteousness, was incurred in *the very moment* of transgression; and the diseases and death of the body which followed were, properly speaking, merely the *outward* marks and indications of the still more important death which had already taken place *within*.

The view of matters which is given in the New Testament Scriptures strikingly accords with what I have just stated. Our blessed Lord, in the fifth chapter of John's gospel, verse 24th, represents believers as *having already passed from death into life*. This, of course, it is impossible to understand of any change which has taken place in the structure and composition

of *their bodies*. These, after the belief of the truth, remain exactly what they were before. *The body is still dead because of Sin.\** To the *mind*, and to the mind alone, therefore, must we look, as the seat both of the previous death and of the subsequent life.—Again, the Apostle Paul, in the spirit, and employing almost the very words of his divine Master, addresses the Ephesian believers, as persons who had been previously *dead in Sins*, but *were now quickened* or made alive *together with Christ*. Eph: ii. 5. How apparent, that, by this great Champion of the cross, death and life are treated of, in the passage now before us, as exercising their respective sovereignties over *the mind*: indeed, so managing the subject, as if the sway of both over *the body* were a matter of very secondary and subordinate consideration.—Need I multiply examples to prove, that the whole of the New Testament writings speak in the most exact accordancy with the two passages which I have quoted.

Warranted by the declarations and reasonings of scripture, therefore—for I acknowledge no other or higher authority—I thus answer the first question proposed:—The death with which Adam was menaced in case of disobedience, and which he actually incurred, was death in the ordinary acceptation of the term, that is, the termination of the animal existence which God at his creation had conferred on him; Gen: iii. 19; and this, in consequence of death in a higher sense, that is, the forfeiture of creature righteousness or death of

\* Rom : viii. 10.

the mind, having been in the very moment of transgression already and necessarily incurred. *ib.* 6.

While the difference between my views and those entertained by the Socinians, respecting the subject matter treated of in the foregoing paragraphs, will be apparent at a glance, I am not quite so sure that I shall be understood by the great majority of my readers as holding sentiments on this point essentially different from those of the Calvinists. To guard against the possibility of mistake, let me, after setting down a few of the positions regarding man's supposed original purity and excellence, and the forfeiture which he incurred by transgression, which will be found in that popular and Calvinistic work Boston's *Fourfold State*, proceed to contrast them with the views which the force of scripture evidence has constrained me to adopt.

I am satisfied, and consequently agree with the popular divines in believing, that Adam was possessed of a *life of the mind*, over and above the vital principle which he had in common with the brutes; and that it was *this life of the mind*, or principle of superiority over the rest of the animal tribes, which he forfeited in the very instant of transgression. But I do not believe, with Boston and those who entertain similar sentiments,

1. That "Adam naturally was subject to the whole law, which God afterwards formally promulgated from Mount Sinai." On the contrary, I believe that Adam

was subjected, and that not until *after* his creation, to one law or prohibition merely; and this, a law or prohibition so very easy as scarcely to have imposed upon him any effort of abstinence at all.\* The more trifling the original prohibition is seen to be, the more strongly, indeed, does it make for my argument.—In this, Adam stands contrasted with the Lord Jesus, who was subjected to the law as requiring the most intense, constant, and universal love to God and man; or, to the law of God in its highest sense and its fullest extent of requirement.†

2. I do not believe that Adam was subjected to the single law or prohibition just alluded to, “with a view to shew how good he was,—how great was the excellence of his natural capacities and dispositions,—and how capable he was of rendering obedience to divine law.” On the contrary, I perceive that he was subjected to a single law, and that too a law of the most trifling kind, for the express purpose of shewing the utter impossibility of human nature, even in its best estate, yielding obedience to divine law; or, of shewing, that *the mind of the flesh*,‡ even in its best estate, *is enmity against God; that it is neither subject to God’s law, nor capable of becoming so.* Rom. viii. 7.

\* “The terms given to the first man, were the easiest that can well be imagined.” Riccaltoun’s Works, vol. 2nd, p. 133.

† “The terms on which the kingdom, or eternal life, was granted to the Lord from Heaven, the quickening spirit, or, as himself expresses it, *the commandment which he received from the Father*, which some have, not improperly, called *the law of the Mediator*, were indeed the hardest that could be imposed on any creature, and such as none but himself could have fulfilled.” Ib: p. 134.

‡ *To φρονημα της σαρκος.*

As contrasted with this, I perceive that the mind of Christ was subjected to divine law in its highest extent of requirement, in order to shew, that *divine mind*, and it alone, is capable of complying with *divine law*. Rom. viii. 3, 4.

3. I do not believe that Adam's mind naturally was holy, heavenly, and generous; or, in Boston's language, that "by *the set* he got in his creation, it directly pointed towards God as his chief end." On the contrary, Adam's mind, like his body, was naturally *of the earth, earthy*—subject to the influence of his bodily frame and external circumstances—and *essentially selfish*. Instead of pointing towards God as his chief end, his chief end naturally was to retain the situation of external and creature comfort in which he had been placed: indeed, instead of God having had any generous principles to appeal to in man naturally, He could only operate on him through the medium of addressing his selfishness; as is proved by the fact of His having issued to him, not a promise, but a threatening. Gen. ii. 17.—As contrasted with all this, the prospect held out to the Lord Jesus from his very birth was the necessity of his parting with his pure earthly life, in order to his thereby rendering service to the guilty children of men; or, the very purpose for which Jesus came into the world was, that, by his sufferings, death, and resurrection from the dead, he might benefit others. Isaiah liii. 12; Matt. xx. 28. The mind of the Lord Jesus was thus *essentially generous*; Acts xx. 35; and *as such* was addressed and dealt with by his heavenly Father.

4. I do not believe that Adam was possessed of any "spiritual" principle whatever, as he came from God's hands. I am satisfied, because I find it expressly declared, that he had originally a *pure soul*, or *pure creature mind*; Gen. ii. 7; Eccles. vii. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 45: but *Spirit*, or *spiritual principle*, being the *mind*, not of Adam the type and creature, but of Jesus the Antitype and Creator, John iv. 24, (see Greek); 1 Corinth. xv. 45—49; it was impossible that the former, in his original state, could possess it.\*

\* "The life we have given and secured to us in Christ, is incomparably better than that which Adam forfeited by his disobedience and rebellion; which, in truth, bears no greater proportion to it than a shadow does to the substance."—Indeed there is an "absolute inconsistency, and direct opposition, between the life we derive from Adam, and that which we have by Christ.—The life we have from Adam we are sure was never designed to reach beyond the limits of a present world, nor to qualify or fit us for any thing but what belongs to the inhabitants of it, and to receive what further light and life the Creator should see proper to impart. This is Christ's business to give, to open to us the secrets of the spiritual and eternal worlds, and to furnish us with life and powers such as are proper for the inhabitants there.—The children by the second birth are all formed upon this heavenly man, from whom they derive their life. They all bear *his image*, and *their life is, like the Quickening Spirit from whom they derive it, spiritual and eternal*.—Riccaltoun's Works, vol. ii. pp. 133, 254, 285, 286.

"There was, and it was necessary there should be, a very great odds between the two," Adam and Jesus, "in many respects. The Apostle gives us the principal ones: 'The first Adam was made a living soul; the second a quickening Spirit; the first was of the earth, earthy; the second was the Lord from Heaven.' But in other respects they agree with surprising exactness; which may reasonably determine us to think, that the first creation, and the way in which men were brought into the world by that original constitution, was designed by divine wisdom to be a *sort of sensible image and representation of the spiritual, and therefore invisible, manner, in which men are brought into the spiritual and invisible world.*" Ditto, pp. 131, 132.

"We are sure there was another sort of life" than that of Adam, "and another way of living upon God, designed in his eternal counsels. Jesus Christ was set up from everlasting as the only mediator between God and man, through

5. So far from believing, that the original purity and uprightness of Adam's creature mind consisted *in an ability on his part to do what is good*, I am satisfied, that it consisted merely in the facts of *his not having been created a transgressor*, Eccles. vii. 29, and *his having actually abstained for a time from the commission of the only crime which God had prohibited*. Gen. ii. 16, 17, with iii. 6. In other words, his creature righteousness did not consist positively, *in his doing, or having been able to do, good*; but negatively, *in his abstaining from one sin*.—As contrasted with this, the purity and uprightness of the mind of Jesus the Creator consisted, *in its ability to do what is good, and inability to do any thing else*; or, in other words, *in its very nature having been to perform whatever is well pleasing in the sight of his Heavenly Father*. Psalm xl. 8, with John iv. 34. Adam's original righteousness was *negative*, consisting merely in a temporary abstinence from transgression; Christ's essential righteousness was *positive*, consisting in a disposition and ability to execute every command which he had received from above. To take another mode of illustrating the difference: Adam had a mind naturally *capable of being overcome by evil*; Gen. iii. 6; whereas the mind of

whom alone all his favours are conveyed to them, and another sort of station was designed in the eternal world, *as much more excellent than Paradise, as heaven is above the earth, and God better than the creature; whereof the paradisaical state was only a faint shadow.*" Ditto, pp. 62, 63.

"Adam was not a spiritual man; 1 Corinth. xv. 46; though in mind and body—a fitting intellectual and external image of God."—Mulock's *Two Letters on the mystery of the Gospel*. P. 3. 1824.



Jesus naturally and necessarily *overcame evil of every description and degree*. Matt. iv. 1—11; John. xiv. 30; xix. 30; 1 Corinth. xv. 25—28; 1 John iii. 8.

6. Instead of believing that God made any *positive promise* to Adam, after his creation and his having been placed in the Garden of Eden; I perceive clearly, that the only recorded divine communication previous to the fall respecting Adam's future prospects is of the nature of *a threat*. To explain myself: I do not believe in the popular dogma, of "Adam having received from God a promise of eternal life to be enjoyed by him in a higher state, in the event of his having continued obedient during what has been denominated his period of probation."\* My reason for rejecting it is, that according to Genesis ii. 16, 17, viewed in connection with 1 Timothy i. 9—11, and the nature of law in general, *the continuance of Adam's creature life upon earth*, and not *the acquisition of a higher life above*, was the only reward which was to have followed on, nay, the only reward which could have been connected with, *his abstinence from violating the prohibition*. The language of the inspired record, our only guide in matters of this kind, is not, "in the event of continuing obedient thou

\* "It has been, I know not how, in a manner taken for granted, that after continuing for some time under probation, (how long, none have pretended to say, but some time or other,) Adam should have been transplanted into a state much like that, if not the very same, which believers in Christ have the well founded prospect of. We may well say, that all this is mere guessing, as there is not the least shadow of any promise or grant of life, much less of such a life, found in the record. He needed no grant of the life he was in possession of. And even that he had no promise of being continued to him, except what was implied in the terms on which he held it."—Riccartoun's Works, vol. 2. p. 60.

shalt inherit eternal life," which certainly would have been a *promise*, and would have justified the popular theory; but, "in the event of being disobedient thou shalt die," which, being obviously a *threat*, cannot by any possibility be reconciled with popular sentiments. Or, if objectors disposed to quibble will contend that every *threat* is an *implied promise*, at all events they must admit, that *the promise* to Adam was not *positive*, but *negative*; its import having been merely, "that if he did not violate the prohibition, he should not incur the execution of the threatening; that if he continued to abstain from eating of the forbidden fruit, he should be permitted to continue in his pristine state of purity and happiness." How clearly thus does it appear, that the original law given by God to Adam, like all other prohibitory laws, proceeded on the principle of holding out to our great progenitor no other reward of *his continued abstinence from transgression*, than this merely, *that, so conducting himself, he should be let alone*: thus fitly connecting *the mere negative virtue of abstinence from evil*, with *the mere negative reward of exemption from punishment*.—To the Lord Jesus, however, there was a *positive promise* given by his Heavenly Father: not of continued life upon earth, the utmost import of the promise made to Adam in the event of his having continued obedient—for, although Christ's earthly life was not to be forfeited by any personal transgression, it nevertheless was a life which, in the prosecution and fulfilment of his mediatorial

undertaking, he behoved to part with—\* but of everlasting, that is, divine life, to be enjoyed by him in Heaven in connection with his divine obedience.† The reason of this obviously was, that *positive righteousness*, such as is *the righteousness of the Creator*,—alone could deserve a *positive reward*, such as is *eternal life* or *the life of the Creator*. The man, then, who supposes, that God gave a *positive promise* of everlasting life to Adam, besides ascribing to a prohibitory law a sanction *inconsistent with its nature*,‡ and, what is still more, *inconsistent with fact*,§ commits the additional mistake of supposing a promise to have been made *to the creature*, which was made,|| and which could only with propriety have been made,¶ *to the Creator*.

7. I do not believe, that Adam naturally was possessed of *immortality*: on the contrary, the term which is applicable to the life with which he was originally endowed is *indefinite existence*. Having had a conditional limit assigned to it from the very first, namely, *eventual transgression*, it was thereby taken out of the category of *infinite* or *immortal existence*. *Immortality*, being *life which cannot come to an end*, is capable of being predicated only of *the essential life of the Son of God*. 1 Timothy vi. 16, with Rom. vi. 9, and Rev. i. 18.\*\*

\* John x. 17, 18. † Isaiah liii. *throughout*; with Phillip. ii. 5—11.

‡ 1 Timothy i. 9—11.

§ Genesis ii. 16, 17.

|| Psalm cx. 1—4.

¶ Rom. viii. 3, 4.

\*\* “No creature can have inherent immortality. 1 Tim. vi. 16.” Malock’s *Two Letters*, &c., P. 6.

To sum up in one sentence all the contrasts just stated; so far from regarding Adam as having been subjected to a number of divine laws—as having been able to obey these—as having been endowed naturally with a principle of generosity—as having been spiritual—as having been able to do good—as having had a positive promise of eternal life made to him—and as having been naturally immortal;—my decided conviction is, that only one law of the nature of a prohibition was imposed on him—that the purpose of this was to make manifest his utter inability to comply with divine law—that his nature was essentially selfish—that he was destitute of spirituality—that his only virtue consisted in abstinence from transgression—that the only reward conditionally promised to him was exemption from punishment—and that naturally he was not, nor as a mere creature could have been, immortal.

These contrasted statements being pondered on and understood, it will be apparent, that my sentiments, in regard to the life forfeited by Adam, differ *toto coelo* from those of the popular divines. They, overlooking the fact, that Adam even at the best was merely a creature\* and a type,† by means of the qualities which while in his primitive state they ascribe to him, raise him to a level with, and clothe him with the attributes of, Jesus the Creator and Anti-type.‡ According to them, Adam naturally was a pure, holy, and

\* 1 Corinth. xv. 47.

† Rom. v. 14.

‡ By representing Adam as having been by nature *positively and perfectly righteous, spiritual, and immortal*. *Righteousness, spirituality, and immortality*, are the attributes, not of *Adam*; but of *Adam's Lord*.

heavenly-minded being—capable of enjoying spiritual communion with God—filled with the most intense love to the laws of his Maker, and able to keep them—and possessed of a happiness which is to us absolutely inconceivable. According to the writer of these pages, founding his views not on ideal human systems but on the infallible word of God, Adam was an intelligent being endowed with a selfish earthly mind—was capable of evil, but for a while abstained from the commission of it—had in him naturally no principle upon which the Creator could operate, except that of fear—was placed at his creation in circumstances of great *external* comfort, but was totally destitute of the capacity of enjoying *spiritual* communion with God\*—and depended for the continuance of his original state,

\* Adam's paradisiacal state has been regarded as the perfection of human nature, and the fall regretted as an irreparable loss to mankind. It was certainly the highest any child of Adam can aspire to, when his ambition is indulged as far as it can carry his wishes. Adam indeed had every thing that could make such a creature happy; all that the earth could afford agreeable, laid to his hand; perfect innocence, unalloyed by any thing that could mar his inward peace; and the friendship of his Maker every day ascertained by fresh instances. But with all the advantages he enjoyed, many and great as the were; yet, were it possible for any of his posterity to be restored to the same situation, he would find himself greatly short of that perfect happiness which he expected to find there; as will appear very plainly from the circumstances in which Adam was placed.—The communion and intercourses of friendship with the Creator, were all managed in a *sensible manner*; I mean, as men converse with one another. This some may reckon a singular advantage, and a high privilege.—But we must find ourselves obliged to think otherwise when we reflect, that Adam neither had, nor could have, in that way, any views of the glory of God, but such as were veiled and darkened by sensible appearances.—He was made for living in the state he was placed in, and for possessing all the happiness a man can enjoy in a *present world*. But it does not appear he was made for any higher station, or more perfect way of living; and we have no intimation of any reason he had to hope for it. Riccaltoun's works, vol II, pages 58—60.

on his abstinence from the violation of a single trifling divine prohibition.—According to the popular divines, Adam naturally was possessed of the most astonishing knowledge of God's character and laws; and naturally had no tendency whatever to the commission of evil. Boston's language is: "that Adam had a perfect knowledge of God's law, and of his duty accordingly:"—"that he had naturally an exquisite knowledge of the works of God—and of their natures:"—"that he was made right (according to the nature of God, whose work is perfect,) without any imperfection, corruption, or *principle of corruption*, in his body or soul:—and that he had no corruption in his will, *no bent or inclination to evil*." According to the views of the writer of these pages, on the contrary, Adam was, at his creation, merely a grown infant,—destitute of all knowledge, because destitute of all experience,—and dependent on immediate divine inspiration for every kind of instruction, as well as for the entire guidance of his conduct. Besides, in his very nature, as earthly, fleshly, and selfish, he carried about with him from his origin *a principle of corruption and evil*, latent for a time, but ready to manifest itself on the first suitable occasion: and, so far from loving God and being able and disposed to keep His law, he loved himself supremely by the very constitution of his nature; and was ready to break the only law given him by the Creator, whenever the observation of it appeared likely to interfere with the dictates of self love. Undoubtedly, at his creation, he had been pronounced *to be very good*;

and was in a certain sense *perfect*: but language like this, when applied to Adam's original estate, is, from the result, clearly seen to have imported no more, than that, like every thing else, he was perfectly adapted to the purpose for which he had been summoned into existence.—In a word, according to the popular divines, Adam's original state of righteousness, was *something marvellously great and inconceivable!* According to the writer or these pages, his original state of righteousness was merely his not having immediately committed transgression—was his *mere temporary abstinence from evil*: and his righteousness, *as the righteousness of a mere creature*, was intended as a foil to stand contrasted with, and to be one means of instructing us in the value of, *the truly great, divine, and inconceivable righteousness of Jesus the Creator.*

Will the reader have the goodness to excuse me, for the length of detail into which I have gone in reference to the topic just treated of? I assure him that I am not exaggerating their importance when I say, that correct views of the difference between Adam and Christ, and of the typical relationship in which the former stands to the latter, are essential, not merely in the present controversy, but to the understanding of every doctrine contained in the word of God.

Clear, however, as it appears to me, and must do to all who are content to take a plain scriptural and impartial view of the matter, that Adam, as having been only *a creature*, could by means of transgression

forfeit no more than *creature righteousness* and *creature life*,—yet, strange to tell! there have not been wanting men dignified with the title of theologians who have fancied, and have even written treatises to prove, that, besides *the loss of natural life both internal and external*, Adam was threatened with and actually incurred *spiritual* and *eternal death*! This being the case, I have resolved to enter still more minutely into the present subject; in order that, not merely in the way of direct statement, but also by contrast with the reasonings of antagonists, the simplicity, correctness, and accordance with the inspired volume, of the sentiments respecting the life forfeited by Adam for which I am contending, may, to the entire satisfaction of my readers, be made to appear.

Without at present enquiring, what is the precise meaning attached to the phraseology *spiritual and eternal death* by those who employ it? suffice it to observe, that, as the arguments by which the doctrine of *this death* having been incurred by Adam is commonly supported are of *a negative* rather than *a positive kind*, they may with propriety be stated in the form of so many objections to the view which I have shewn to be suggested by the inspired narrative itself.

In the first place, it may be objected, that “the literal translation of Gen. ii. 17, *in the day thou eatest thereof* DYING THOU SHALT DIE,\* has an emphasis which is far from being exhausted, on the supposition of the forfeiture of what was natural having been its *only* import.” In answer to this cavil, for it is nothing

\* See the margin.



more, it might be sufficient for me to observe, that, according to the best Hebrew interpreters and philologists as well as our own translators,\* *the certainty of the event* is all that is intimated by the repetition of the word מוֹת †; just as our blessed Lord, with a view to impress on our minds the conviction that he himself is *the Truth*, and consequently *the certainty* of his words being accomplished, frequently uses the phrase אֱמֵן, אֱמֵן, which we translate, *verily, verily*. But I prefer calling the attention of my readers to the fact, that the objection proceeds on the erroneous principle of setting up human reasonings, in opposition to the interpretation which God himself hath given to His own language. “There is greater emphasis in the threat of *eternal torments*, than in the simple menace of *conditionally forfeiting what was naturally possessed*: ergo; *the former*, not *the latter*, is the meaning of Gen. ii. 16, 17.” Now when God himself, in passing sentence upon Adam, has expressly interpreted the threat to signify *sufferings connected with, leading to, and terminating in, death*; Gen. iii. 17—19; is it not “rather too bad” for men, professing a more than ordinary respect for divine authority, to venture to give God the lie by asserting, and this, too, merely on the ground of reasonings of their own, that the threat imported *death connected with, leading to, and terminating in, eternal torments*? ‡

\* *Thou shalt surely die*, is their version of the words.

† מוֹת תָּמוּת.

‡ Some admirable remarks, rather too long to be quoted, respecting the meaning of the original threat to Adam, will be found in the second volume of Riccaltoun's Works, from page 72, to page 76.

In the second place, it may be objected, "that Adam's original possession of a *soul*, Genesis ii. 7, implies his having been endowed, at his creation, with something superior to mere *natural* and *destructible* principles." In answer to this, and without stopping to enquire into the meaning of the English word *soul*, I observe,—what indeed must be obvious to every reflecting person,—that the life, or whatever it was that Adam originally possessed, is to be determined, not by turning over the musty pages, or annoying ourselves with the vague and discordant theories, of divines, but by a reference to the signification of the Hebrew word נֶפֶשׁ here translated *soul*, as well as to that of the corresponding Greek word ψυχή, by which it is rendered in the Septuagint Version and the New Testament. This signification may be ascertained in two different ways:—1. By observing that נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה in Hebrew, and ψυχή ζῶσα in Greek, which is the phrase translated *living soul* in Genesis ii. 7, when applied to man, is the same phrase in the original which, when applied to the inferior animals, is rendered by the English words *living creature*, in Genesis i. 21 and 24; and ii. 19.\* Whence this marked difference in translating the same words? is of course the first question that will occur to the mind of the unlettered reader; and sorry am I to say, that it cannot be answered, without reflecting severely upon the partiality and want of candour evinced in this, as well as in several other

\* See also Genesis i. 20 and 30; where the same phrase occurs in the original, with a similar application, although somewhat differently translated.

instances, by the translators of the authorized version. Correct, and even slavishly literal, as they are, where the party purpose is to be served, and no favourite theory is to be supported,—the moment some popular dogma crosses their path, or the voice of royal authority is interposed, truth and fidelity are without hesitation sacrificed at their shrine. But for some bias of this kind, what could have induced men, whose claims to sense and learning it is impossible to dispute, to abandon the phrase *living creature*,—which, besides being a literal translation of the Hebrew words, had answered their purpose and expressed their meaning admirably, when speaking of the inferior animals,—and to substitute in its place, when applied to man, *living soul*, a term ambiguous by its very nature, and calculated to suggest a difference where no difference exists? If, in doing so, they were influenced by the consideration, “that as man is possessed of a nature or life superior to that of the other animals, *therefore* the term expressive of life, when applied to him, ought to be translated differently from what it is when applied to them,” they were assuming the very thing to be proved; and, instead of confining themselves to a fair, and faithful, and simple, exhibition of what the inspired writers have said, (which is the sole business of the translator,) leaving it to others to explain difficulties, and reconcile apparent incongruities, they were guilty of usurping the office of the commentator and the controversialist, and of betraying the confidence reposed in them, by making their translation a vehicle for the advancement

of their own private views and prejudices.\* And yet, never was a departure from these maxims which should invariably regulate the conduct of translators, more ill-judged and uncalled for than this. If it be admitted, as it must be, that the same words are employed in the original Hebrew to denote the life of the inferior animals, which are employed to denote the life of man; and if it be admitted also, as it must be if our opponents deal candidly, that there is nothing on the face of the texts themselves to justify a diversity of translation; then, it clearly follows, that if in Genesis ii. 7. the phrase *נפש חיה* is correctly rendered *living soul*, it is capable of being rendered in the same way in verse 19th of the same chapter, and in the 20th, 21st, 24th, and 30th verses of the preceding one;† and, that if it denotes a spiritual, indestructible, and immortal principle in the one case, it must denote the same in the other case also. There is no way in which those who have been accustomed to defend the propriety of the reading in the authorized version can extricate themselves from the difficulty, except by candidly admitting, that *the possession of a principle of life common to man with the inferior animals*, is all that is meant by the phrase translated *living soul*, in

\* See some admirable remarks on the duties of a translator of the Holy Scriptures in Dr. Campbell's Preliminary Dissertations. The three last dissertations, particularly, deserve and will repay a very attentive perusal.

† In Revelation xvi. 3, the Greek words *ψυχὴ ζῶσα*, are rendered *living soul*, where *living creature* would have answered better; as, whatever may be the remote and figurative meaning of the passage, it is evidently of the fish that the inspired writer is directly speaking.

Genesis ii. 7.\* 2. The signification of the Hebrew word נָפֶשׁ, and the corresponding Greek word ψυχή, may be ascertained by consulting some of the most approved Lexicons. To save time, as well as to avoid a needless parade of learning, let me just refer to two works of this description, which, with all their defects, are of standard merit; and which, I have reason to think, are in the hands of every Biblical scholar: I mean, Parkhurst's Hebrew and Greek Lexicons. From an examination of these we learn, that the grand primary meaning of both words is *breath*; and, that their chief secondary and derived meanings are, *a breathing frame, or the body that by breathing is sustained in life; a living creature, or a creature that lives by breathing; life considered as connected with breathing; and personality considered as connected with life*. What deserves to be remarked is, that, by the confession of Parkhurst himself,—who seems to have

\* See Ecclesiastes iii. 18. 19.

As the Septuagint is uniform in translating נִפְשָׁא נָפֶשׁ by the words ψυχή ζῶσα, so does the Vulgate uniformly render it by the phrase *anima vivens*. Le Clerc's paraphrase is, *Homo animal factus est*. S. Castellio has it, *ex quo esset animans homo effectus*. T. Beza translates the same words, as quoted in 1 Corinth. xv. 45, *animal vivens*.—When we turn to some of the English translations, we find Dr. Geddes rendering Gen. ii. 7, *thus man became a living person*. Archbishop Newcome, and after him the editors of the improved version, translate 1 Corinth. xv. 45, *And so it is written, the first man, Adam, became a living animal, &c.* Dr. Macknight leaves this latter passage as ambiguous as he finds it. His words are: "*for thus it is written, the first man Adam, from whom men derive their animal body, was made a living soul, an animal whose life depended on the presence of his soul in his body.*" Mr. Locke, in his valuable paraphrase and notes, says, much more to the point: "*And so it is written, the first man, Adam, was made a living soul, i. e., made of an animal constitution, and endowed with an animal life.*"

been anything but favourable to the views which I entertain respecting man's natural destitution of spiritual principle, (as may be seen by consulting his Greek Lexicon at *ψυχη*, No. 6, and *πνευμα*, No. 2,)—he had been unable to meet with a single passage in the Old Testament scriptures, in which he could unhesitatingly say, that *שׁוּבָה* has the sense which we commonly attach to the English word *soul*. I have given his own words in a note.\* It is of no avail to object, that *ψυχη*, in classical writings, means frequently *the mind, or thinking principle in man*: because, as Dr. Campbell has shewn with invincible power of argument, it is not by classical, but by Hellenistical usage, or by the way in which Greek words are employed in the Septuagint and New Testament, that

\* "VI. As a noun *שׁוּבָה* hath been supposed to signify the *spiritual part* of man, or what we commonly call his *soul*: I must for myself confess, that I can find no passage where it hath *undoubtedly* this meaning. Gen. xxxv. 18, 1 Kings xvii. 21, 22, Ps. xvi. 10, seem fairest for this signification. But may not *שׁוּבָה* in the three former passages be most properly rendered *breath*, and in the last a *breathing* or *animal frame*?" Hebrew Lexicon, p. 460, 7th edition, 1813.

Bate, in his *Critica Hebraea*, is of the same mind with Parkhurst. After having defined the meaning of *שׁוּבָה* to be, "*to breathe out, respire, take breath; the animal frame, that which lives by breathing; it is the animal part of all creatures; the person in rational creatures*;" Gen. xxxv. 18, *merely of the breath, going out*;" he adds, "*שׁוּבָה* is never, that I know of, *the rational soul*. It is no more the soul than the brain is the understanding, or the heart the will, &c." "They who leave the S. S., and reason from the nature of *matter* to prove we have a *soul*, and that it is naturally *immortal*, are paving the way to a disbelief of both points."—"It is the vital frame, whether alive or dead, the thing that once breathed, though not then, Isaiah liii. 10; *שׁוּבָה*, his vital frame, life, or he himself, shall make the atonement, and not by sacrifice." Bate's *Critica Hebraea*, p. 362. London, 1767.

their scriptural signification, in doubtful cases, is to be ascertained. But if it still be insisted on, that classical authority in a matter of this kind is entitled to *some* deference, let me observe, that, in the classics themselves,  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  is perhaps as often used in the sense of *life*, or *animal life*, as in any other: and that, even though I admit the fact of its also in the same writings occasionally signifying *the mind*, or *thinking principle*, or *intellectual part of man*, this is merely like its sense of *personality*; a secondary meaning derived from the former; and one which, from the disputes relative to the subject existing among the different sects of philosophers, it is clear did not necessarily imply *immateriality* or *immortality*. Fortified by the authorities which I have produced, and by others which with a view to further demands I keep in reserve, I have no hesitation in maintaining, that when, in Genesis ii. 7. and the corresponding passage 1 Corinthians xv. 45, Adam is declared according to our translation to have *become a living soul*, nothing more is meant thereby than that, *God having breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, he became a living creature; or a creature that lives by breathing*. Observe, I am not denying, that from other parts of the inspired narrative we may discover, as we actually do discover, Adam to have possessed, even *naturally*, capacities, faculties, and principles, superior to those of his fellow *living creatures*: all that I now assert, because I conceive myself to have proved it, is, that this discovery cannot be made from the bare fact of his being denominated,

in common with them, *a living creature or living soul.* — Perhaps, what I have been stating in answer to the present objection, will be better understood by the unlearned reader, if the verse itself, Gen. ii. 7, be analysed, and the several steps of the process there enumerated be pointed out:—1. God formed the body of Adam. *The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground.* 2. God conferred life on this previously organized but inanimate mass by enabling it to breathe. *And breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.* 3. In consequence of this, that which had formerly been an inanimate lump or mass, became a creature endowed with a principle of life, evinced by and connected with breathing. *And man became a living soul, or a living breathing creature.*—In the whole process, I can discover, in so far as the text itself is concerned, nothing more than this. \*

\* To those who are desirous of prosecuting farther their investigations into this subject, I would suggest the following works as likely to be of assistance to them in doing so:—

Buxtorf's *Lexicon*; in which *נְפִשׁ* as a noun is translated, *anima, animus, mens, vita, corpus animatum, habitus*; item, *animæ concupiscens, concupiscens, appetitus, cadaver, corpus exanimæ*: and, as a verb, *respirare*. Need I mention the decidedly high respect paid to the authority of Buxtorf by all genuine Hebrew scholars?

E. Castellus' *Lexicon Heptaglotton*; where, by the way, after rendering *נְפִשׁ*, *habitus, breath, or breathing*, the author, without producing any authority or reason for the difference, translates that word in Gen. i. 20, *anima sensitiva*, and in Gen. ii. 7, *anima rationalis*.

J. C. Biel, in his *Novus Thesaurus Philologicus sive Lexicon in LXX et alios interpretes*, translates *נְפִשׁ*, *animus, animans, mens, voluntas, vita, habitus, homo, animal, corpus exanimæ, cadaver, ego ipse, tu ipse, ille ipse*; but never *spiritus*.

Dr. Campbell's note on Matthew xxvii. 50, is worth perusing.



In the third and last place, it may be objected, "that, as Adam is declared in Genesis i. 26, 27, to have been created *in the image* and *after the likeness of God*, it is impossible to understand these phrases in any other sense than as intimating, that he was originally possessed of a *spiritual and immortal principle*." But even this objection, with whatever triumph it may be urged, and with whatever force it may have struck some minds, is answered and set aside with the utmost ease. Nay, wherever it is broached or entertained, the most deplorable ignorance of scripture, and inability to reason correctly are evinced: for the language upon which it is founded actually points to a conclusion *the very reverse of that to establish which it is employed*. To make myself understood, be it observed, that, in the passages quoted, Adam is not declared to have been *the image of God*; but to have been made *in, after, or, (as the Septuagint version reads,  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ ) according to, the image or likeness of God*. This necessarily suggests to the reflecting and scripturally enlightened mind, that Adam was *the figure or representative* of some other individual, to whom the phrase *image of God* is capable of being applied; it being absurd to suppose, that he who is made *according to*

To these references to authorities I may add, that it appears to me to be impossible to understand Genesis xxxv. 18, in any other sense than this: *as her life or breath was in departing, or as she was dying*. So in 1 Kings xvii. 21, 22, the child's *breath or life* is clearly intended. Of Psalms xvi. 10, the translation I conceive to be neither more nor less than this, *thou wilt not leave my body, or frame formerly actuated by a principle of life supported by breathing, in the grave*.

*like to another, can be that other himself.* But there is no occasion for any inference in the matter. What I have just suggested as *a necessary conclusion* from the words of the Old Testament, is actually *the express declaration* of the New. Jesus, not Adam, is asserted to be *the image of the invisible God*, Coloss. i. 15; and it was Jesus, not Adam, who could say with truth, *he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father*. John xiv. 9. Adam, then, not having been *God's image*, but merely made *like to Him who is God's image*; or, to use the language of the Apostle Paul, having been merely *the figure of Him that was to come*, Rom. v. 14; how obviously and irresistibly does it follow, that, as a mere *type, figure, or representative* of another, Adam could not by any possibility have possessed the *same* attributes with Him, whose *type, figure, or representative*, he was. He might have possessed, and he actually did possess, qualities *analogous to* and *figurative of* those which distinguished the Son of God; but qualities the *same* with those of the Son of God it is impossible to ascribe to him, without contradicting scripture; as well as becoming chargeable with the most consummate blasphemy. That there is an exact correspondence between what is possessed by *the antitype*, and what was shadowed forth in *the type*, a very little reading and reflection may satisfy us. For instance: Jesus is exalted Head over all; He is united to the Church, His daughter and spouse, in the bonds of an everlasting marriage covenant; He is the ancestor of a spiritual posterity; His righteousness is spiritual and

divine; and His existence, instead of being subject to death, is that by which death is swallowed up and destroyed. So, in exact agreement with all this but still as a mere shadowy representation of it, Adam naturally had dominion over the inferior animals; was married to Eve, at once his daughter and wife; was constituted the ancestor of the human race; was originally possessed of a soulical or creature righteousness; and had an existence over which, except through the medium of transgression, death could have had no power. In being made *in or according to the image of God*, it is thus obvious, that Adam neither was, nor could have been, *that very image*. Am I wrong, then, when I assert, that the present objection is suicidal, or that it actually recoils on and refutes itself? It admits, that Adam was made *merely in the image* of one necessarily possessing *spiritual and eternal life*. But if so, then *the natural life of Adam*, as at best *merely the type, or figure, or image, of Christ's life*, is necessarily degraded to a rank inferior to it; that is, as at best only *the type* of the life of the Son of God, in whatever respects it may have resembled that life, it never by any possibility could have been *the same* with it; which, if *spiritual and eternal*, it nevertheless would have been.\*

\* Without pledging myself to support the unscriptural theories and vagaries which Osiander and others may have entertained, I have no hesitation in saying, that the celebrated Calvin, in his Institutes, Book 1, chapter 15, section 3; and Book 2, chapter 12, section 6, *et sequen*; has completely failed in his attempt to overthrow the position, "that Adam was created *after or according to the image of God*, because he was created *like to the future Messiah, who is God*"

In these objections, to which I have given their full weight and importance, lies the strength of the ordinary hypothesis, that the death which Adam incurred, in consequence of his first transgression, was not merely *the loss of natural principles*, but was also *spiritual and eternal*. If, as arguments, they shall appear to any of my readers to be excessively weak, I cannot help it. They are the best which the cause of my opponents hitherto has been able to produce.

At this point I might stop, satisfied that, by overturning every objection which can be brought against it, I have virtually established my own position. But that nothing may be omitted which is calculated to throw light on this all-important subject, and by way of turning the tables on my opponents, I now proceed to shew, that the idea of Adam's *having incurred by the fall spiritual and eternal death*, is liable to objections which are absolutely insurmountable, on the supposition of scripture being true and consistent with itself. These objections, for the sake of brevity, I reduce to three; one or two of which it is my intention to dwell on and illustrate at some length.

*only authorized image*," which he ascribes to them. That Oslanders, and those who coincided with him in opinion, held sentiments at variance with this plain and scriptural view of matters, which afforded their redoubtable antagonist a handle against them, upon the supposition of their language being fairly quoted, I allow: but when Calvin is stripped of the advantage which he derives from their concessions, and when his own concessions are taken into account, the arguments by which he attempts to confute their doctrine, relative to the point in question, will be found to be extremely futile.

First. If Adam *died spiritually and eternally*, he must have incurred *the loss of spiritual and eternal life*.

Secondly. If he *died spiritually and eternally*, he must have incurred *a severer punishment than that with which he had been threatened*.

Thirdly. If the threatening to him and all his posterity was *spiritual and eternal death*, then, neither he nor they can attain spiritual and eternal life *without exposing the Supreme Being to a charge of having threatened what He does not execute*.

First. If Adam *died spiritually and eternally*, he must have incurred *the loss of spiritual and eternal life*.

Death, in common parlance as well as according to scriptural usage, signifies, not *the want of destitution of life*, but *the loss of it*: in other words, it always implies, that *life had been previously possessed*. That it does so in common parlance, without recurring to the sovereign authority of Dr. Johnson, I at once assume. That this is its meaning in scripture, whether employed literally or metaphorically, may be sufficiently established by referring to an instance or two. When in Rom. vi. 2, and vii. 4, believers are spoken of as being *dead to sin* and *dead to the law*, their having been previously *alive to sin* and *alive to the law* is clearly implied in the phrases themselves, independently even of this being the very language used by the Apostle, as well as the manifest scope of his reasoning. Life and death, it thus appears, are relative terms, not in the sense of the one being simply *the negation of*

the other, but in the sense of the one implying the *deprivation* or *loss* of the other. If, then, it be assumed, that Adam when he transgressed incurred *spiritual and eternal death*, is it not obvious, that as *natural death* implies the *loss of natural life*, so must *spiritual and eternal death* imply the *loss of spiritual and eternal life*? But the assumption of *spiritual and eternal life having been lost* is inadmissible, because:—

1. What is spiritual or eternal cannot be lost or forfeited. *Spiritual* and *eternal* are terms evidently of the same import, and consequently convertible, with the term *divine*. As God is defined by the Lord Jesus, in John iv. 24, to be *a spirit*, or rather *spirit itself*,\* it follows, that *spiritual*, or the word when used in its adjective form, signifies *that which belongs to or can be predicated of the divine nature*: and as to *eternal*, *eternity* is too obviously *a divine attribute* to admit of any dispute with regard to the Being to whom it is solely and properly applicable. Spiritual and eternal life, then, is the life of God, or the divine nature; and as, wherever spiritual and eternal life is enjoyed by any creature, it must be in consequence of the divine nature having been communicated to that creature,† to maintain that *such a life may terminate or be forfeited*, would be to maintain, that *the divine nature may come to an end*—a proposition too extravagantly absurd to be for a single moment listened to.

\* πνευμα ὁ Θεος, *God is spirit*.

† That believers are partakers of *the divine nature*, is proved *directly* by 2 Peter i. 4; and *indirectly* by Rom. viii. 8, 9; and 2 Corinth. v. 17.

This indefeasibility of spiritual and eternal life may be shewn likewise in another way.—Spiritual life is that which proceeds from the Spirit of God, or that which the Spirit of God communicates. John iii. 6, and vi. 63. But as this—which is also the spirit of Jesus, John xv. 26, and Gal. iv. 6—was unquestionably neither revealed nor bestowed *till after the fall*, therefore, nothing proceeding from or connected with the spirit, whether life or knowledge, could have been forfeited *by the fall*. Besides, if Adam originally possessed the spirit, it must have *abode with him for ever*; according to John xiv. 16; and must have produced in him *love to God and confidence in Him*, its necessary fruits, according to Gal. v. 22, and 1 John iv. 8—10; 18, 19: whereas, whatever was the nature of the pure principles originally possessed by Adam, the result proves that he *could lose them*; Gen. iii. 6; and even while he continued upright, it was not *his love*, but *his fears*, which God addressed and operated on. Gen. ii. 16, 17.—Eternal life stands exactly in the same predicament. There is no mention made of it in scripture, except in connection with a state of things which *succeeded the fall*; Gen. iii. 15.; nay, further, a state of things which was not introduced and fully manifested *till the coming of the Messiah*. 2 Tim. i. 10. But, independently of all this, the very phrase *eternal life* signifies *life which cannot terminate*; and, therefore, it neither was, nor could have been, *the life which Adam originally possessed and which by his transgression he forfeited*. It will not detract from the force of this remark to al-

lege, that at first Adam had eternal life *conditionally bestowed on him*: for, although so long as transgression had not been committed by him his life might fitly be styled *indefinite, yet a conditional eternity, like a conditional infinity of any other kind*, is so gross a solecism in terms, that no person who allows himself time to think would choose to be guilty of employing it.

Let it be supposed, however, for the sake of argument, that Adam *did forfeit spiritual and eternal life*: what then? Why, that the security of the people of God, for the continued possession of the same glorious privilege, is at once and completely sapped and overthrown. For, as is not pretended by any one that believers at the present day possess *more than spiritual and eternal life*, they merely possess that which, according to the supposition in question, *has been once already forfeited*; and which, for aught they know or can strive to the contrary, *may in their case be forfeited again*. Lives there a Christian so destitute of the reasoning faculty, as to hesitate for a single moment about what should be done with a hypothesis involving in it consequences so revolting as these?

Thus, let the subject be viewed in whatever light we will, it appears clear, that *spiritual and eternal life* if once possessed *cannot be forfeited*; and that, therefore, the notion of *spiritual and eternal death having been incurred by Adam*, is incredible, because absurd.

2. The hypothesis of Adam's having incurred by the fall spiritual and eternal death, implying his previous possession of spiritual and eternal life, cannot be



maintained, except at the expense of confounding the nature and character of Adam, with the nature and character of the Lord Jesus. Although, in the preceding part of the treatise, that confusion of the natures of the earthly and the heavenly Heads, which necessarily follows from adopting the popular system, has been adverted to and exposed; yet the importance of the argument is such as to justify me in again urging it on the special attention of my readers. It is, as I have already shewn, the express declaration of holy writ, that Adam was *the figure of Him that was to come*. Rom. v. 14. The meaning of this phraseology is explained by the Apostle at considerable length, both in the context of the passage just quoted, and throughout the fifteenth chapter of first Corinthians. From these two passages taken in connexion with each other, and illustrated by the whole analogy of scripture, it appears, that Adam, as the lord of the old or natural creation, Gen. i. 28, was the type of Jesus, as the Lord of the new or spiritual creation: compare Psalm viii. with Matt. xxviii. 18; 1 Corinth. xv. 27; Coloss. i. 15—17; and Hebrews ii. 8:—that Adam, as the head or ancestor of a natural posterity, was the type of Jesus, as the head or ancestor of a spiritual posterity: 1 Corinth. xi. 3, with xv. 21, 22, 48, 49, and Rom. v. 15:—that Adam, as the source of natural life, was the type of Jesus, as the source of spiritual and eternal life: 1 Corinth. xv. 22, with John x. 10:—and that Adam, as having by his one transgression introduced death, was the type of Jesus, as having by

His one righteousness become the author of the resurrection of the dead to life everlasting. Romans v. 12, *downwards*, with 1 Corinthians xv. *throughout*. Those who are desirous of tracing the analogy farther, will find abundant matter for the gratification of their laudable curiosity, not merely in the passages directly referred to, but in many others which lie scattered over the pages of inspiration. Adam is thus uniformly represented as no more than Christ's type, figure, image, or shadow; it never having once entered into the minds of the apostles, or of the other sacred writers, *to confound the type with the antitype*. Am I wrong, however, in charging many of those who profess to respect the authority of the apostles with this very practice? What is the necessary consequence of representing Adam to have possessed spiritual and eternal life previous to his first transgression? Why, certainly, that, as the Lord Jesus possessed *no more than spiritual and eternal life*, instead of Adam being merely *the type or figure of Jesus*, the distinction between the type and the antitype is thereby *completely done away with*; and the figure, and the thing figured or denoted thereby, instead of being preserved distinct, *are confounded with one another*! Not so spoke and reasoned the apostle, when in 1 Corinth. xv. 46. he declared: *howbeit that was not first which is spiritual,\* but that which is natural, animal, or soulical; and*

\* *ἡ οὐκ ἐστὶν πνευματικὴ* is here understood; but this in no respect whatever affects my argument, which is merely, that *the natural or soulical preceded the spiritual*, and is *not to be confounded with it*.

*afterwards that which is spiritual*: and not so speaks and reasons any man, who is capable of comprehending the difference between *shadow* and *substance*—*figure* and *reality*—*type* and *antitype*. Every such person will at once scout the idea of Adam, at his creation, having possessed *spiritual and eternal life*; knowing that, unless *the life* which he possessed had been merely *natural and creaturely*, it could not have been *the type* or *figure of*, but, strange as the expression may appear, must have been *the same with, another and a more glorious life afterwards and otherwise to be bestowed!*

3. If Adam originally possessed spiritual and eternal life, which if the death incurred by him was spiritual and eternal he must have done,—and if he lost this life by the fall,—then is the salvation of the gospel represented as a mere remedial and restorative scheme. It is impossible, by any process of reasoning that I am acquainted with, to gainsay this: for if, as is uniformly allowed, Jesus bestows *spiritual and eternal life* upon his people; and if Adam enjoyed *this life* in his state of innocence before the fall; then Jesus *merely restores what Adam lost*. Nay, without having recourse to inferences at all, proof positive that this view of the matter is that which is commonly taken by divines, may be easily obtained from their ordinary and current phraseology. *The restoration of our primitive dignity and integrity by Jesus,—our recovery by Jesus,—our regaining through Jesus the divine image lost by Adam,* and many other expressions of similar import, abound in the pages of Calvin; and continually arrest our

notice in the works of others who have distinguished themselves in the walks of theological literature.\* Little, alas! have such persons been aware of the gross manner in which they were misrepresenting, nay, even libelling the divine character. To speak of God as *restoring any thing*, is at once to impeach his wisdom. The necessity of reverting to original plans, or beginning anew any particular course of procedure, can only be accounted for and justified among mankind, on the ground of the limited nature of their faculties, and their constant liability to be thwarted in their best concerted schemes by unexpected and insurmountable obstacles. Nothing, however, could save the reputation of that man for wisdom, whatever might be thought of his ingenuity, who, without any pressing cause, and merely to shew the dexterity with which he could restore matters to their original footing, should involve himself and others in temporary difficulties and embarrassments. And yet, this is the very part which those who maintain that Adam *lost spiritual and eternal life*, and that it is *recovered and restored* by Jesus, represent God as acting; and the very character which, in the ignorance of their minds, they endeavour to fasten upon him. They exhibit the Creator, either as foiled and disappointed in his expectations from Adam,

\* In a volume of Bishop Heber's sermons now lying before me, I find that eminent scholar and amiable man unhesitatingly asserting, that we have "been replaced by the free mercy of God in the same immortality which Adam forfeited." Sermon, 18th, p. 373, London, 1829. Similar expressions occur at pages 265, and 334, of the same work.

thereby paying a miserable compliment to His foreknowledge, and reducing him to a level with His creatures; or, as having so arranged and over-ruled His scheme of providence and grace, that—after the lapse of many thousand years, the appearance upon the stage of patriarchs, and prophets, and judges, and kings, and apostles, and martyrs, and confessors, and even of His own Son, and the occurrence of events the most extraordinary—the magnificent drama *ends exactly where it began*, Jesus merely *restoring matters to the same condition in which they were when Adam was created!* Can this be true? Is God, with reverence be it spoken, to be represented as acting the part of a bungling artificer, who first mars his work, and then mends it; or of a foolish eccentric tradesman, who destroys his whole stock of goods, merely to have the pleasure of replacing it with a stock in all respects similar? Is there not a something, in every well regulated and reflecting mind, which revolts with abhorrence from such an idea?\*

But the most surprising part of the matter is, that there is nothing on the face of the inspired records themselves to warrant a view of the Supreme Being so false, calumnious, and blasphemous. In the scriptures, instead of going back and recommencing His

\* "Yea, it seemed better to thee to cast down *in order to restore*, than altogether to uphold, *so as to need no restoration!*" Such, in the course of a pompous and theatrical address to God by the somewhat unscriptural appellation of "mysterious Father!" is language which occurs in a Sermon preached and published within the last few months by one of the ablest and most deservedly popular Ministers of this town.

work anew as is commonly supposed, God appears advancing from one step, and one manifestation of his character, to another—always and uninterruptedly going forward in his glorious career, and subordinating every event that happens to the attainment of some ulterior object. Instead of permitting what is *spiritual and eternal to be lost*, that He may afterwards recover it, He employs the forfeiture of what is *natural, earthly, and inferior*, as the means of conferring what is *spiritual, heavenly, and superior*. He brings the *natural creation state of Adam to an end*, not that He may restore it or any thing like it, but that by its termination He may open up a way for the advancement of his people to a state which is *spiritual and eternal*.

The fact is, then, that *the loss of what is spiritual* is not followed by *its recovery*, as the popular divines imagine; but *the loss of what is natural* is the cause, by affording the opportunity, of *bestowing what is spiritual*. Agreeably to this view of matters, says the Apostle, *sin hath reigned unto DEATH*; that *grace might reign through righteousness unto ETERNAL LIFE by Jesus Christ our Lord*.\* in other words, *sin, which is a departure from creature righteousness*, hath not issued in death, that an opportunity might be afforded for displaying what the same creature righteousness is able to effect under more favourable circumstances; but *the loss of creature righteousness* hath issued in *the loss of creature life*, that an opportunity might be acquired for confer-

\* Rom. v. 21.

*ring the life of the Creator, through its only proper medium, the righteousness of the Creator. Is this restoration ?\**

I am well aware that, on some occasions, those who hold *the restoration scheme*, affect to speak of the state to which through Jesus believers are exalted, as *more glorious than that which Adam forfeited* : but as this is merely one of the proofs, as well as consequences, of the inconsistency and self-contradictoriness of their system, they must pardon me if I demur to allowing them the benefit of the concession, until that part of their theory which is inconsistent with it shall have been abandoned. If they continue to maintain “that Adam *lost spiritual and eternal life*, and that through Jesus *spiritual and eternal life is again bestowed*,” as by so doing they continue to hold *the restoration scheme*, their concession amounts to nothing : on the other hand, if they perceive and hold in reality, that *the life which Jesus bestows is infinitely more valuable than that which Adam lost*, (as taught by common sense, independently of scripture altogether, they can scarcely fail to perceive), then, to apply the term *restoration*, or *any similar one*, to *the bestowing of a new and different life*, is a gross

\* “It neither was nor could be the intention of our great high priest, nor of him who appointed the sacrifice, *to restore any one to Adam’s life*. There was an irrevocable sentence given against it; the same which goes so often under the name of a curse, and which never leaves the subject it fastens on, *until it has brought it to absolute destruction*. Adam’s child must die. But then, in the virtue of this great sacrifice, there comes along with the promise of pardon a free grant or deed of gift of *what is infinitely better, even eternal life*.” Riccaltoun’s works, vol. ii. p. 148.

and palpable absurdity. As soon might the man who, having borrowed from his neighbour *a farthing*, gives him instead of it *a thousand pounds*, be said to *restore the thousand pounds* to that neighbour. If, then, my opponents would be understood to coincide in opinion *with me*; they must cease to be at variance *with themselves*.

Let me observe further, that it is not without reason that I wage interminable war with *the restoration scheme*, or with that system of religion which *represents Christ as restoring what Adam lost*; for to it clearly falls to be traced, the widely-spread and unscriptural doctrine of *a spiritual amendment and improvement being undergone by human nature in consequence of the belief of the gospel*: a doctrine which even the consciences of those who hold it, if not blinded by pride and self-conceit, might tell them to be false; as well as one which exposes religion, and its profession, to the merited ridicule and suspicion of shrewd discerning worldly men.—Human nature, as all who know the truth are well aware, neither undergoes, nor is capable of undergoing, any change;—having come under the curse in Adam, it continues under the curse in all his posterity, and this in the believer no less than in the unbeliever.\* The knowledge of God's character, or *the first fruits of the divine nature*, entering into the conscience of the child of God, so far from being in him *a principle by which human nature is amended or improved*, which it would be if *Adam's pure nature were thereby in any measure*

\* It is of believers, and not of the ungodly, that the apostle declares, *the body is dead, because of sin*. Rom. viii. 10.



*restored, on the contrary is in him that by which the tendencies of human nature are subdued, controlled, and crucified.\**

The only way in which even an attempt can be made to overturn the force and validity of the present argument is by alleging, that although *death* does ordinarily and scripturally signify *the loss of life*, yet *eternal death* does not imply *the loss of eternal life*, but *eternal punishment*. "Adam," it may be said, "when he incurred *eternal death*, did not forfeit *eternal life*, but became *obnoxious to eternal torments*." In advert- ing to this cavil, for in reality it is no more, I shall be obliged to anticipate some of the statements and rea- sonings to be brought forward and insisted on after- wards: but as it is continually in the mouths of those who advocate the unscriptural system which I am opposing, and as it appears to be regarded by them as one of the strongholds of their cause, it becomes neces- sary for me even in the present stage of matters to dispose of it. I observe, then, that the man who holds the doctrine of *eternal or everlasting death*, and main- tains that there is implied in the phrase *everlasting torments*, or *the everlasting loss of God's favour and endurance of His displeasure in a state of existence succeeding the present*, brings himself under certain obligations, and must satisfactorily answer certain queries:—1. He must prove that the phrase *eternal* or

\* Compare Rom. vii. 25, and viii. 7, with xii. 1; 2 Corinth. v. 14, 15; 1 John iii. 3; iv. 19; Gal. v. 24; Heb. xiii. 15, 16; Titus ii. 11—13; &c.

*everlasting death* occurs in scripture.\* 2. Supposing to be found, he must prove, by the same infallible authority, that *eternal death* is declared to be synonymous with *eternal punishment*. 3. As, upon the hypothesis in question, persons who are to be *everlastingly punished* in a future state must be *everlastingly alive* to undergo that punishment, how is it that they can be said to be *everlastingly dead* and *everlastingly alive* at the same time? and what authority is there in scripture for such a monstrous supposition? 4. Where *eternal life* spoken of in the sacred writings, except in connection with, and as implying, *eternal happiness*? If, with a view to extricate himself from the dilemma, he shall be pleased to allege, that *everlasting existence* and *everlasting life* are two distinct things, he

\* The celebrated critic and commentator Dr. MacKnight, after having, in his notes on Rom. vi. 23, decided with no small degree of the *fortiter in modo* at last, "that the death which is the wages of sin *must be eternal*," is compelled to make the following rather curious admission: "It is observable, that, although in scripture the expression eternal life is often to be met with, we nowhere find eternal joined with death." Why, truly, it would be wonderful if we did. Were such an expression, or even such an idea, to be found in the writings of the inspired penmen, it would be better to avowed infidels than a score of their ordinary arguments; for (I speak reverently) it would convict the holy Spirit of having uttered arrant nonsense. *Eternal life*, as every person whose mind has not been vitiated and sophisticated by School Divinity knows, *life that cannot end or cannot be lost*; and, therefore, as *eternal death*, if it has any meaning at all, must signify *the loss of eternal life*, it is, like every other real contradiction, impossible to be met with in the inspired writings. Curiously enough, in his comment on the same verse, the learned Dr., without any authority, as appears by his own admission, says, "*For the wages which he gives to its slaves is eternal death.*"—I thought the Dr.'s commentary on Rom. v. 21, would at least have been consistent with this; but, on turning to it, discovered to my great surprise the following paraphrase: "*that as sin, both original and actual, hath tyrannised over mankind by introducing and continuing death in the world, with its train of sorrows and miseries,*" &c.

is respectfully asked, what foundation there is in scripture, common sense, or the ordinary use of language, for such a distinction? 6. If, constrained by the irresistible force of truth, he shall admit, that *life* and *existence*, as applied to intelligent beings, are synonymous terms, he is asked, how it is that, if God bestowed *eternal life* at first upon Adam, our progenitor *could lose it*?—or, if he *did not lose it*, the popular theorist is requested to state *what it is that we are indebted for to the Lord Jesus*; for, according to this latter alternative, *we derive eternal life from Adam, not from Jesus.*—7. If *eternal death*, that is *eternal torments*, was the punishment incurred by Adam and his natural posterity, it is asked, upon what principle, consistently with the veracity of the Supreme Being, Adam and his posterity can escape that punishment?—As soon as the obligation to answer the foregoing queries shall have been satisfactorily discharged, then, but not till then, will I admit, that the objection to my statement of *death* always in scripture signifying *the loss of life*, derived by my opponents from the alleged fact of *eternal death* signifying *eternal torments*, does not deserve the appellation of a cavil.—Since I am treating of this subject, I would just remark further by the way, that the phrase *spiritual death* stands in the same predicament with *eternal death*; having no existence, that I have yet been able to discover, except in the writings and reasonings of divines, But of this hereafter.

Secondly. I object to the popular divines, that if

Adam, as is alleged by them, *died spiritually and eternally*, he must have incurred *a severer punishment than that with which he had been threatened*.

The *vis consequentie* of this objection may be brought out in the following way. The death which Adam by transgression *actually incurred*, must have been exactly commensurate or of the same extent with the death *previously threatened*. It is impossible for any person to dispute this plain and self-evident proposition, without being prepared at the same time to maintain that tyrannical dogma and monstrous anomaly in criminal procedure, that a judge, bound to decide according to law, is nevertheless warranted in inflicting a punishment different from and severer than that which the laws have previously sanctioned and denounced. Besides, were it admitted, that the punishment inflicted on Adam was greater than that with which he had been menaced, how dreadful the stain brought upon the veracity of God. If, then, spiritual and eternal death was *the result of Adam's disobedience*, it was so because spiritual and eternal death had been *the import of the menace or threatening previously held out to him*. That threat, however, cannot have implied so much, for the following reasons :

1. No such meaning appears on the face of the record itself. I must here enter my solemn and decided protest against all mere human assumptions in this matter. The notion of scriptural and eternal death having been *the amount of God's threatening to Adam*, if not proved, either from the Mosaic narrative itself,

or from some other source of equal and infallible authority, falls at once to the ground. I have already shewn, from an examination of the meaning of Genesis ii. 7, that the life conferred on Adam, as he came from the hands of God, was *life connected with breathing, or an animal life such as we still possess* ; along with which, as is obvious from the language of the 16th and 17th verses of the same chapter, he possessed *a life of the mind, consisting in creature righteousness or abstinence from transgression*. Thus situated, with *death, or the loss of life*, he was eventually or conditionally threatened. But as there is no kind of life, besides his *animal existence*, 7th verse,—and his *creature rectitude of character*, 16th and 17th verses,—spoken of in the inspired narrative, I am obliged to conclude, that *the death threatened* was merely *the loss of this animal and creaturely-righteous life* : and this conclusion I must adhere to, until it shall be made out to my entire satisfaction, either, on the one hand, that *a creature may loss more than it has* ; or, on the other, that *we are entitled to charge the Supreme Being with deceit*—a charge to which God unquestionably lies open, in the event of His having, as the popular divines assert, employed terms which denote one thing, while in reality He was intending another. Both these suppositions being inadmissible, I cannot help understanding the terms *life* and *death*, in Genesis ii. 7, 17, in their plain, obvious, and scriptural, signification and relation to each other: the former, *life*, as denoting *the pure, animal, and creaturely-righteous existence which Adam originally possessed* ; and the latter, *death*, *the loss or forfeiture of it*.

2. The threat in Gen. ii. 17, cannot have implied spiritual and eternal death, because Adam, in his creation state, was incapable of understanding it in that sense. The force of my present argument lies in this, that it is inconsistent with every idea of justice to regard those who are unable to apprehend the import of the sanctions by which abstinence from crime is enforced, as amenable to punishment for their misdeeds. No man, and no legislature, in the exercise of a sound and discreet authority, ever attempted to inflict punishment upon individuals who were necessarily ignorant of the demerit of their conduct. From this plain and incontrovertible fact I am clearly entitled to argue, that unless Adam, in his creation state, was *capable of comprehending what was meant by spiritual and eternal death*, it is impossible, without violating all our notions of justice and casting a most injurious reflection upon the Supreme Being, to suppose *spiritual and eternal death to have been the import of the threat in Gen. ii. 17*. Here let me put it to any man of common sense and common honesty who believes in the truth of scripture, if, with the utmost stretch and licence of imagination, he can suppose, that Adam previous to the fall was able to apprehend, in any measure or degree, the meaning of terms so complex, sophistical, and metaphysical, as *spiritual and eternal death*? If any shall be fool-hardy enough, in the face of this appeal to their understandings and consciences, to answer in the affirmative, grounding their answer, perhaps, on *that alleged intimate spiritual communion with God which*

*they are pleased gratuitously to ascribe to Adam in his state of innocence*, I then enquire, how they contrive to reconcile this notion of theirs with the Mosaic narrative, and the analogy of scripture? When I turn to Gen. iii. 1—7, and compare that passage with ii. 16, 17, I find that,—instead of Adam having had any knowledge of evil, and of good as contrasted with evil, *previous to the fall*,—all his acquaintance with both the one and the other was derived *from the fall itself*. But as, upon the principles and by the shewing of the popular divines, an acquaintance with the nature, magnitude, and demerit, of evil is requisite to *the understanding of spiritual and eternal death*,—and as, by the scriptural facts of the case, it is evident that Adam in his state of innocence *could not have possessed any such knowledge*,—how was it possible for God, consistently with justice, to threaten Adam with *spiritual and eternal death*?—a punishment of the nature of which, and consequently of the fact of which having been threatened, it was out of his power to have had naturally the remotest apprehension. The argument for Adam's having naturally possessed the knowledge in question, founded on the alleged fact of his having enjoyed while in a state of innocence *spiritual communion with God*, is, as has been already hinted, utterly untenable. In Adam's original paradisiacal state, he enjoyed unquestionably all that natural, earthly, and *soulical*, intercourse with his Creator, which it was competent for an intelligent being like man while he had not yet sinned to do: but to suppose on his part naturally any heavenly, divine,

and *spiritual*, communion with God, is at once to fly off into the regions of romance, ascribing to Adam the type and creature, a privilege which from the New Testament Scriptures we discover to belong to the Lord Jesus Adam's antitype and Creator, and which only through the Son of God is communicated in different degrees to his believing people. Compare 2 Corinth. xiii. 14, and 1 John i. 3.—As it thus appears that Adam, in his creation state, was necessarily *both ignorant of evil, and incapable of acquiring any spiritual views concerning its nature and consequences*, how clearly does it follow, that to a being so situated it was impossible for divine wisdom and justice to address *a threat of spiritual and eternal death*; and, consequently, that *spiritual and eternal death was not the punishment which Adam by his transgression incurred*.

Thirdly. I object to the popular theory, that if Adam and all his posterity by the fall *incurred spiritual and eternal death*, then, neither he nor any of them *can possess spiritual and eternal life, without exposing the Supreme Being to a charge of having falsified His threatening*.

This my last objection to the notion of spiritual and eternal death having been the amount of the punishment with which Adam was menaced, and which he incurred, is exactly the converse of the preceding one; and, it appears to me, requires only to be stated, in order to carry home conviction to every candid, considerate, and unprejudiced mind. If spiritual and



eternal death was threatened to Adam, and was incurred by him for himself and his posterity, then either spiritual and eternal death is executed upon them, or the Supreme Being stands convicted of falsehood. Now spiritual and eternal death, according to those who have espoused the popular dogma, signifies *eternal exclusion from God's presence, and the eternal endurance of His displeasure in a future state of existence*. But how, in the event of the whole human race having rendered themselves obnoxious to this dreadful doom, can the execution of it—and executed it must be if God be true—be reconciled with the fact of any of them enjoying happiness hereafter? I should like to know on what principles, and in what way, the supporters of the hypothesis which I am now engaged in confuting, will be able to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which this question involves them.

It will not serve their purpose to have recourse to the doctrine of the atonement, and to say, that God has received from the Lord Jesus an equivalent for the everlasting misery of the righteous: because this explanation, besides leaving God under the charge of not executing what he has threatened, leaves also unexplained and unaccounted for, the fact of natural death being still inflicted. When it is alleged, that the punishment due to the transgressions of God's people has been completely laid upon and undergone by their exalted Head, a plain and unlettered but sensible man will be apt to propose the pinching and puzzling query, why then are they, in common with the rest of

the human race, still exposed to the stroke of death? “You acknowledge,” he may add, “that natural or temporal death is at least *a part* of the punishment deserved by sin; for your language is, that *Adam, by the fall, incurred death temporal, spiritual, and eternal*: why, then, does *that* or *any part* of the punishment remain, when, according to your own statement, sin has been atoned for; or, in other words, the full punishment due to it has been undergone?” Were it to be alleged, in order to parry this home thrust, “that the temporal death of believers is no longer a punishment, but is by the death of Jesus converted into a blessing,” those who should attempt this evasion would at once involve themselves in the following difficulties: 1. Self-contradiction; for, by their own admission, temporal death is at least *a part* of the punishment incurred by Adam. 2. In what is called a *petitio principii*, or in English *a begging of the question*; for, when they say, that temporal death is no longer a curse or punishment but a blessing, they are guilty of assuming the very thing to be proved. 3. In contradiction of scripture; for, it declares broadly and explicitly, that death is at once *the boundary of sin’s reign*, and *sin’s wages*. Rom. v. 21, and vi. 23.\*—Do our antagonists still refuse to surrender?—in that case, close at their heels, let us track them to their last lurking place, and observe the shifts to which they have recourse to keep us a little longer at bay;

\* Vide also, Rom. viii. 10. *The body is dead because of sin*; i. e. the body of the believer is still under the curse, and has death inflicted on it as that curse.

“Jesus,” they may say, “has made atonement for *the spiritual and eternal part* of the punishment due to sin, but *the temporal part* of it still remains to be endured.” This distinction I flatly deny; and demand to have pointed out to me the scriptural authority upon which it rests. Will our opponents venture to say, that a single passage can be produced from the sacred writings in which it is laid down? or do they expect us to receive it out of deference to their own lordly and magisterial assertions? Nay, laying scripture out of the question altogether, and viewing the matter in the light of plain common sense, what can be thought of a hypothesis which pretends so nicely to mete out and adjust the deserts of sin, as to assign *such of them as are spiritual and eternal* to God’s Son, and *such of them as are temporal* to his people? Does not the metaphysical subtlety, or rather the arrant nonsense, to which the advocates of the popular system thus find themselves obliged to have recourse, throw an air of suspicion over the whole in the eyes even of the most careless and superficial?

To the objection now urged against the ordinary doctrine of Adam and his posterity having incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural, death by the fall,—the force of which objection every candid mind must admit,—the view which I take, and which I have endeavoured by so many strong and substantial arguments to support, is in no respect whatever obnoxious. The sum of my present reasonings is, that *whatever God threatens, He executes*. When He menaced Adam

with death, He menaced him with *that which, in case of transgression, He intended to carry into full and irremediable effect*. Is not this clearly established by the result? The prohibition has been violated;—the loss of creature righteousness, and of this present life, has thereby been incurred;—and this loss has been, and will to the end of time continue to be, sustained by every individual of Adam's posterity. The threat denounced is thus literally and completely executed. But if spiritual and eternal death had been the amount of the threatening, *how could it have been executed consistently with the future happiness of any of the human race?* Which of these two systems, then, deserves the preference: that which represents God as threatening *what He does not actually execute*; or that which *shews His veracity to be as untainted in the execution of His threatenings, as it is in the fulfilment of His promises?*<sup>2</sup>\*

Such, then, briefly, but I hope intelligibly and conclusively, stated, are my leading objections to the ordinary

\* The true doctrine of the atonement will be found stated at some length in my work, entitled, *the Assurance of Faith, or Calvinism identified with Universalism*, volume 2d, pages 100—117. See also Appendix, letters K and L. Christ, it is there shewn, came into the world not to compromise any of the divine attributes, but to shew how *all* of them might shine forth in their full and genuine lustre, consistently with the enjoyment of eternal life on the part of the guilty. He came, *not to save us from any punishment which we deserved to undergo*, for salvation, in this sense, would have been inconsistent with the truth and justice of God: but to *render our complete endurance of the punishment deserved and threatened consistent with our possession of eternal life*. In a word, he was manifested in the flesh, died, and rose from the dead, for the purpose, not at setting at variance, but of reconciling, *the otherwise incompatible and discordant attributes of justice and mercy*.

doctrine, "that Adam by the fall incurred spiritual and eternal, as well as natural, death." These are,—1. Spiritual and eternal death, as implying the loss of spiritual and eternal life, involves in its very nature an impossibility:—2. God can inflict no greater punishment than what he has previously threatened; and having threatened the loss of Adam's pure creature state and earthly existence merely, therefore the loss of these was all that Adam by transgression incurred:—and, 3. as what God threatens, He behoves to execute, the infliction of what is commonly denominated spiritual and eternal death would have rendered the salvation of man utterly impossible.—Perhaps, the conclusion resulting from the whole of these arguments may be thus expressed: As Adam, in the event of transgression, was menaced with the complete and everlasting forfeiture of all that he naturally possessed, it was impossible for him naturally to have possessed spiritual and eternal life; seeing that, had this been included among the number of his natural advantages, it must have been forfeited by him on his own behalf, and on behalf of his posterity, completely and for ever.

My answer to the first question proposed, namely, *that natural death, meaning thereby the loss of the life of the natural mind as well as that of the natural body, was the amount, and the whole amount, of the forfeiture or punishment incurred by Adam in consequence of his original transgression, so far from being invalidated, stands thus confirmed and established, by a considera-*

tion and examination of all the reasonings that can be adduced, as well in opposition to it, as in opposition to the theory commonly maintained. But, as there still remain one or two ways in which my antagonists may attempt to turn aside the force of the remarks already made, it will be proper to bestow a little passing attention upon these before proceeding to the second question.

1. It may be alleged, "that although Adam, according to the hypothesis in question, was possessed of spiritual and eternal life previous to the fall, the words *spiritual* and *eternal*, when applied to him, are used in a sense different from that in which they are when applied to the Lord Jesus." In what different sense, pray? As signifying that which, throughout the whole of these reasonings, I have expressed by the term *natural*? If this were admitted, who does not perceive, that it would be on the part of my opponents a virtual, and yet entire, abandonment of their cause? That it would be equivalent to an admission of the correctness of my statements with regard to the life which Adam originally possessed and by transgression forfeited, as well as of the blundering and absurd character of the ordinary system?—But, perhaps, it is not the intention of those who are supposed to make the above concession, to admit the accuracy of my statements. In what sense, then, I again ask, do they allow a difference between the terms *spiritual* and *eternal* as applied to Adam, and the same terms as applied to Jesus? Will they venture to assert, that there is a nature intermediate between the *creaturely* nature of the former, and the *divine* na-

ture of the latter? If so, in what part of scripture is it revealed? If not, in what other sense can they hold the difference in question, except in that in which the Apostle Paul states it, 1 Corinth. xv. 45—49, viz, the difference between what is *natural* or *animal*, and what is *spiritual*?—the very difference for which I have all along been contending.—Let me, for the sake of argument, allow my opponents the benefit of meaning by *spiritual and eternal life*, as enjoyed by Adam previous to the fall, no more than I myself mean by the employment of a different and a more correct phraseology: even then I must protest, in the most decided manner, against the idea of scripture lending the slightest sanction or countenance to so dreadful a perversion and mis-application of terms, as that of which they are guilty. So far, indeed, is it from doing so, that in all those parts of the sacred writings where Adam and Jesus are treated of and contrasted, the utmost care is taken to distinguish between the former as *a creature*, and the latter as *the Creator*; between the former as the source of what is *natural*, and the latter alone as the source of all that is *spiritual and eternal*. There is no such thing *in the Bible*, as the application of the phrases *spiritual and eternal* to the life which Adam possessed previous to the fall.—Let it be understood, then, that if my opponents feel any inclination to abandon their unscriptural notions concerning the life forfeited by Adam, in order to take off from their concession the aspect of duplicity, and render it of any value, they must likewise consent to abandon the ambiguous, unscriptural,

and inappropriate language, by which they have been accustomed hitherto to express these notions.

2. I may be asked, "is it not positively declared in scripture, that men as they come into the world are *dead in trespasses and sins*; Ephesians ii. 1; and does not this, upon your own principle of death implying the loss of life, signify that they are *spiritually dead*?" Without enquiring into or discussing the exact meaning and merits of the passage quoted, and assuming it, as my antagonists imagine, to be applicable to the natural state of the whole Gentile world, I observe that, upon the system which I advocate, any apparent difficulty that may be involved in it, is with the utmost ease disposed of. It must be abundantly clear, even to the most superficial thinker, that a man may be *destitute* or *in want of* that to which he is not *dead*, or which he has not *lost*. I am *destitute* of kingly power and of the rank of nobility in Great Britain, but I am certainly not *dead* either to the one or to the other, because I have *lost* neither. Let the foregoing plain remark and illustration be applied to the case and circumstances of mankind naturally. As *death* uniformly signifies *loss*, I can perceive that the whole human race are *dead* to the creature purity and other advantages which their first progenitor enjoyed while in the Garden of Eden; for, these they *lost* in him: but *dead* to spiritual and eternal life they cannot be; for, as it has been I trust satisfactorily proved that Adam did not originally *possess* it, so neither could he *lose* it. It is not denied that, as Adam's descendants,



mankind are naturally *destitute of* spiritual and eternal life, as Adam himself was previous to the fall; and that they must continue *destitute of* it until, or unless, God in the course of His adorable providence shall be pleased to bestow it upon them: but who sees not, after the explanation just given, that to be *destitute of* spiritual and eternal life is a very different thing from being *dead to* it?—This, then, is the plain state of the case, as we gather it from the inspired records themselves, that we come into the world *dead to* Adam's original creature purity, and *destitute of* any higher principle. Of course, on the supposition of the passage in Ephesians being applicable to the natural state and circumstances of the Gentile world, or of mankind in general; it cannot signify that they are *spiritually dead*, but that they have *lost certain natural privileges and advantages which were once possessed*.\*

I thus sum up the preceding statements and reasonings :—

#### ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION.

The death which was threatened to Adam, and which was incurred by him in consequence of transgression, was the immediate loss of creature righteousness or life of the natural mind; and immediate liability to the loss of the life of the natural body, followed in process of time by the actual loss of that life.

\* As my argument is sufficiently strong without it, I have here abstained from insisting on the fact that *spiritual death*, like *eternal death* and *death to God*, is a mode of speech never to be met with in the sacred writings.

## CHIEF REASON OF THE ANSWER.

As death signifies the loss of life previously possessed; and as Adam, previous to the fall, had no life, except life of the body, connected with and dependent on the continuance of life of the soul, or natural mind; it was impossible for death, in his case, to denote more, than forfeiture of the purity of the natural mind, followed by the dissolution of the body.

## INFERENCE FROM THE ANSWER.

Spiritual and eternal life, when bestowed by the Lord Jesus Christ, is not a restoration, or any thing like a restoration, of Adam's natural creature purity of mind and conditional deathlessness of body; but, as an existence which is supernatural and divine, is essentially different from, and infinitely superior to, that which Adam, in his state of creature purity and innocence, ever possessed, or ever could have possessed.



## SECOND QUESTION.

What is the cause of the resurrection of the dead ?

Let it be remarked, that the resurrection of the dead is assumed by me as a fact which cannot be controverted by those who give credit to the testimony of scripture. If any person chooses to call it in question, of course he has no more ado with my arguments than he has with the inspired writings themselves.

It is proper also to remark, that, throughout the present enquiry, I do not forget, that *the grand originating cause* of the resurrection of the dead, as well as of every other phenomenon natural and spiritual, is *the will of the Supreme Being*. The matter now to be investigated, however, is, what is *the proximate or instrumental cause* of this resurrection ? or, in perhaps plainer language, what is the *medium* or *channel* through which God accomplishes His purpose, that the dead shall rise again ? True it is, God raises the dead : but how ?

This enquiry resolves itself into two parts. First. Do the dead rise again in virtue of a connection with Adam or with the Lord Jesus ? Secondly. If in virtue of a connection with the latter, in what particular way is this glorious consummation accomplished ?

First. In answer to the former of these questions, I deny, in the most marked and positive terms, that the resurrection of the dead is the result of, or in any respect whatever to be ascribed to, the connection subsisting between mankind and the first Adam. This denial it is not difficult to substantiate by a great variety of arguments. Let the following suffice.

1. Adam, both in the Old and New Testaments, is uniformly represented and spoken of as the author and source of *death*. This is the leading feature or circumstance by which he is distinguished from the Lord Jesus, and one which the inspired writers, in a variety of ways, insist upon and illustrate. On the other hand, there is not a single sentence or passage in the sacred records in which *the resurrection of the dead*, either in one point of view or another, is directly or indirectly ascribed to Adam. Indeed, what ground would there have been for instituting a comparison between Adam and Jesus, as is done by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, and his first Epistle to the Corinthians, if the former, by being *the author of the resurrection*, had been *the author of life*, as well as of death? This whole matter is so obvious, that I should consider myself guilty, not only of abusing the time and patience of my readers, but of insulting their understandings, were I to insist upon it farther. Those who are desirous to see the argument exhibited in its full force, should consult Rom: v. 12, *to the end*; and 1 Corinth: xv. *throughout*.

2. As it is to eternal life or immortality that, by the

admission of all, the dead are raised, if eternal life or immortality be the divine nature, it will obviously follow, that Adam cannot be *the source, origin, or author of the resurrection of the dead*, without being also *the source, origin, or author of the divine nature*. That *eternal life is the life of God, or the divine nature*, will only be disputed by him who has never reflected on the meaning of the terms ; or who is capable of comprehending a distinction between *eternal existence*, and *eternal life*, which I confess I am not. That *immortality is the life of God, or the divine nature*, and, consequently, of synonymous import with *eternal life*, is equally obvious ; besides being the express declaration of scripture, 1 Timothy vi. 16 : where, speaking of God, the inspired writer lays it down as an incontrovertible position, that *He only hath immortality*. To possess *eternal life or immortality* is, then, to possess *the divine nature* ; and when God bestows *eternal life or immortality* upon any creature, it is clear that He bestows upon that creature *His own existence*, or makes it *one with Himself*. If Adam, then, by being *the author of the resurrection*, transmits to his posterity *eternal life or immortality*, as he thus transmits to them *the divine nature*, the following consequences ensue : 1st. He thus appears in a totally different character from that in which scripture exhibits him, namely, as the source or author of *human nature* only. 2ly. The whole mediatorial undertaking of the Lord Jesus is superseded and rendered nugatory, and he is represented as having come into the world on a bootless errand : for, if Adam

bestow *divine* as well as *human nature*, what is left for the Lord Jesus to bestow? 3ly. As Adam was but a *creature*, and as eternal life is *the life of the Creator*, if Adam be the source of eternal life or immortality, we have a *creature* transmitting to his posterity what is *uncreated* and *divine*!—But enough. Such monstrous consequences cannot be admitted; and Adam, therefore, cannot be the author or source of the resurrection.

3. If the resurrection of the dead take place in virtue of any connection subsisting between mankind and Adam, *the declarations of the Lord Jesus concerning himself are expressly contradicted*. This is so clear and obvious, that my only difficulty, amidst the rich abundance of proofs and illustrations which present themselves to my notice, is to make a selection of a few.—Jesus declares himself to be the author and source of *eternal life* in these memorable words: *My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give unto them eternal life*. John x. 27, 28. Also, in his intercessory prayer: *As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him*. John xvii. 2. See also the following passages: John iii. 15; iv. 14; v. 26, 39; vi. *throughout*; particularly verses, 27, 35, 40, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53—58, 68; x. 10; xiv. 19.—Jesus declares himself to be the author of *the resurrection* likewise, in language which cannot be misinterpreted or misunderstood. *I am the resurrection and the life*. John xi. 25, 26. See also John v. 25—29;

vi. 39, 40, 44, 54.—If the resurrection of the dead, or the possession of immortality by the human race, sprang *from their connection with Adam*, would it not demonstrate the whole of these statements and declarations to be false and delusive?

Thus, then, do I prove my first position, *that the dead rise again, not in virtue of any connection subsisting between the human race and Adam, but solely in virtue of a connection with the Lord Jesus*, by a direct appeal to scripture itself, without having recourse to conclusions already established when discussing the first question proposed. I was certainly and fairly entitled, by all the rules of dialectics, to have availed myself of these conclusions, as the basis and principles of ulterior reasonings: but, in declining the use of them hitherto, it has been my object to shew, that I am completely independent of them. Let me now, however, assume it as demonstrated—which, I am satisfied, it has been—that the life originally conferred on Adam, as the head of his natural posterity, was *a creature life only*; and then, I ask, how it was possible that he who himself had but *a creature existence here*, could be the author or source of the resurrection of the dead to *an uncreated and immortal existence hereafter*? Can any being confer upon another *more than he himself possesses*? Can any creature communicate by generation to its posterity *a nature different from and superior to its own*?—Nay, let me take up my antagonists even upon their own principles. “Adam,” according to them, “although originally possessed of spiritual and



*eternal life, nevertheless forfeited it by his one transgression."* Suppose that, for the sake of argument, I accede to all this: what, then, follows? Why, that *Adam, after losing spiritual and eternal life, had not spiritual and eternal life to bestow.* His children having been begotten posterior to the fall, that is, after the forfeiture of what he originally possessed, could not derive from their parent that of which, by their own shewing, he was already utterly despoiled. If he ceased to be *spiritually and eternally alive himself*, he could not impart *spiritual and eternal life to others.* How is it possible for this argument to be legitimately got over, or even controverted?—Thus, then, stands the matter. Adam must be supposed to *have been immortal himself, or possessed of the divine nature,* 1 Timothy vi. 16, even posterior to the fall,—at the expense of all the self-contradictions and absurdities in which the supporters of such a hypothesis would land themselves,—before he can be supposed to *be the source of immortality to his descendants.* But, as it has been proved, that the life which Adam even in his state of innocence possessed was but *the life of a creature, or a life connected with breathing*;—and, as it is admitted by our opponents, that *the spiritual and eternal life, which they are so fond of ascribing to him while he continued obedient, had been forfeited by him before any of his posterity were begotten*;—does it not obviously and incontrovertibly follow, that Adam might be to his posterity *the source of a life similar to that which he himself possessed, and also the occasion of that life being*

*forfeited* ; but that *the source of immortality, or of the resurrection of the dead to eternal life*, it was absolutely impossible he could be ? In proof of the scriptural accuracy of both my premises and my conclusion, I vouch 1 Corinth. xv. 48, compared with verses 21st and 22d of the same chapter, and Romans v. 12.

Perhaps, in the opinion of some, particularly of that numerous class of *thinkers*, who, content with viewing the surface of things, never trouble themselves about consequences, I have laboured the preceding point too much ; and have indulged in a useless display of argumentation : since, for their parts, they can see no difficulty or impropriety in admitting the plain fact, which I appear to be so anxious in contending for and maintaining. “ Christ, and not Adam, we cheerfully concede to you, is the author of the resurrection of the dead.” Such persons I cannot prevail upon myself to take advantage of ; and would, therefore, seriously and candidly request them to suspend their concession, until they shall have maturely weighed and deliberated on the lengths to which it will inevitably conduct them. Have they reflected, that if my premises be correct and well founded—and correct they must be, if scripture be true—they give a death-blow to the ordinary, fashionable, and long-established doctrine of *the immortality of the soul* ? Christ, not Adam, we have seen, and our adversaries are disposed to admit, is *the cause of the resurrection of the dead ; or, of the possession and enjoyment of immortality by the children of men.* *I am come*, says the Redeemer, *that they might have*

*life, and that they might have it MORE ABUNDANTLY.* John x. 10. See also xvii. 2. But if Christ be thus *the sole and recognised fountain of immortality*, what becomes of every attempt, on the part of puny man, to represent Adam as *having had naturally immortal principle*,—as *having retained it in spite of the fall*,—and as *transmitting it to his natural posterity*? By what possibility can two propositions so self-contradictory as, that *Jesus is the source of immortality*, and that *Adam is the source of immortality*, stand together? If it be said, that *we derive immortal principle from Adam*, is it not virtually denied thereby, that *we derive it from Christ*? If *from Christ*, how can we be *indebted for it to Adam*?—This reasoning being clear and conclusive, it is probable that some of those who previously were disposed to acquiesce in the former part of my statements, now find themselves taken by surprise, and are startled at the obvious consequences to which these statements lead. Let such persons put to themselves the following plain and simple question: *Can I derive immortality, or immortal existence from Jesus; and can I, at the same time and consistently with this fact, be regarding the present existence or soul which I derive from Adam, and which comes to an end, as being immortal?*—and then let them try in what way, except by rejecting the current doctrine of *immortality* or an *immortal soul being derived from Adam*, and by ascribing the enjoyment of the privilege of immortality solely and exclusively to their connection with the

*Messiah*, they can extricate themselves from the dilemma, and speak consistently with their own admitted principles.\*

I have no wish to push matters to unpleasant lengths, or unnecessarily to wound the feelings of others; but if any one of those superficial thinkers to whom I am now addressing myself, shall attempt to take shelter from the conclusion upon which I am forcing him by supposing, that *immortality may be derived both from Adam and from Jesus*, I must take the liberty of acquainting him, that this hypothesis is agreeable neither to scripture nor to common sense; and, that it leaves the subject, which it professes to clear up, involved in tenfold perplexity. The inspired records never speak of Adam, except as the source of *natural life*; nor of Jesus, except as the source of *spiritual and eternal life*: and, indeed, were not this the case, what ground or reason would there be for *contrasting the one with the other*? Except as respectively the authors of *mortal and immortal principle*, why are they spoken of and reasoned about by the apostle, in Romans vii. and 1 Corinthians xvth.? Let those, then, who would hurry

\* In connection with the subject of *creature mortality*, and as illustrative of the necessity of *immortal principle* being communicated through a higher channel than that of Adam, the following passage of Ecclesiastes may be read with much advantage by the favourers of the popular system: *I said in my heart concerning the state of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath, so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place, all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.* Ecclesiastes iii. 18—20.

thoughtlessly to a conclusion, pause and weigh well the arguments which I have adduced, before they either accuse me of a waste and superfluity of reasoning, or declare themselves converts to my positions. They are welcome to find out flaws in the foregoing statements if they can : but they must not be permitted, after declaring themselves upon mature deliberation satisfied with these, to reject the consequences to which they necessarily and inevitably lead.

Secondly. It being thus established, that the dead rise again, not in virtue of any natural principle of immortality possessed by them, but in virtue of a connection with the Lord Jesus, I now proceed to the other branch of the present enquiry, namely, that which relates to the particular way or manner in which the resurrection of the dead is accomplished. Under this head, I observe, that *the resurrection of the dead stands inseparably connected with the resurrection of the Lord Jesus ; or, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is the proximate cause of the resurrection of the dead.* This may be proved, 1. negatively ; 2. positively and affirmatively.

1. Negatively. If the resurrection of the Lord Jesus be not the cause of the resurrection of the dead, then is the former event one of, comparatively speaking, subordinate importance.

One of the ordinary notions entertained with regard to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is, that it furnishes us with *the strongest evidence of the truth of his divine mission, and of his title to the character of the Messiah.*

Far be it from me to call in question the accuracy of this view, when I find the Saviour himself and his apostles frequently referring to his resurrection, for the express purpose of establishing it. Matthew xii. 38—40; Luke xxiv. 25—27; 44—47; Acts ii. 31—36; Rom. i. 4. Ancient prophecy had foretold, in language which for a time indeed remained obscure and unintelligible, 1 Peter i. 10—12, John xx. 9, but which to us, instructed by the event and by the Apostolic comments, shines forth in full meridian effulgence, that *the body of the Messiah should not be left in the grave, neither should his flesh see corruption*, Psalm xvi. 10; and on the fulfilment of this and similar predictions rested, as one of the main pillars and proofs of his divine mission and character. I also admit, that by the resurrection of the Lord Jesus was demonstrated the truth of his own declaration, that *he had power to lay down his life, and to take it up again*; and of such facts as, that *the Father was well pleased with him for his righteousness' sake*; and, that *he had been ordained Judge of the quick and the dead*. This, however, is to represent the resurrection of the Lord Jesus as being *merely of the nature of proof or evidence of claims formerly advanced*: and, yet, will any reflecting person, acquainted with and believing in the truth of scripture history, venture to affirm that it implies and imports no more?

It is commonly alleged also, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, besides establishing the truth of his divine mission, is *the grand pledge or proof of the resurrection of the dead*. With this statement, so far as it

goes, I readily concur: but it is incumbent on me to enquire, in what sense the phraseology *pledge* or *proof* is employed, that I may guard against being imposed on by mere words. Do those who make use of it intend to be understood as meaning, that there is such a necessary and inseparable connection between the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and the resurrection of the dead, that the one event could not take place without drawing along with it, and being productive of, the other? If such be their meaning, I rejoice to say, that there is no difference, or at least no essential difference, between us. I have long been a decided convert to the truth of the theory of that amiable man, as well as elegant, enlightened, and acute metaphysician, Dr. Brown, of Edinburgh, that the invariable and inseparable connection of antecedence and sequence, is the only notion we have, or can have, concerning the relation of cause or effect: \*—and, therefore, to suppose, that the resurrection of the Lord

\* "A *cause*, therefore, in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits, may be said to be, *that which immediately precedes any change, and which existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change.* Priority in the sequence observed, and invariableness of antecedence, in the past and future sequences supposed, are the elements, and the only elements, combined in the notion of a cause. By a conversion of terms, we obtain a definition of the correlative *effect*; and *power*, as I have before said is only another word for expressing abstractly and briefly the antecedence itself, and the invariableness of the relation." *Inquiry into the relation of cause and effect, by Thomas Brown, M. D. 3d. edition, page 17.*

"It is most satisfactory therefore to know, that the invariableness of antecedence and consequence, which is represented as only the sign of causation, is itself the only essential circumstance of causation." *Preface to the above work.*

Jesus is necessarily and inseparably connected with, and followed by, the resurrection of the dead, is, in the only sense of the word for which I deem it worth while contending, to suppose the one event to be *the cause* of the other. If, however, when the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is spoken of as a *pledge* or *proof* of the resurrection of the dead, it is not the intention of those who employ this language, to allow such a necessary and inseparable connection between the two events, as that just alluded to—and that it is not their intention to do so I entertain strong suspicions—then, they either consider the resurrection of the dead as being produced by and ascribable to some other cause, or their words are destitute of meaning altogether—are a mere *vox et præterea nihil*. Thus, then, is the matter fairly brought to an issue. Either the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is the cause of the resurrection of the dead, or the resurrection of the dead falls to be ascribed to some other cause. Let the latter alternative be adopted, and it immediately follows, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus occupies no higher a place in the estimation of those who do so, than that of a unit among the thousand and one proofs by which the resurrection of the dead is established. Is this, I ask, to assign to the resurrection of Jesus its due weight and importance? Is it enough, that a fact the most interesting and glorious recorded in the annals of the world, should take its place *merely among a number of proofs and evidences!*—while no intrinsic value or efficacy, and no real, necessary, and inseparable, con-



nection with the event of which it is coldly allowed to be a proof, are ascribed to it? Why, if merely *one of the proofs* of the resurrection of the dead, then, instead of entering as a necessary ingredient into the divine arrangements, and constituting an essential part of the divine procedure, is it not represented as bearing so very loose a relation to that event, that it might have been dispensed with altogether, and have had its place supplied by *some other evidence* of equal force and validity? So clearly thus does it appear, that there is no medium between regarding the resurrection of Jesus as the cause of the resurrection of the dead, and consigning the former event to comparative insignificance. But it is not difficult to discover the reason, why such persons would prefer representing the former event as *the proof or evidence*, rather than *the cause* of the latter, when we reflect, that if the resurrection of the dead be *occasioned* by Christ's resurrection, it draws along with it, at once and inevitably, the mortifying consequence of *Adam not being the source or cause of immortality*.

2. Proceed we now to prove positively, or by a reference to scripture testimonies to that effect, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is the cause of the resurrection of the dead.

1st. Were it not that, after what has been said under a preceding head, it would savour too much of repetition, I might here quote largely from the language of the Lord Jesus himself, as recorded by the Evangelists. Avoiding, however, passages already insisted on, and

contenting myself here with a general reference to them, out of many others in which the subject is touched upon and intimated, I select John xii. 24: *Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.* I instance; also, John xiv. 2—4: *In my Father's house are many mansions, &c;* which should be compared with the scope of the whole chapter in which the words occur, and particularly with verse 19th, *because I live, ye shall live also.* One circumstance cannot fail to strike the mind of an attentive reader of the Gospels, and that is, that the Lord Jesus during his personal ministry speaks more frequently, and with more distinctness, of the resurrection of the dead being derived from *himself in general*, than of its being derived from *his own resurrection in particular*. This is easily accounted for. By turning to John xx. 9, we discover, that the resurrection of Jesus himself was not understood by his disciples, notwithstanding all the hints of it which he had given them, until after that event had taken place. From this it obviously results, that, except in an obscure and indirect way, it was impossible for the Lord Jesus, during his personal ministry, to allude to any connection subsisting between the resurrection of the dead, and an event of which his disciples understood nothing.

2dly. When, from the Evangelists, we proceed to the Acts of the Apostles, we find, that as soon as the Lord Jesus had ascended up on high, and had by the outpouring of his Spirit given his disciples to understand the import and significance of his resurrection, they

began to speak out, boldly and distinctly connecting that event with the resurrection of the dead. What was it that stirred up the resentment of the Jewish Rulers against the Apostles? Acts iv. 2. It was not, surely, their preaching *the resurrection of the dead*; for, however much their doing so might provoke the Sadducees, the doctrine of *the resurrection* was held as firmly, and maintained as strenuously, by the Pharisees, as by the Apostles themselves: but it was, that the latter *preached it through Jesus*; that is, as appears from the context, ascribed it, as well as all the miracles which they performed, to *the power of his resurrection*.—What was it that induced Paul, in the presence of the Jewish High Priest and Council, Acts xxiii. 6, to declare, that *he was a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee*, and that *of the hope and resurrection of the dead he was called in question*; and afterwards, before Felix, Acts xxiv. 14, 15, to reiterate a similar declaration? Why, evidently to suggest to the minds of his Judges, that the true ground of his difference with the Jews respected not *the resurrection of the dead*, but *the cause of that event*; and to shew them, that *by denying the resurrection of the Lord Jesus*, they subverted the foundation of the very doctrine which they professed to hold.—In one word, it is only by understanding the fact, that the Apostles preached the resurrection of the Lord Jesus *as the cause of the resurrection of the dead*, as well as of all the miracles which they wrought in his name, that we can understand such passages as, Acts iv. 33, with

*great power gave the Apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus ; or see what peculiar emphasis and importance attach to that event.*

3dly. If any doubt remain with regard to this subject, it will be effectually and completely removed by a reference to the Epistles. From a variety of proofs I select the following. In Romans viii. 11, the argument of the Apostle connects together inseparably Christ's resurrection, and the resurrection of the dead. *If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.* The exertion of divine power in the one case, being thus represented as a medium or channel through which it is necessarily exerted in the other, what language almost could express more strongly the fact, that the one event is *the cause*,—the *instrumental cause*, if the term be preferred,—but still *the cause* of the other. But the matter is set at rest by a perusal of 1 Corinthians xv, from the 12th verse to the 33d. In this remarkable passage the Apostle shews, by a train of reasoning which it is impossible to misapprehend, and which as inspired it is impossible to controvert, that *the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is necessarily and inseparably connected with, and followed by, the resurrection of the dead*—the only sense in which, as I have already stated, I contend for the one event being *the cause* of the other. To the passage itself, which is rather too long for insertion here, I refer the enquiring reader. He will there find the Apostle, first, proving *negatively*,

that to say the dead do not rise, is virtually a denial of the Lord Jesus himself having risen ; and, then maintaining *positively*, that the Lord Jesus having actually risen, has thereby *become the first fruits of them that slept*. In the prosecution of this latter part of his argument, the inspired writer observes: *since by man, (Adam,) came, (or was,) death, by man, (Jesus,) came also, (or was also,) the resurrection of the dead. For, as in Adam all die, even so IN CHRIST SHALL ALL BE MADE ALIVE*. Can such language—can such reasonings—be perverted or misunderstood? If it be not their scope to shew, that *Christ, not Adam, is the source, author, or cause of the resurrection, and this, through the medium of his own resurrection*, I know not what object the inspired Apostle could have had in view, by the employment of the phraseology quoted.

Thus have I, it is hoped, proved satisfactorily to every person actuated solely and simply by a regard to the testimony of the *Most High*, that *the dead rise again, not in virtue of any connection which they have with the first Adam, but of that which they have with the second* ; and, that *the resurrection of the Lord Jesus is the cause\* of the resurrection of the dead*. Indeed; wherein lies, or in what way is exhibited, that power which the Apostle ascribes to *the resurrection of Jesus*, Philip. iii. 10, if not in an effect so glorious and transforming? I am not ignorant, as has been already

\* i. e. proximate or instrumental cause.

noticed, that to establish the resurrection of the Lord Jesus as the cause of the resurrection of the dead, is to aim a fatal blow at the ordinary doctrine of *the immortality of the soul* ; or, of *our being immortal as descendants of Adam*. But why stumble at this, if it has been evinced by a train of legitimate and conclusive argumentation, that *natural* or *creature immortality* has no foundation in scripture, beside implying a gross contradiction in terms? Has it never struck the supporters of the ordinary doctrine, that, although its claims to antiquity cannot be disputed, the authority upon which it rests is somewhat questionable—the prospect of *creature immortality* being the very argument by the insinuation of which the Devil seduced Eve from her allegiance? *Thou shalt not surely die*, said the old serpent to the mother of mankind; and to his suggestion she lent a willing ear. *Ye shall not surely die*, whispers the foul fiend to Eve's descendants; and from them obtains the same easy credence. The immortality promised to the one, differs in some respects, it is true, from the immortality promised to the other: but as they are both *immortality inherent in the creature*, and thus both opposed to scripture, by this kindred feature they betray their common origin, and fall to be traced to the same *authentic* source.

Are my antagonists, nothing daunted, and confident in their own prowess, still disposed to break a lance with me, in behalf of their favourite theory? Well, then, as preliminary to ulterior hostilities—for, until they shall

have removed this barrier out of the way, I must decline advancing farther into the field of controversy—in maintaining, that *the human soul is immortal*,\* or that *a naturally immortal principle is transmitted to mankind by their descent from Adam*, I charge popular religionists with necessarily maintaining thereby the following, among other positions:—

1. That we rise from the dead, and possess immortality, independently of the Lord Jesus, or of any power or virtue derived from him. The reason of this is, that if we are immortal already by our very nature and constitution, as ordinary religionists assert, we cannot be indebted to Christ for immortality. But how is such an idea reconcileable with our Lord's numerous and explicit declarations, that *he is the resurrection and the life*? that *by him the dead are raised*? and so on.

2. Those who hold the popular sentiment necessarily also maintain, that we derive the divine nature from Adam. This consequence is seen necessarily to follow, the moment it is perceived, that *immortality or eternal life is the life of God*. For, if *immortality be the divine*

\* Which, when analysed and stripped of verbiage, is just in other words to say, that *human nature or human life is immortal*. This, certainly, is not the dictate of experience; nor is it warranted by the language used by the Judge of the whole earth, when pronouncing sentence upon Adam: *In sorrow shalt thou eat of it, all the days of THY LIFE*. Can words intimate more plainly than these do, that, if Adam were to live in another state of existence, *the future life* so to be enjoyed by him was not *his*, it not being *the same with that which he then possessed*. Can words intimate more plainly than these do, that *immortality, or eternal life, is not, in any respect whatever, connected with or derived from him*?—What I mean will, perhaps, be better understood, if I throw my statement into the following form: *eternal life, or the life enjoyed hereafter, is not a continuation of Adam's life, but a life essentially different*.

*nature*,—and who that credits the scriptures will deny that it is so? 1 Tim. vi. 16,—is it possible to maintain that Adam was, and notwithstanding the fall continued to be, *immortal* as to any part of his being, without at the same time maintaining that, as to that part of his being, he *was* from his very origin a *partaker of the divine nature*? And yet, is it consistent either with scripture or with common sense to suppose, that *the life of the Creator* could be *derived from a creature*?—I do not attempt to disguise or deny, that some little progress would be made towards subverting my conclusions, if it could be proved, that *eternal existence* and *eternal life* were two distinct things:—that it is *eternal existence* which Adam originally possessed, and which his descendants derive from him; and that, on the contrary, it is *eternal life* which is communicated by the Lord Jesus. But who, without any countenance and support from scripture, and at the risque of all the absurdities in which it would infallibly land him, will venture now-a-days publicly to maintain this theoretical distinction?—Let it not be supposed, that the argument for *the immortality of the soul* which I have thus suggested to my opponents, is the offspring and coinage of my own imagination. I have heard it adduced, and strenuously insisted on, by persons otherwise extremely sensible; nay, sooth to say, I remember having actually seen it in print: a fact which shews, to what a pitiously hopeless state that man must ever be reduced who, like the fabled giants of antiquity, attempts by dint of mere human reasonings to overwhelm and bear down the declarations of the Almighty.



Before dismissing this question and proceeding to the next, I am bound to recollect, that I have to do with the dull and the malicious, as well as with the quick-sighted and the candid; and that unless some farther pains be taken by me to illustrate my meaning respecting the *non-immortality of the soul*, I shall most assuredly be misunderstood and misrepresented. Let me, then, in illustration of what goes before, call the attention of my readers to the following remarks:

1. I hold *the non-immortality of the soul*, just in the very same sense in which I hold *the non-immortality of the body*. Our present natural bodies *as such* are not immortal; for, *flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*. 1 Corinth. xv. 50. But these present *natural* bodies of ours are capable of becoming immortal by being rendered *spiritual*, or by being changed into the likeness of *the glorious body of the Son of God*. *He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in you*. Rom. viii. 11.—Just so with regard to soul. Scripture lays down a distinction—but little, alas! observed—between *soul* as the life and mind of *the first Adam*, and *Spirit* as the life and mind of *the second*. *The first man Adam was made a LIVING SOUL; the last Adam was made a QUICKENING SPIRIT*. 1 Corinth. xv. 45. Soul, it thus appears, is *natural*,—Spirit, is *supernatural life and mind*. Now *soul*, as *mere natural mind*, is of itself *no more immortal than is mere natural body*. Death is a quality which, through the medium of sin, equally attaches to both. But as

*natural body* is capable of being rendered *immortal* by being changed into *spiritual body*; Rom. viii. 11; Philip. iii. 21; so is *soul*, or *natural mind*, capable of becoming *immortal* by being changed into *spirit*, or *supernatural mind*. John iii. 36; v. 24; xi. 26; xvii. 3; 2 Corinth. v. 1—8. In other words, we are immortal in no respect whatever, neither as to our minds nor as to our bodies, by *bearing the image of the earthy*; but we are *immortal*, both as to *mind* and *body*, by *bearing the image of the heavenly*. *Soul* in itself and as such is not *immortal*, because it is *mere natural, fleshly, and destructible mind*; but *soul* is *capable of becoming immortal*, by being changed into *spirit* or *supernatural mind*. If we would speak correctly and scripturally, then, we must say, it is *spirit*, not *soul*, which is *immortal*.\*

2. One obvious and necessary result from the preceding statement is, that a fate awaits those who are merely possessed of *body and soul or natural mind*, different from that which awaits those who, in addition to *body and soul*, are also possessed of *the first fruits of spirit or supernatural mind*. See 1 Thessal. v. 23, Scripture divides the whole human family into two distinct classes: first, those who do not believe the truth; secondly, those who do. The former are characterised by it as merely *sensual* or *soulical*, that is, they have merely *natural* minds; Jude 19; the latter, and the latter only, possess *the spirit*. Rom. viii. 23; indeed, *throughout*. Concerning the former, as persons

\* That is, in other words, *immortality is through the second, not through the first, Adam*.

who have merely *body and soul*, or principles wounded by *the old serpent*, the language of John iii. 14—16 shews us, by a most obvious implication, that *they perish*. That is, death is to them the loss of all that they possess. On the contrary, respecting *those who believe*, it is expressly declared in the same place, and in numerous corresponding passages, that *they do not perish, but have everlasting life*. In addition to John iii. 14—16, see v. 24, and xi. 25, 26. In other words, those who believe the divine testimony respecting Christ Jesus, by possessing the first fruits of Spirit, have in them a principle over which death has no power : and, therefore, though they die like others as to their *bodies and souls*, or, in so far as they are partakers of *the Adamic principles and nature*, yet, as possessing also *the first fruits of Spirit*, they possess *the first fruits of immortality* ; and, consequently, have in them a principle which, instead of *being overcome by death*, is actually that which *overcomes death*. Rom. viii. 37—39 ; 1 Corinth. xv. 54 ; 2 Corinth v. 5. *Whosoever liveth and believeth in me*, saith the faithful and true witness, **SHALL NEVER DIE**. John xi. 26. *To day shalt thou*, said the same high authority to the dying thief, *to-day shalt thou*, as a believer in me, and as consequently even upon earth a partaker of the first fruits of immortality, **be WITH ME in Paradise**. Luke xxiii. 43.—The unbelieving, then, as merely *soulical*, when they die, *perish*, and have no farther existence, till *the second resurrection*. They *live not again until the thousand years are finished*. Revel. xx. 5. Believers, on the contrary,

as in part *spiritual*, are also so far *immortal*; they *never die*; they are *risen with Christ*, and have thus experienced *the power of his resurrection* as to their minds, even while they are upon earth; Ephesians i. 17—20; ii. 1, 5, 6; Coloss. iii. 1—4; and, therefore, death, although sleep or suspension of their existence *as to their bodies*, neither does, nor can, in the slightest degree, interfere with the continued existence of *their spiritualised minds*. *Absent from the body*, they are *present with the Lord*. 2 Corinth. v. 8. Were this not the case,—could they die *as to their spirits* or *spiritually enlightened minds*,—how could that principle of faith, by their possession of which they are distinguished from an ungodly world, deserve to be called *everlasting* or *never-ending life*?

Having been thus explicit, I hope there is no risque of any well informed person confounding my sentiments respecting the subject matter in question, with those entertained by the learned and celebrated Law, Bishop of Carlisle. With that eminent individual I perfectly agree, in regarding the resurrection of the Son of God as the only cause of the resurrection of human beings; and, consequently, in disclaiming with him, as absurd and romantic no less than unscriptural, the ordinary notion of *natural and creature immortality*. This, however, is very nearly the utmost length to which I can go in the way of agreement with his theory. I have now perused twice, with the greatest care, his treatises, *On the nature and end of death under the Christian*

*Covenant ; and Concerning the use of the words soul or spirit in Holy Scripture ; and the state of the dead there described : with The postscript.\** From the perusal of them, the second time, I rose with the full conviction, that all the learning and laborious industry of their author had not been able to prevent his falling into mistakes of the grossest kind. Having had no clear and scriptural apprehensions of the divine nature and character of the Messiah, he has confounded *Soul* with *Spirit*, or *the nature of Adam* with *the nature of Christ*; has shewn himself ignorant of the fact, that, even upon earth, *the power of Christ's resurrection* is put forth in *the new creation* of the minds of his people; has overlooked the distinction between believers and unbelievers in their disembodied state, by representing what is the fate of an unbelieving world after death, as being also participated in by the members of the family of God; and, what to a real disciple of Jesus is most striking of all, has, in glaring inconsistency with some of his own statements, exhorted those *whom he calls Christians* so to act as *to ensure to themselves a happy immortality*!† Still, however, with all their blunders, Law's treatises are valuable. They lay down and establish *one* most

\* These treatises are to be found at the end of his work, entitled, *Considerations on the Theory of Religion*. The edition which I consulted was that published at Cambridge in the year 1774.

† Inconsistent with his own statements, most obviously: because, if the resurrection of the dead be *on the ground and through the medium of Christ's resurrection alone*, as the Bishop has most luminously and satisfactorily shewn that it is, then, our being immortal hereafter depends *entirely* on what *Christ hath done*; and not, in any respect whatever, on what *has been done, or may yet be done, by ourselves*.

important scriptural position at least. Besides, they tend to illustrate, both what the natural mind *can*, and what it *cannot, do*. Negatively, it can often detect and expose errors; positively, to know the truth *always surpasses its power*. 1 Cor. ii. 14. How astonishingly, thus, is the distinction between *Soul* and *Spirit* in no small degree evinced by the fact, that Law, as possessed merely of *soul* or *inferior principle*, was, notwithstanding all his learning, application, and acquaintance with the letter of scripture, totally unable to apprehend *that*, to the understanding of which the possession of *spirit* or *superior principle* is ever and necessarily required.\* See Hebrews iv. 12.

There is one individual, but little esteemed in the religious world, between whose sentiments as they are brought out in his writings, and those to which I have been led by the scriptures of truth, I have within these

\* I have now lying before me an extremely interesting work, entitled, *An Essay on such physical considerations as are connected with man's ultimate destination, the essential constitution of superior beings, and the presumptive unity of nature*, by Andrew Carmichael, M.R.I.A. Dublin, 1830: for the possession and perusal of which, I am indebted to the politeness of its amiable and talented author. With a force of evidence which no sophistry can evade, and no straightforward dealing can overturn, Mr. Carmichael has proved, that neither body nor mind, as at present constituted, can be immortal; and that, consequently, the immortality of both must depend upon something else besides their present physical structure and constitution. This *something else* he shews clearly, by an appeal to scripture, is the resurrection from the dead, which takes place on account of Christ's resurrection. Will my very amiable and gentlemanlike correspondent pardon me for taking this opportunity of hinting, that, while most successful in the negative part of his argument, I conceive him to have failed decidedly in some of the very respects in which Bishop Law and other able men have failed before him.

few years remarked a very striking coincidence. I mean, the Rev. Robert Riccaltoun, who was minister of the parish of Hobkirk in Roxburghshire, during a considerable portion of the early and middle parts of last century: a man better known in consequence of his having been one of the first who counselled and befriended Thomson the poet, than from any interest which his own works have excited in the public mind. And yet, Riccaltoun was no ordinary person. His natural turn of mind was original and ingenious to a most surprising degree. In touching on scriptural topics, he displays a sagacity almost intuitive. Finely rounded periods—pathetic declamation—and the other *agréments* of composition, appear to have had no charms for him. At all events, he never has recourse to them. Indeed, if there be any one thing more than another to be complained of in his mode of writing, it is his excessive tediousness and prolixity. But, under this somewhat rough exterior, a diamond lies concealed: I know not where more valuable and instructive compositions of mere human origin, on the subject of religion, are to be found, than his *Christian Life*, and his *Notes and Observations on the Epistle to the Galatians*, which occupy a portion of the second, and the whole of the third, volumes of his works. I do not except even Luther's Treatise on the Epistle just mentioned, notwithstanding its confessedly great and peculiar merit.—Of Riccaltoun's leading sentiments a tolerably distinct idea may be obtained, by a careful perusal of that portion of his second volume which lies between the 52nd and the 87th pages. All

who know the truth will be delighted with the pains which he takes, to distinguish between the paradisiacal state of Adam, and the infinitely superior state to which believers are raised through Christ Jesus ; and with the strong, valid, and satisfactory, reasons which he assigns, for the original state of Adam having preceded, and for its having been brought to an end in subserviency to the introduction of, that of Christ. In perfect consistency with his other sentiments, to the resurrection of the Son of God alone he traces up the possession of immortality on the part of his people. Of the distinction between *Soul* and *Spirit* he appears to have had occasional glimpses. Still, he is in many respects erroneous, and in some positively self-contradictory. The man who would consult his writings with advantage, must possess previously a considerable measure of acquaintance with the letter and meaning of scripture : but, to one thus prepared for their perusal, the volumes of Riccaltoun will be absolutely invaluable.

#### ANSWER TO THE SECOND QUESTION.

The cause of the resurrection of human beings is, not any natural immortality of which they are possessed, but the resurrection of the Lord Jesus from the dead.

#### CHIEF REASON OF THE ANSWER.

Seeing that creatures as such can only possess creature or finite principles, it is impossible that immortality, which is infinite existence, and therefore properly speak-



ing an attribute of the Creator, can be possessed by them, except in consequence of the divine, that is, the infinite, nature having been communicated to them, through a medium suitable to its conveyance.

#### INFERENCE FROM THE ANSWER.

Human beings thus possessing the principle of immortality here and hereafter only in consequence of Christ's nature having been imparted to them, it is obvious, that their possession and enjoyment of immortality can extend no farther than to the degree in which they are possessed of the nature of Christ.

### THIRD QUESTION.

Is there any authority in scripture, or in reasonings legitimately derived from scripture, for the ordinary doctrine that the wicked shall be eternally punished in a future state of existence ?

Were it not that I am determined to sift this subject to the very bottom, and to afford antagonists the most complete opportunity of detecting flaws and fallacies in my reasonings if they can, I might here bring the discussion to a very brief and speedy conclusion. No man who has given the requisite attention to the preceding part of the work, and has observed the line of argumentation which I have pursued, can remain long at a loss to perceive the inferences which fall to be deduced. I have proved, in the first place, that Adam, when he sinned, lost only creature righteousness and creature life ; and, in the second place, that the resurrection of the dead to a divine and immortal existence hereafter, is solely in virtue of their connection with the Lord Jesus. Now, what are the plain and obvious conclusions resulting from these premises ? Why, 1st, that there is no life hereafter to man, except through Jesus. John xi. 25, 26. 1 Corinth. xv. 21, 22. 2dly. That as Adam transmits only a life similar to his own to his

posterity here, so Jesus transmits only a life similar to his own to his posterity hereafter; 1 Corinth. xv. 48; that is, in other words, the only life possessed and enjoyed hereafter, is a life similar to that of Jesus, or spiritual and eternal life. Ibid. 49. 3dly. That as the life of Adam, or human nature, begins and terminates with this present world; and as there is no life hereafter, but the life of Jesus, or the divine nature; there can, therefore, be no punishment, in the ordinary sense of the term, hereafter, except on the absurd and revolting hypothesis of *the divine nature being the subject of punishment!*—a hypothesis which, of course, refutes itself. Thus, then, does it appear to be impossible to admit the accuracy of the preceding statements and reasonings, and at the same time to reject the conclusion to which they inevitably lead; namely, that the doctrine of eternal punishment, of the nature of torments, being inflicted in a future state, is a mere figment of the human mind, having its origin in early prejudices, or in mistaken views of the meaning of scripture.

But briefly and conclusively as the matter might be settled by a simple reference to preceding statements and reasonings, I am far from intending, in this abrupt although strictly logical way, to supersede farther discussion. On the contrary, I shall endeavour, by a series of additional views and arguments, to afford additional conviction to the mind, staggered in some measure perhaps by the novelty of the subject, and the importance of the conclusions to which it leads. Besides, I shall thereby

pave the way for those ulterior developments of the divine purposes towards the family of man, to which it is my intention in due time to direct the thoughts of my readers.

In the prosecution of my object, I shall, first of all, consider and refute two of the principal arguments by which the *ordinary* doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter is supported. These are,

First. The infinite nature of evil.

Secondly. The necessity of eternal punishment, in the popular sense of the term, to the administration of the moral government of God; or, the necessity of preventing, among superior intelligences, the commission of crime, by the salutary dread which the everlasting torments of the wicked are calculated to inspire.

First. The infinite nature of evil.

Here I at once join issue with the advocates and supporters of the ordinary system, by denying, in the most pointed terms, that sin or evil is infinite; and demand, that the matter may be remitted to trial.—The arguments for sin being infinite are:—

1. That it is committed against an infinite Being. But this argument, however much vaunted, is in reality a mere sophism; falls to be ranked under the head of those absurdities which have been so happily ridiculed by Johnson, in the well-known line,

“Who drives fat oxen, must himself be fat;”—

and is calculated to impose only on such as do not re-

flect, or are not capable of reflecting. It is liable to the following objections, which I conceive to be completely fatal to it. 1st. If sin be *infinite*, it is possessed of a *divine attribute*, or of the *divine nature*—infinity being an attribute of God; that is, in other words, sin, according to this scheme, is *one with God*. 2dly. Sin, which is merely *the act of a creature*,\* being *infinite*—and yet, it never having been pretended that *creatures themselves are so*—we have, according to this rational, luminous, and self-consistent system, *the acts of creatures* invested with an attribute which does not belong to those by whom the acts are committed. 3dly. If sin be infinite, it cannot, in any case, or by any possibility, come to an end, or be removed; the very circumstance of its termination or removal declaring it, in the teeth of the supposition, to be *finite*. 4thly. If sin be *infinite*, it cannot have had a beginning. But has this ever been alleged?—How, I ask, are these four objections to be got over?

2. That it required an infinite atonement. This argument likewise, as applied to its present purpose, is a mere sophism: for, although I grant, taught by the word of God, that *not by human nature merely*, but by *the divine nature in conjunction with human nature*, sin has been taken away; † and, although it evidently follows from this fact, that *by the Infinite Being alone* sin could have been atoned for; yet both the fact, and the conclusion resulting from it, instead of establishing, tend to subvert the very position in sup-

\* Or, a quality of creature action.

† Romans viii. 3, 4.

port of which they are commonly adduced. This will appear, if we consider, 1st, that the atonement or reconciliation has been effected, not *by any change in the divine nature*, but *by the sacrifice of the human nature of our blessed Lord*. It is true, that by God manifest in flesh alone could pure human nature have been exhibited ; and it is also true, that God manifest in flesh alone was competent and entitled to bring such a pure human nature to an end : or, to express myself briefly, it is true, that by the infinite Being alone manifest in flesh could the atonement have been made. But it is not true, that *the infinite nature of the Messiah* was sacrificed, or in any way whatever changed or affected, in the accomplishment of this glorious work. It was by the sacrifice of his *human or finite nature* that sin was taken away.\* But if so, how can sin be infinite ? That which *a finite nature can bring to an end*, it is surely absurd in the highest degree to speak of *as being itself infinite* ! But, 2dly, if it be maintained, that *an infinite atonement* has removed *evil*, which by its own nature is *infinite* also, are we not treated with the curious idea of *one infinite bringing another infinite to an end* ? What by the terms of the supposition is *essentially boundless*, is nevertheless, by the terms of the same supposition, *capable of having bounds set to it by something else which is essentially boundless* ! Who shall prohibit our calling this the very climax of absurdity ?—Let any plain, unlettered man, endowed with common sense, ask himself

\* Colossians i. 21, 22.

calmly and deliberately, what is implied in the word *infinite*? Is it not *absolute boundlessness of every description*?—a conditional or limited infinity, like a conditional or limited eternity, being a perfect solecism in terms. What, then, is proved by the circumstance of *sin*, which theologians are pleased to style *infinite*, having been, by their own admission, *removed* or *brought to an end* by the atoning sacrifice of the Son of God,—except the absurdity and impropriety of the epithet which they have seen meet to apply to it, and the fact of its being in reality *finite* or *bounded*?\* On a point so obvious as this, it is needless for me to insist farther.

Secondly. Another grand argument in support of the ordinary doctrine of everlasting punishment hereafter, is a supposed necessity for its infliction, in order to the right administration of the moral government of God; or, a supposed necessity for preventing, among pure intelligent beings, the repetition of man's offence, by the salutary dread which the everlasting torments to which he is subjected are calculated to inspire.

“God finds it necessary to punish the wicked with everlasting torments hereafter, for the purpose of restraining other intelligent beings from transgression.” This argument which has obtained the sanction of some of the greatest names in the department of theology, is at first sight exceedingly plausible: but, when examined into, it will be found to evince the most intense, I had almost said incurable, ignorance of the character of

\* Vide, in proof of this, Romans v. 20.

God, and the nature and operation of divine truth. Let the following remarks, in confirmation of this charge, be attended to :

1. Although the nature of man is fitly characterised in scripture as *enmity against God*, Rom. viii. 7, yet the nature of God is nowhere in the sacred volume represented as *enmity against man*.\* So far, indeed, from God's being a wrathful and malignant Being, cherishing vindictive feelings towards any of his creatures, His nature is actually expressed in one emphatic word, LOVE. This we learn solely and exclusively from the lively oracles, in which he has condescended to reveal and make known his character. *God is Love ; and in this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent His only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him.* 1 John iv. 8, 9.

2. The immediate and necessary effect of understanding the divine character, is the banishment of fear from the conscience :—*There is no fear in love, (in other words, love implies confidence), but perfect love casteth out fear ; because fear hath torment : he that feareth is not made perfect in love.* 1 John iv. 18. *Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.* Rom. : v. 1 : *The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace.* Galat : v. 22. Indeed, we might fearlessly appeal to common sense, as to the impossibility of love subsisting in union with dread, or even suspicion,

\* The argument of the Apostle, Romans v. 6—8, is founded on the principle, that *the nature of God* is exactly the opposite of, and is thereby evinced to be infinitely superior to, *the nature of man*.



of the object professed to be loved.—Another necessary effect of the divine character being understood, is the destruction of creature enmity, or the formation of the divine nature, in the mind of him by whom that character is understood. *We have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love ; and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him.* 1 John iv. 16: *We love him, because he first loved us.* Ibid : 19. In one word, to understand *the divine character*, is to be possessed of *the divine nature*.

3. This understanding of *the divine character*, or possession of *the divine nature*, is the source of all the genuine and acceptable obedience of believers. *If ye love me, keep my commandments.* John xiv. 15. *For the love of Christ constraineth us—that they which live, should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again.* 2 Corinth ; v. 14. 15. It is also the grand principle to which, by the instrumentality of the apostles, God addresses His exhortations. *Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.* 1 John iv. 11. *I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice.* Rom : xii. 1.

If these remarks be duly attended to, and deliberately weighed, they will be found to involve principles, which overthrow completely the argument for eternal torments, derived from their expediency as a means of restraining pure intelligent beings from transgression : for,

1. It is impossible for God to manifest Himself, or make Himself known, in any except His true character.

Hardy, indeed, must that man be who will venture to contradict this. If, therefore, God shall condescend to reveal Himself, in another state of existence, to any class or order of beings besides glorified Saints, it must be as what He really is, that is, as LOVE.

2. The understanding of God's character as LOVE, must uniformly be attended with the effect of inspiring confidence in the being who understands it. *Love*, upon scriptural principles, must *cast out fear*, if fear in the breast of a sinless being could be supposed ever to have had a residence: but, as this is of course out of the question, it must *beget, and continue to inspire, love or confidence in such a being*, as its necessary and inevitable result.

3. All this, it must be obvious, is perfectly inconsistent with the notion of the fear of eternal torments constituting *any part* of the motive to obedience, in the case of pure intelligent beings acquainted with the divine character. For, if God could employ the principle of terror as a means of keeping such beings in a state of dependence on Him, and compliance with His will, it must be, either in consequence of His own character when apprehended inspiring sentiments of alarm, or of His availing Himself of opposite and contradictory methods of arriving at the same result. But neither of these suppositions is admissible: for, on the one hand, God's character when understood is so completely at variance with fear, or even suspicion, in the minds of those who understand it, that *it begets unqualified and unlimited confidence*; and, on the

other hand, *God cannot contradict Himself, by revealing Himself to be, what he is not, an object of terror or alarm.*—Besides, by the very terms of the hypothesis which I am combating, “the beings to whom God reveals Himself as an object of terror are *pure or sinless* ;” and how He should be an object of terror *to such* is more than I can conceive. If, therefore, God be an object of terror to any intelligent beings, either here or hereafter, it is not in consequence of His character having been revealed to them, but the reverse ;—it is not *because they know Him*, but *because they know Him not*.

The amount of the preceding argument is this :—that to suppose God to reveal Himself *to pure intelligent beings*, as inflicting everlasting torments *upon wicked men*, with a view to deter the former from transgression, is to suppose Him to reveal Himself to them in a character *different from, and contradictory to, that in which He has revealed Himself to His people in His word* ; and is likewise to suppose Him to aim at ensuring the obedience of such intelligent beings, in a way *exactly the reverse of that in which He draws out and ensures the obedience of His people*. As, then, it is not *by exciting the fear of eternal wrath*, but *by inspiring love or confidence, and thereby destroying the possibility of such fear having a place in their bosoms*, that God, according to His own declarations, ensures the obedience of beings naturally sinful who have become acquainted with His character ; the idea of His revealing Himself to pure intelligent beings, as *the eternal*

*tormentor of the wicked in a future state of existence, for the purpose of inspiring them with dread and thereby restraining them from transgression, is seen to be utterly untenable, because decidedly unscriptural.*

It will be observed that I employ these remarks, only to shew the folly of supposing eternal punishment, in the ordinary sense of the term, necessary to keep *pure intelligent beings, or intelligent beings who have never sinned and are acquainted with the divine character*, in a state of dependence upon God, and obedience to Him: and I thus limit their application, for the plain and substantial reason, that *impure and wicked beings, or beings who have already transgressed irremediably*, if such there be, are beyond the reach and influence of example, and of course out of the question. It was *ignorance of the divine character* which led to the transgression of *such irremediably wicked beings*; for, *knowledge of the divine character* is, as we have already seen, *the divine nature*, which cannot transgress: and, therefore, it could not be by the eternal torments of themselves and others,—a state of things which would *still leave them ignorant of the divine character*; but by the manifestation of the divine character to them,—a blessing with which, by the terms of the supposition, they *are not to be favoured*; that their tendency to farther transgression could be counteracted and overcome.

It is in vain to think of overturning these reasonings by alleging, “that if God is revealed in scripture as LOVE, He is also revealed as a threatener or object of

terror." So far from this allegation being correct, wherever God utters threatenings, we have him not revealing, but *veiling and concealing his character*; or, to express myself rather more correctly, God's threatenings do not constitute *a revelation of His character*, but are *preliminary and subservient to such a revelation*. God did not reveal His character to Adam, when He prohibited him from eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil: but he laid thereby the foundation of that revelation of Himself with which our progenitor was subsequently favoured. Genesis iii. 15. God did not reveal His character to the Jews by the threatenings which He denounced from Mount Sinai: but he paved the way thereby for that manifestation of Himself, which was partially and obscurely made otherwise during the subsistence of the Mosaic dispensation, and which afterwards shone forth in all its lustre in the person and work of His own Son.—Here, however, let me take up those who recourse to this mode of contradicting me, upon their own principles. Is it their opinion, that God may reveal Himself as a threatener or object of terror, for the purpose of ensuring obedience? What proof, I ask, do they afford of this? If the sacred writings be appealed to—and no inferior testimony can be admitted in a case like this—how happens it, that the hypothesis in question is not only destitute of scriptural authority, but completely at variance with it? It is a fact capable of being easily verified, that God's recorded threatenings, instead of having been *followed by obedience*, have been *uniformly dis-*

*obeyed*;—that, instead of having *ensured submission*, they appear upon the face of the scriptures *only in connection with the violations of them*. Witness, the cases of Adam and the Jews already referred to. How is this fact, I again enquire, to be reconciled with the theory in question? On what scriptural principles or authority can God be said to threaten *in order to ensure obedience*, when all such threatenings as are contained in scripture *appear to have been disobeyed*? From the circumstance of the two first covenants entered into by God with the human race having been violated, notwithstanding the tremendous threatenings and sanctions with which they were accompanied, I find myself obliged to draw a conclusion directly in the teeth of the above hypothesis: namely, that it was God's purpose, by means of the violation of His prohibitions, and the disregard of His threatenings, on the part of those to whom they were addressed, in the first place, to demonstrate *the impossibility of threats ever ensuring obedience to divine law*; and, in the second place, to introduce a principle which, without the aid of threats altogether, nay in opposition to them, should *by its very nature effect that which threats had invariably failed in accomplishing*. The language of the 8th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews from the 6th to the 12th verses, to which I would now refer, shews that the Apostle viewed the matter in the same light that I do. According to him, it was not *by issuing prohibitions sanctioned by threatenings*, but *by the implantation of a new principle*, that God was to ensure

the attachment and obedience of His people in New Testament times.\*—If any opponents remain unconvinced by these statements, I must still farther enquire, what is the class or order of pure intelligent beings to whom, in their opinion, the menace of punishment, in the ordinary sense of the term, may be addressed? Is it those who are in a *probationary*, or to those who are in a *fixed and permanent state*?—If to those who are in a *probationary state*,† as scripture alone can authorise such a supposition, we must have recourse to scripture for information relative to beings who may be so placed, and the nature of the threatenings which may be addressed to them. Adam and the nation of Israel furnish us with the two most important scriptural instances of intelligent beings placed in probationary states. But in neither of these instances was everlasting punishment in a future state of existence threatened; for, in the case of Adam, when the divine record is examined, we do not find that the everlasting punishment of others in a future life, whether everlasting or limited, was proposed to him as a motive to deter him from disobedience; nor, indeed, from his ignorance of good and evil would he have been capable of comprehending such a threat:—and, in the case of the Jews, independently of the fact that they were not pure

\* See Heb. viii. 6—12; indeed, *throughout*.

† Observe, I do not use the phrase *probationary state*, in the ordinary and popular sense which it bears, viz. as implying “that persons behaving well in an *inferior state*, may entitle themselves to be raised to a *higher one* ;” but in the sense of a “person or persons being put on their trial, as to whether they deserve even retaining the state in which they are originally placed.”

beings, it has been proved by Bishop Warburton with irresistible force of reasoning in his *Divine Legation of Moses*, that punishment to be inflicted in another life was not among the number of the sanctions addressed to them. If, then, we suppose, (without any authority from scripture, be it observed), that God may address threatenings to other pure intelligent beings besides men in a *probationary state*; and if scripture is to furnish us with specimens, both of such beings themselves, and of the threats addressed to them; it clearly follows, that the everlasting punishment of wicked men can constitute no part of these threats.—On the other hand, let the supposition be, that the pure intelligent beings, to whom the everlasting punishment of wicked men is proposed as a motive to deter from transgression, are in a *fixed and permanent state*, and is it not apparent to the least reflecting mind, that we are at once involved in gross self-contradiction. If their state be *fixed*, why propose to them *that* which must imply, either a *state of probation*, or be *perfectly nugatory*?—Thus, then, by sifting the matter to the bottom, do we discover: 1st, that when God threatens, He is not *revealing*, but *preparing to reveal His character*. 2ndly. That the object and purpose of divine threatenings is, not to *ensure obedience*, but by means of their violation to *bring out and develope something ulterior*.\* And, 3dly, that the threat of everlasting punishment hereafter can be addressed to no class of supposed intelligent beings: not to those who are in a *probationary state*, for we have no

\* Rom : v. 20; viii. 3, 4.



example of it, and such a threat could not be understood by them ; not to those who *are confirmed in happiness as glorified saints are*, for threatenings suit only a preliminary and probationary dispensation, and are inconsistent with permanent and unchangeable felicity. Thus does an examination of the supposed objection, tend to confirm the preceding reasonings.

Having thus shewn, that the principal arguments on which the ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter rests, the *Jachin* and *Boaz* of the system, are worthless and inconclusive, instead of acting any longer on the defensive, I would now assume an offensive position, and ply my antagonists with a few plain objections which are fatal to their cause. If it be maintained, that the wicked undergo eternal punishment in the ordinary sense of the term in a future state of existence, it must also be maintained, first, that the wicked possess eternal life ; and, secondly, that sin is eternal.

First. If the wicked are punished eternally in a future state of existence, they are necessarily possessed of eternal life.

I presume, that to every man who is capable of reflecting and endowed with ordinary candour, the bare statement of this proposition must evince its truth—must satisfy him of the conclusion to which it leads—and must supersede the necessity of illustration altogether. But as the dull and the prejudiced constitute always a large proportion of the human race, with a view to

assist the apprehensions of such I observe, that as, by the very terms of the doctrine which I impugn, punishment of the nature of torment is to be inflicted eternally upon certain individuals, it plainly and undeniably follows, that such individuals *must eternally exist, or be eternally alive, to undergo this punishment.* In other words, those who are *eternally tormented*, must at the same time be *possessing eternal life*. But such a notion is inadmissible for the following reasons:—

1. Eternal life is declared by the Lord Jesus himself, in passages innumerable, to be the peculiar privilege or blessing which he bestows upon His own people; whereas, according to the doctrine in question, eternal life must be maintained, without any authority from scripture, to be likewise the privilege of wicked beings as such.\*
2. Eternal life is the life of God—eternity being, as we have already seen, one of the divine attributes; and, therefore, to possess eternal life, is to possess the divine nature or to be one with God. But is it intended by the advocates of the system of eternal punishment hereafter, to predicate concerning the wicked as such, that they possess the life of God or the divine nature?
3. If the wicked as such, by possessing *eternal*

\* It will be shewn afterwards, that there is a *sense* in which even the unbelieving portion of mankind come to *possess eternal life*: but, 1st, such have not eternal life *as unbelievers*; 2dly, they have not that blessing *now*; and, 3dly, in a most obvious sense, they *have it not at all*. Believers, as partakers of the first fruits of the divine nature by their new creation upon earth, 2 Corinth. v. 17, even *now have a life which can never come to an end*; unbelievers, as not now partakers of the divine nature, *have no eternal life now*, (and *eternal life* is properly speaking *present life*), but depend, for their *living hereafter*, upon their being *new created hereafter by the omniscient word of the Son of God*. Rev. xxi. 3—5.

*life* hereafter, have *the divine nature* as well as the people of God, what reason can be assigned by our opponents why God should feel complacency in *His own nature* as possessed by the one, and regard and treat as the object of His marked and everlasting abhorrence *the same nature* as possessed by the other ?

But this is not all : for, not merely is there a manifest inconsistency between the ordinary theory of *eternal punishment hereafter*, and the declarations of scripture with respect to *eternal life*, but the theory on this very point is at variance with itself. It is plain, that persons who are *eternally punished* must be *eternally alive* to undergo the punishment ; but, according to the advocates of the system assailed, they are *eternally dead!!!* How are these notoriously conflicting statements reconcileable ?—Besides, it has been already shewn, that as *death* implies *the loss of life*, so must *eternal death* imply *the loss of eternal life!*—a consequence which, although legitimately deduced from its premises, lands my opponents in the grossest self-contradiction.

The only way in which, as I have more than once hinted, an attempt can be made to turn the edge of this objection and get rid of it, is by denying, that *eternal life* is necessarily a blessing ; or, rather, by devising an imaginary distinction between *eternal existence* and *eternal life*. Those who have recourse to this *ingenious\** way of parrying an acknowledged difficulty, are pleased

\* Not *ingenuous*.

to bestow on *eternal existence*, by a strange perversion of terms, the appellation of *eternal death*!—making *eternal life*, on the other hand, to consist in *the eternal enjoyment of the divine approbation and favour*. But, in the name of wonder, what reason do our antagonists produce for all this, except their own bare and dogmatical assertion? What foundation is there for the distinction in scripture? or, who authorised them to invent meanings for words, unknown, nay in diametrical opposition, to that common usage which is the only genuine *norma loquendi*? Where is *eternal death* spoken of in the word of God? Where is it declared to be synonymous with *eternal existence*? Where is *eternal existence* distinguished from *eternal life*?—I allow that our opponents, in the bitterness and desperation of their minds, have invented a distinction which, although not worth a rush, may enable them to throw dust in the eyes of the unthinking multitude, and thus secure them from the disgrace of a total defeat. But do they expect us to be imposed on by so common and shallow a stratagem? Do they really imagine that, out of compassion, and at the expense of truth and our own consciences, we will concede to them even the *possibility* of their distinction being well founded? Tyros, indeed, in such matters must they be, if they can cherish for a single moment expectations so ridiculous;—But, softly; they have at last procured something, in the shape of scriptural argument, for the views which they hold. “*In His*, that is, *God’s favour is life*, according to David, Psalm xxx. 5; from which proposition,” say

they, "it clearly follows, that there may be *existence* which is not worthy of the name of *life*; the Psalmist expressly restricting the term *life* to signify *the favour of God*." Now, can they possibly expect an answer to such arrant trifling? Will they, with any pretensions to an acquaintance with the original Hebrew, venture to deny, that the words *חיים ברצון* might as well have been translated, in *His favour is existence*, as in *His favour is life*?\* And if so, what becomes of their argument?—But, laying the original Hebrew out of the question altogether, and supposing *argumenti causa* that a distinction is implied in the words quoted, what is there to warrant the idea of its being such a distinction as the one contended for? Is it not obvious that, in the event of any distinction or contrast being intended, it must, if agreeable to the analogy of scripture, be between *this present life* or *existence*, as forfeited to divine justice; and *eternal life* or *existence*, as properly, and in the highest sense of the term, an expression of the divine favour;—a distinction which is at once tangible and intelligible: and not, as is ridiculously supposed, between *eternal existence* and *eternal life* hereafter?

It is possible, however, that some advocate of the popular system, more candid and somewhat better informed with regard to this point than his brethren in general are, may admit, that the attempted distinction between *existence* and *life* is a mere chimera, and that

\* The Septuagint version reads thus: *καὶ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ θεληματι αὐτοῦ*, and is *His WILL is life or existence*.

*eternal existence, or eternal life, is unquestionably a divine attribute; and yet may contend, "that the possession of the divine nature in one respect, by no means necessarily implies the possession of it in others."*—Without attempting any lengthened exposure of the utter groundlessness of such a hypothesis, or noticing all the inconsistencies and contradictions to which it leads, it is enough to observe, that the moment a being who is possessed of eternal life or the divine nature *is supposed to undergo eternal torments hereafter*, that moment is it supposed, both that *the divine perfections are capable of being separated*, and that *the divine nature may be subjected to the most signal mark of the divine displeasure!* Can these things be?

Secondly. If the wicked are punished eternally in a future state, then is sin eternal.

This consequence follows as necessarily as the preceding one. On the ordinary hypothesis of eternal punishment hereafter, the persons undergoing that punishment are either righteous or wicked. Righteous they cannot be; since to suppose God to continue punishing persons who either are righteous, or who become so under the influence of the discipline to which they are subjected, is an idea so horrible,—so repugnant to justice,—and so completely at variance with the divine character revealed in the scriptures, as to be quite inadmissible. It remains, therefore, that those who are eternally punished hereafter are wicked or sinners, and continue to be so. But, if they are eternally sinners, then *sin clearly is eternal*; or, should the phrase be

better liked, *then sin is perpetuated to eternity!* This, however, cannot be, for reasons of the most substantial kind.

1. If we assume that *sin is eternal*, we invest it with a *divine attribute*. It is evident, that the circumstance of having neither *beginning of days nor end of life*, is an attribute of the supreme Being; and it is likewise evident, that *as such* it cannot be ascribed to sin.—If other reasons be required, they are at hand:—1st. Can we suppose *that* to be *eternal* or *possessed of a divine attribute*, which is *in opposition to the divine nature*? 2ndly. No creature *as such* is or can be *eternal*; and can we suppose then *the act of a creature*, which sin is, to be invested with a quality *which does not belong to the creature itself*? 3rdly. Can we forget that, if sin be *eternal*, it is impossible for it *to be expiated or removed*?

I am not fond of raising the cry of heresy, or of fastening consequences on an antagonist which he himself would disavow, but it is right for the supporters of the ordinary system to be made aware, that the doctrine of *eternal torments*, which involves in it *the eternity and infinity of sin*, leads directly to Manicheism. The heresy of Manes, like that of the ancient magi, is said to have consisted in the supposition of *two co-eternal principles of good and evil*; or, of the existence of a good Deity and an evil One, who everlastingly cherish hostile feelings, and display these in overt acts, towards each other; but *neither of whom is able to effect the destruction of the other*. To this heresy, the

doctrine of everlasting punishment hereafter bears a close affinity; coinciding with it in the grand and leading circumstance of *investing sin with divine attributes*, and representing it consequently *as the rival of Jehovah!* Will it be contradicted, that *infinity* and *eternity* are attributes of the Supreme Being?—Besides, when it is declared, that “sin unless atoned for *must exist everlastingly*,” have these who use this language reflected, that *necessary existence* is predicable only of God himself?—Such, without any exaggeration, is the awkward predicament in which every advocate for *everlasting punishment hereafter* places himself: he makes *sin infinite and eternal*, and clothes it with *necessary existence*, thereby raising it to an equality with God! What did Manes ever say worse than this?

Here, however, I almost fancy my antagonists triumphantly exclaiming:—“your argument, if it proves any thing, proves too much. The proper inference from the fact of sin being *infinite* and *eternal*, upon your own principles, is not that sin is *God's rival*, but that it is *God himself*. And yet, if this be admitted, what becomes of the eternal life of the people of God? For, if sin cannot be invested with eternity without confounding it with God, no more can any being be possessed of eternal life without confounding it with God.” This objection, though somewhat ingenious and plausible, is at bottom a mere cavil. I am willing to allow that, if sin be *infinite* and *eternal*, the proper conclusion is, that it is *one with God*, or is *confounded with Him*—a fact, by



the way, which wonderfully confirms the preceding reasoning: but I deny the inference which my antagonists would draw from this. When I maintain, that believers are *one with God*, I have the authority of scripture for thus expressing myself;\* and when I shew, that this astonishing and incomprehensible union results from their being *partakers of the divine nature*,† any understanding, however feeble and unpractised, may perceive the force, necessity, and validity, of my conclusion. On the other hand, that sin cannot be *one with God*, I have these plain and incontrovertible proofs, that it is nowhere in the sacred writings declared to be so; and that it neither is, nor ever was pretended to be, *possessed of the divine nature*, but is diametrically opposed to it.—Here I might stop, resting the weight of my answer to the above cavil on the fact, that believers are declared in scripture to be *one with God*, whereas no such declaration is made concerning sin. But I proceed further and observe, that, although a *person* may be *one with God* without being *confounded with Him*, the case is widely different in regard to a *mere quality or attribute*, such as sin on all hands is acknowledged to be. *God's attributes*, it is well known, are *God Himself*; and therefore, if *sin*—however monstrous the idea—were *one of these attributes*, it must be *confounded with God*, or be *God himself*.—Thus, then, is my argument strengthened rather than weakened by the present objection: for, my opponents, by making *sin* which is a mere quality or attribute *infinite* and *eternal*,

\* John xvii. 21—23.

† 2 Peter i. 4.

necessarily confound it with God Himself—if they object to allowing to be *God's rival*; whereas, in representing believers to be *one with God*, as being *partakers of the divine nature*, I do no more than scripture itself, and the circumstances of the case, warrant me in doing.\*

2. If *sin be eternal*, then, instead of being *one of the means by which God displays His perfections*, it actually becomes *the end, scope, and ultimate design of the divine procedure*.

The ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment is founded on a gross mistake with regard to the nature of sin, and the purpose of its introduction into the world. By representing sin as eternal, it ascribes to it a quality, and invests it with an attribute, which can only belong to the end, object, or final cause, or to one of the ends, objects, or final causes, which God aims at accomplishing by all His providential and gracious dispensations. But that sin cannot be the end, object, or final cause of the divine procedure, or any part of that end, is plain for the following reasons:—

1st. God, as a pure and holy being, can propose to Himself no end or object, except what is good and worthy of Himself. But if this be true—and who shall be found daring enough to gainsay it?—then, to give a permanent and everlasting existence *to evil, or to that*

\* As to the *modus existendi*, or manner of the existence of believers hereafter, farther, than that it must imply a larger and more abundant manifestation and enjoyment of the divine character than is conceded to them while here, I neither know, nor while in the body can know, any thing. See 1 John iii. 2.

*which is the opposite of goodness, cannot constitute any part of the end, object, or ultimate design of the divine procedure.*

2ndly. The idea of God making the eternity of evil or sin the object, or any part of the object, of His procedure towards the human race, stands in opposition to the whole tenor and analogy of scripture, which speaks of Him as having but one end or object in view in all that He does, namely, *His own glory*; or, in perhaps plainer and more intelligible language, *the display of His own character and perfections*. See, in proof of this, the language of Psalm xix. 1; Luke ii. 14; John viii. 50; Rom: xi. 36; xvi. 27; 1 Corinth: x. 31; 2 Corinth: iii. 18; iv. 6; Galat: i. 5; Ephes: i. 6; iii. 21; 2 Timothy iv. 18; Hebrews xiii. 21; 1 Peter v. 11; Rev: iv. 11; and v. 12. 13. In connection with this subject it deserves to be remarked, that the enjoyment of eternal life by the people of God, though inseparable from *the divine object or purpose*, is not directly and properly speaking *that object or purpose itself*; but results from the fact, that as *the divine character is to be eternally manifested*, there must be *persons to whom the manifestation is made*: the *intended manifestation* thus creating the necessity for the *persons*, and not the *persons* creating the necessity for the *manifestation*.

Seeing, then, that sin is not the end, object, or final cause which God proposes to Himself in His procedure towards the human race, nor any part of it; and seeing, farther, that the only end which He aims at is His

own glory, or the eternal manifestation of Himself; it follows, that sin, like all creatures and all the acts of creatures, is merely one of the means or instruments by which He accomplishes this end. That is, in fewer and simpler words, sin is not *an end*, but is *one of the means employed for the attainment of an end*. The correctness of this statement, and its inconsistency with the idea of sin being eternal, will be rendered obvious by a consideration of the few following particulars :

1st. It being abundantly manifest, that sin is not an end or ultimate object of the Supreme Being, but one of the means or instruments which He employs for the accomplishment of an end, it must, like other means, cease or terminate, when the end for which it is employed shall have been accomplished.

This is so obvious that, like other truisms, it almost sets illustration at defiance. What architect, after having completed a sumptuous and splendid edifice, would refuse to remove the scaffolding, by the assistance it had been erected, but which, while standing, concealed its beauties from the public gaze? What artist would insist that, along with his workmanship, there should always be presented and exhibited the tools with which that workmanship had been executed? —To generalize the principle involved in these illustrations:—if it is confessedly the part of wisdom to accomplish the best ends by the most suitable and best adapted means, it is confessedly its part also to remove and have done with the means when the ends are accomplished. That sin is the most suitable means.

of accomplishing God's purposes in regard to the human race follows, without needing to have recourse to any other method of proof, from the mere fact of His having employed it. But, shall a charge of deficiency in wisdom be brought or insinuated against Him by supposing, that He will continue sin in existence, a single moment after all His purposes in the employment of it shall have been answered ?

2ndly. If the ends, objects, or purposes for which sin is employed by the Supreme Being, are answered, attained to, and accomplished in this present world or system of things, sin must cease or come to an end with it.

This follows so obviously from what precedes, and appears so distinctly from the bare statement of the proposition itself, that I should regard myself as insulting the understandings of my readers, were I to attempt any illustration or proof of it.

3rdly. The ends or purposes for which sin enters into the plan of the Divine government, are accomplished in this present world ; and, therefore, it neither has nor can have any existence beyond.

Were the question put to me, what is the end or purpose that God aims at by the introduction of sin ? —taught by the scriptures, I could have no hesitation in answering, the introduction of something better. This, indeed, is strictly according to analogy. The world we now inhabit is, we are informed, in due time and after having served its purposes, to be superseded by one higher and better ; and it is, therefore, what might

*a priori* have been expected, that if *sin entered*, it should, after serving its purposes, be superseded and annihilated likewise. Plain it must be to the heaven-instructed mind, that sin is merely one of the agents, by which God brings out, displays, and developes, the glories of his character;—a part of the scaffolding, by means of which He is erecting that wondrous edifice of love, which He himself is to inhabit throughout eternity. Sin, being thus of the nature of a *means* or *instrument*, could only have been employed in connection with a system of things, which was itself *instrumental, subordinate, and introductory to another*. For, could we suppose the reverse, and assign to sin a place in a system that was *permanent and eternal*, this would be to impart *permanency and eternity to sin itself*; and, besides the other monstrous consequences which would follow, would we *to exclude it from the class of means altogether*. Hence, from its very nature, sin must stand connected with a transient and subordinate system, such as the present world is; and the removal or destruction of the one, must draw along with it the removal or destruction of the other.—Perhaps a more popular, as well as a more intelligible, mode of stating the argument, will be to observe, that the introduction of sin appears clearly to be subservient to two leading purposes on the part of the Supreme Being. In the first place, to afford an opportunity for the conquest of it. It is by *sin entering and abounding*, that *Grace* is enabled *much more to abound*.\* —In the second place, to be the means of death, by which

God breaks off the connection of His people with this present world, and brings them to that more enlarged manifestation and fuller enjoyment of Himself, which has been their destined inheritance from everlasting. *Sin reigning unto death*, is the means of *Grace reigning through righteousness unto eternal life*.\*—The purposes of God in regard to *sin* are thus fully accomplished, in its being triumphed over and trampled under foot by His own Son ; and in *death*, which is its necessary and inseparable attendant, *being swallowed up in victory or eternal life*. But does not all this convincingly prove, that sin must be limited in its existence and operations to this present world, or present system of things? Could we suppose the reverse—could we suppose, that this present world was not the only *arena* on which the petty, transient, and gloriously over-ruled, triumphs of sin were to be displayed, and that it was to endure and exist in another and eternal state of being—then, instead of *sin*, according to the divine declaration, *reigning UNTO DEATH*, and expiring in the very act of executing the divine sentence upon transgression,† *it would reign TO ETERNITY*; and would thus be invested with a jurisdiction and sway, co-ordinate and co-extensive with that of *Grace* itself. Nay, were *sin* thus to extend its existence and reign to *eternity*, then, instead of having been triumphed over and rendered subservient

\* Rom. v. 21.

† In *bruising the heel of the woman's seed*, the seed of the serpent has its own head bruised, according to the terms of the very first promise. Genesis iii. 15.

to his purposes by the Lord Jesus, *it would for ever remain a monument of the inefficacy and incompleteness of his undertaking*;—and, instead of death as the last enemy *being destroyed*, it would, as the necessary consequence and inseparable attendant of *sin*,\*—however strange the idea may appear,—be *possessed of everlasting existence, and invested with everlasting authority*, likewise! Such monstrous consequences cannot, of course, for a single moment be admitted: and hence it follows, that *sin having entered into the world* for certain specific purposes, such as, *to afford the Supreme Being an opportunity of manifesting and developing His perfections in the conquest of it, and to break off the connection of His people with this present world*, must, when it has served these purposes, come to an end with the world itself which is the theatre of its operations.†

But I have not yet exhausted my stock of proofs that sin can have no existence hereafter, derived from

\* Rom : vi. 23. *The wages of sin is death.*

† From the following passage it appears, that the celebrated infidel Rousseau had some confused notions of the truth for which I am contending:—"Que m'importe ce que deviendront les méchants? Je prends peu d'intérêt à leur sort. Toutefois j'ai peine à croire qu'ils soient condamnés à des tourments sans fin. Si la Suprême Justice se venge, elle se venge dès cette vie. Vous et vos erreurs, ô nations, êtes ses ministres. Elle emploie les maux que vous faites à punir les crimes qui les ont attirés. C'est dans vos cœurs insatiables, rongés d'envie, d'avarice, et d'ambition, qu'au sein de vos fausses prospérités les passions vengeresses punissent vos forfaits. Qu'est-il besoin d'aller chercher l'enfer dans l'autre vie? Il est dès celle-ci dans le cœur des méchants. Ou finissent nos besoins périssables, ou cessent nos desirs insensés, doivent cesser aussi nos passions et nos crimes. De quelle perversité de purs esprits seroient-ils susceptibles?" &c. *Emile, Tome 2de, pp. 253, 254, edition stereotype.*



the fact of its being merely one of the means or instruments by which God accomplishes His purposes. I have just shewn *positively*, that the purposes for which it entered are fulfilled during the subsistence of this present world : and now, with a view to complete the present argument and silence the voice of cavilling for ever, I proceed to shew *negatively*, that no end or purpose, or at least none worthy of God, could be served by its continuance in a future and eternal state of being.

In the first place, the eternity or eternal existence of sin hereafter could not be intended to answer any purpose worthy of God, in the case of the wicked, or those who were already undergoing eternal torment. It could not be intended to make manifest to *them* the divine character ; for that character, being LOVE, is manifested, not as *eternally tormenting*, but as *freely pardoning*. 1 John iv. 8—10. It could not be intended to produce in *their* minds, acquiescence in the justice and propriety of the divine procedure towards them ; for this, it is acknowledged on all hands, eternal punishment hereafter is neither intended nor calculated to produce : besides, if such an acquiescence could be produced, the punishment, consistently with justice, could no longer be continued ; for, it would then have answered its purposes. It could not be intended to prepare the sufferers for the remission of their punishment ; for, according to the terms of the hypothesis, that punishment is eternal. It appears, then, that if sin were eternal, the knowledge of this fact

could answer no purpose, in the case of the damned, except that of exasperating their minds and aggravating their torments; and God must be supposed to punish, either *for this purpose*, or *merely for punishing' sake*. But is either of these suppositions worthy of the Supreme Being? Can God reveal Himself in the character of *an everlasting tormentor*? or as *gratifying splenetic and revengeful feelings*?

In the second place, God could have no end at all to answer by the eternity of sin hereafter, in the case of pure intelligent beings. He could not intend, by making known to them the everlasting torments of the wicked, to produce terror in their minds; or, to excite in them suspicions relative to the certainty, permanency, and stability, of their own happiness: for, by doing so, He would, as we have already seen, counteract His own purposes—which are, by the manifestation of His character, entirely to banish fear from the conscience, with every approximation to it or possibility of it; and, to engender love, confidence, and obedience. Nay, without needing to have recourse to previous reasonings at all, are not pure beings whether angels or men, in a future state of existence, conceived, even by the supporters of the adverse theory, to be everlastingly confirmed and established in their respective situations and privileges?—and if so, where is the necessity—where is the possibility—of any thing in the shape of exhortations or warnings being addressed to them?—But, still farther; God could not intend, by the eternity of evil or punishment hereafter, to produce in

the minds of pure intelligent beings admiration of His *justice* ; for, this is effected, not by visiting the acts of creatures, which are of course *finite* like themselves, with *infinite* punishment, but by meting out to sin its *exact* reward or wages, which is death. He could not intend, by the eternity of evil, to shew forth the praises of His *wisdom* ; for, this is accomplished, not by bestowing permanency, eternal existence, or the divine nature, upon evil, but by making its entrance and temporary reign, subservient to its own destruction, and the everlasting life of His people. He could not intend, by the eternity of evil, to manifest His *power* ; for, can it be made a question, whether this attribute is more glorified by sin being independent of God ?—which, if possessed of necessary and eternal existence, it must be\*—or, by its being subject to His control during the whole period of its existence, and destroyed as soon as the purposes for which it was introduced into the world are accomplished ?—In short, there is not one of the divine attributes which, instead of being magnified and illustrated, would not be sullied, obscured, and even annihilated, by the eternity of evil ; and there is not one end worthy of God, either revealed or conceivable, which would be answered by it.

Such, then, is the strong and conclusive evidence which we afford, that, as sin is not *an end*, but merely *one of the means by which God accomplishes His ends or purposes*, it cannot be eternal. We have shewn, first,

\* If sin be eternal, it is either *one with God*, or *the rival of God*. The former of course, it is not ; the above reasoning shews, that it cannot be the latter.

that every means must cease or terminate, when the purposes for which it is employed are accomplished— Secondly, that, if the purposes for which sin is employed are accomplished in this present world or present system of things, the one must come to an end with the other—And, lastly, that, as the purposes for which sin is employed are confined to this present world, the existence and reign of sin are confined to this present world likewise. Upon this last head we have enlarged; pointing out, 1st, *positively*, what the purposes are which sin answers in this present world, and how it answers them; and, 2dly, *negatively*, that sin neither has, nor can have, any end or purpose whatever to answer hereafter. From the fact, that sin is not eternal, the plain and inevitable conclusion follows, that there can be no eternal punishment of sin—taking the phrase *eternal punishment* in the sense of *eternal torments*.

But something yet remains to be done, in order to give the *coup de grace* to the popular theory. Hitherto I have contented myself with refuting the objections of its adherents, and shewing that it is itself liable to objections which are absolutely insurmountable. I now proceed to shew, that the word of God positively and formally denies it; and, consequently, to warn its supporters that, in the event of their being determined to persevere, they fight with the fearful odds of having God himself for their antagonist.

One explicit declaration of the Most High being as good as a thousand, out of many passages of scripture,

which are inconsistent with the popular system, I select the following :

1 John iii. 8.

*For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he MIGHT DESTROY the works of the Devil.*

It will at once be conceded to me, by every one professing regard to the language of God's word, that whatever the Messiah undertook to accomplish, he actually does accomplish. The reason is, that there is no opposing force sufficiently strong to frustrate any of his undertakings. If, then, he was manifested for the purpose of destroying the Devil's works, he actually does destroy them.

It is also too plain to be disputed, that the phraseology of this passage is general and unlimited. It is not said, that Jesus will destroy the Devil's works *in certain cases*, and leave them undestroyed *in others*. No; so far from this, a complete conquest over them, issuing in their entire and everlasting destruction, is here predicated of him. *He destroys THE WORKS of the Devil.\**

Now, how is it possible to reconcile this with the popular theory?—Sin, sufferings, and death, it is obvious from other passages of scripture, constitute the Devil's works. Sin, sufferings, and death, therefore, the Son of God *destroys*. But sin, sufferings, and death, the Son of God, according to our popular religionists, in the great majority of cases *confirms*! This becomes clear, when we consider, that to him is ascribed, by the common consent of all parties, the resurrection of the dead. The

\* Εφανερώθη—ἵνα λυθῇ ΤΑ ἜΡΓΑ.

wicked, no less than the righteous, shall hear his voice, and shall by it *be brought forth from their graves*. John v. 29. And how does he raise them? Does he raise a single person with a sinful nature hereafter? Does he raise a single person to suffer hereafter? Does he raise a single person subject to the power of everlasting death hereafter? Much more, does he raise many persons so circumstanced?—Let there be no shirking of these questions. Bring the matter home to your consciences, and speak out fairly.—To assist you in your answer, I will put the whole in the form of one question:—Does the Son of God, as the author of the resurrection, raise any intelligent beings to sin, suffer, and die, everlastingly? If you say, yes; then, mark the consequence. The text in question, according to your reading of it, should have run thus: *For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that in a few cases HE MIGHT DESTROY, but that in the great majority of cases HE MIGHT CONFIRM, the works of the Devil!* That is, you represent the Son of God as acting in a *future state*, the very part which scripture represents the Devil as acting in *this present world!* Nay, what is far worse, and indeed the very height of blasphemy, you represent the Lord Jesus, by the alleged fact of his raising intelligent beings from their graves *with wicked natures*, as giving *everlasting existence* hereafter to *those very evils*, upon *which* the Devil had been able previously to confer only a *temporary existence* here! Jesus, thus, according to you, does the Devil's work; aye, and does it with infinitely more success than the Devil himself

had been able to attain to!! Oh, monstrous idea! Jesus condescending to take his cue from his arch-enemy; and to render his undertaking *subservient to the everlasting confirmation of that enemy's dominion over intelligent creatures!!*!\*—When, when will those, who would fain pass for the wise and the enlightened of this world, learn to express themselves in a way consistent even with their own professed sentiments?

It is in vain to allege, in opposition to these home-thrusts, such declarations of scripture as, *where the tree falleth, there it shall be*. Ecclesiastes : xi. 3. True, *there it shall be*; aye, and as the text is commonly quoted, *there too it shall lie* for ever. But it is no where said, *as it falleth, so shall it be raised again*; and until this can be established on *divine authority*, every allegation that *it shall be so* proceeding *merely from man* is absolutely worthless. God no doubt intended, that human nature should, from its origin to its termination, continue ever the same. As it *came from the dust*, so it was His purpose that *to the dust* it should in due time *return*. As it fell, so it was to be or lie for ever. It was to be destroyed, and under the power of destruction it was for ever to continue.—But, was it not to be raised again? Yes: not, however, as *human nature*. As *human nature*, it had seen both its beginning and its end in this present state of existence.† In the future world, *a new creation, or new state of things*, is to exist

\* In other words, Jesus made *the minister or servant of sin*, notwithstanding the abhorrence with which the apostle scouts such an idea. Galatians ii. 17.

† 1 Corinth. xiv. 49, 50.

and be developed, from which the things of *the old creation*, whether *human nature* or its effects, *sin, sufferings, and death*, are to be entirely and for ever excluded.\* Thus, then, the passage so often quoted, and so much insisted on as decisive of the truth of the popular theory, actually makes against the purpose for which it is adduced. Proving, that as human nature falls, so it is for ever to be, it of course proves, that *human nature being destroyed by death is to continue destroyed by it for ever.*

The only way in which even a plausible attempt can be made to get rid of my present argument, is by boldly denying, that sin, sufferings, and death are the works of the Devil to which allusion is made in the passage quoted. Passing by those proofs of the correctness of my application of the words which might be gathered from the context, I hereby declare myself perfectly willing to dispense with the assistance to be derived from the present text altogether; it being in my power to shew, by express declarations of scripture to that effect, that *Jesus is the destroyer of sin, sufferings, and death.* Doing so, what more can my adversaries require? And doing so, what becomes of the ordinary doctrine of *everlasting sin, everlasting sufferings, and everlasting death?*

Well, then :

1. Sin is destroyed by the Son of God.

*Once in the end of the world hath he appeared TO PUT AWAY SIN by the sacrifice of himself.* Heb : ix. 26.

\* Rev. xxi. 3—5.



Observe, it is not one, or a few, or even many sins, which Jesus appeared *to put away*.\* It is *sin* itself.—Unquestionably the text intimates, that he put away, set aside, or brought to an end, sin-offerings; and this, by having been himself the anti-type of all such sin-offerings. But this is very far from being its exclusive signification; for, he was the anti-type of sin-offerings by the very fact, that such was the value of his sacrifice, that it swallowed up, destroyed, and obliterated, sin itself for ever. And manifest it must be, farther, that he who died personally *to put away sin*, can never raise from the dead, to live for ever, intelligent beings clothed with *sinful natures*; or *give everlasting existence* to that hated principle which he died *to destroy*.

2. Sufferings are by the Son of God destroyed.

*And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, NEITHER SORROW, NOR CRYING, NEITHER SHALL THERE BE ANY MORE PAIN; for the former things are passed away. And he that sat upon the throne (Jesus) said, Behold, I make all things new. Rev: xxi. 4. 5.*

All things shall be made new, says the infallible record; and, in connection with this new state of things, there shall be no sufferings endured. “True,” say antagonists, “in a future state all things shall be made new; but, nevertheless, in that future state sufferings of the intensest kind shall exist for ever.” Now, whether is the word of God, or the word of men, in regard to

\* The words of the original are *εις αβερησαιν ἀμαρτίας*.

this matter, to be believed?—Besides, are not sufferings *a part of the old things*, as being connected with this present state of existence? And if so, how can they exist in a state in which *all things* are to be *made new*?

3. Death is by the Son of God destroyed.

*Our Saviour Jesus Christ—hath ABOLISHED\* death.*  
2 Timothy i. 10.

*The last enemy that shall be DESTROYED is death.*†  
1 Corinth : xv. 26.

*Death is SWALLOWED UP in victory.* Ibid : 54.  
If death itself be *destroyed*, by being swallowed up in the divine life of him who is the victorious one, what possibility is there of its *existing everlastingly*? Were death *everlasting*, it would be *infinite as to its duration*; and, if thus *infinite*, how could it be *brought to an end* or *destroyed*?—Besides, where does the phrase *everlasting death* occur in scripture?—It is in vain to allege, in justification of the use of the language, that the word of God makes mention of *the second death*. I grant that it does : but, as it appears from Rev : xx. 14, that *the second death* means *the death or destruction of death itself*, that is, the fulfilment of the sentence denounced against the serpent in Genesis iii. 15, what reason now can be urged in behalf of the proposition, that *death*, in the case of certain intelligent beings, is

\* *Karapynsavros*—the word which is translated *destroyed* in 1 Corinth. xv. 26, the next text quoted.

† The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed.—MacKnight's *translation*.

The last enemy who will be done away, is death.—Archbishop's Newcome's *version*.

The last enemy shall be destroyed *even* death.—The improved version, 1808.

rendered *everlasting*? If Jesus, *the Prince of life*, have overcome death, by *dying the just for the unjust*, and by *rising again from the dead to the power of an endless life*, is it very complimentary to him, or consistent with the truth of those oracles which declare him to have been thus *the destroyer of death*, to represent him as on the contrary *conferring on death everlasting existence*?

Have I not now established my position?

If sin be destroyed, how can a sinful nature be everlasting? If sufferings be destroyed, how can intelligent beings be subjected to everlasting torments? If death be destroyed, how can there be such a thing as everlasting death? If *all* the Devil's works be *destroyed*, how can *any* of these works *eternally exist*?

In a word, it is plain, and must by every candid mind be admitted, that whatever the phrase *everlasting punishment* may imply, it cannot mean *the endurance of everlasting torments by beings possessed of an everlastingly sinful nature*.

By this time, I suspect, the great bulk of my readers have set me down as hostile to the doctrine of eternal punishment, and are convinced that my object in this work is to undermine and subvert it. If such be their opinion, they are egregiously mistaken.

There does not, perhaps, exist a more strenuous supporter of the doctrine of eternal punishment, than the writer of these pages. And this simply because it is denounced as the portion of the wicked, in terms the *most express*, in the word of God. To the declarations

of the Most High, whatever they may be, my conscience is accustomed to yield a ready and implicit submission.

But I do not say that, in matters of religion, I am disposed to yield an equally ready and implicit credence to the declarations of men. On the contrary, in so far as regards these, I find my mind becoming every day more and more sceptical.—Liable to err as all men are, and erring as I find myself in many respects to have done, I am now in the habit of sifting, examining, and testing, by God's word, every statement of a religious kind which I meet with in human compositions, or hear drop from the lips of a fellow-mortal. The benefits to be derived from pursuing a line of conduct like this, are becoming to my mind more and more apparent. And in no respect more so, than in regard to the *quaestio vexata* of *eternal punishment*.—The word of God declares, that Jesus *destroys the Devil's works*. This satisfies me of the impossibility of eternal torments.—But the same word declares, that the wicked *shall go away into everlasting punishment*. This equally satisfies me, that there are never-ending consequences connected with the existence and practice of wickedness.—And now comes the pinching question:—"Denying as you do *eternal torments*, and yet maintaining as you do *the necessity of eternal punishment*, how can you render the one proposition consistent with the other? If there be no eternal torments, how can there be eternal punishment? And if there be eternal punishment, how can it be inflicted except through the medium of eternal torments?—This I admit to be, a fair statement of the difficulty. *Hic labor, hoc opus est.*

From this difficulty I do not propose to escape, by having recourse to any thing which may be legitimately construed into a quirk or a quibble. I have no occasion for instance to contend, that *eternal punishment* means *limited punishment*. On the contrary, I am perfectly willing to assume, that the word *eternal*, when applied to *the punishment of the wicked*, signifies *that which is boundless in point of duration*. Nay, it is abundantly plain to me, and I have no hesitation in avowing the principle, that if there be any punishment at all of the nature of suffering inflicted in a future state of existence, the infliction of this punishment must continue for ever. For, it having been already shewn, that it is not by *sufferings inflicted*, but by *the revelation of the divine character as Love*, that the views and dispositions of intelligent creatures *are changed*; and that from being *natural* they become *spiritual* and *divine*; it evidently follows, that if the wicked be punished by means of sufferings inflicted hereafter, and if no other agent besides such sufferings be employed to effect a change, *no change can by any possibility take place*. Continued and increasing punishment, *instead of tending to a change for the better*, must under such supposed circumstances *be attended with continued and increasing desperation and sin*.\* Now, it is not contended by the consistent advocates for limited punishment by means of sufferings hereafter, and for the efficacy of such punishment in altering the

\* This, indeed, is the popular theory; and, admitting their postulate that "*suffering may exist hereafter*," the conclusion necessarily follows.

views, that any other means besides such sufferings are resorted to, in order to bring transgressors to a sense of duty, and introduce them into the fold of God. To these limited sufferings they profess to look, as the sole and efficient instrument of the ultimate conversion of the wicked. That is, they profess to expect from *suffering*, what scripture shews us can only be expected from *the manifestation of God as Love*. This it is that, in a way of which the advocates for limited punishment hereafter do not appear to me to have been aware, stamps inconsistency and ignorance of the nature and end of punishment upon their system; and, in so far as regards this present subject, imparts to that of their ordinary antagonists, however inconsistent with itself in other respects, more of the appearance of truth.

Besides—and why, merely because we may happen to hurt the minds of injudicious friends, should we disguise the truth?—the doctrine of the existence and efficacy of *limited punishment hereafter*, seems to me to be neither more nor less than the revival, in another shape, of the exploded dogma of purgatory. It is true, that by Universalists it is not made use of as an instrument for promoting the reign of priest-craft, as it is by the crafty and interested supporters of the Romish hierarchy. But this does not militate against the fact, that the doctrine itself is baseless because unscriptural.—Let me correct myself, however. The doctrine of *purgation by fire* has a scriptural foundation; but not in either the Popish or Universalist sense of the

terms. Although God purges by fire, or by the introduction of his own nature which is fitly compared to fire into the conscience; 1 Corinth. iii. 12—15; and although the grand effect of fire is, to consume or destroy; Heb. xii. 29; yet the fire in question is not productive of torment, but the reverse. Rom. xii. 20, 21. Upon earth, the moment that *the divine nature* enters into the conscience, while it proves itself to be fire by destroying the principle of evil, it does so, not by tormenting, but by swallowing up that principle, along with its necessary accompaniment a sense of guilt, in the enjoyment of certain and permanent peace; Jerem. xxiii. 29, and Malachi iii. 2, with Rom. v. 1: and so also, upon earth, the torments of the unbelieving or wicked are the result, not of *the divine nature as fire* having entered with divine efficacy into their consciences, but of the operation in them of *the principles of human nature*. If, then, God is hereafter to act on the minds of intelligent beings who continue wicked here by means of his own nature which is fire, reasoning from analogy, His doing so cannot have the effect of *tormenting* them, as is commonly but erroneously supposed; but must have the effect of *destroying*, or *swallowing up, their nature in His*. See 1 Corinth. iii. 12, 15.

I thus, in the most decided manner possible, concede to my opponents, that *if sufferings exist at all hereafter, they are everlasting sufferings*.

In what way, then, *are the wicked eternally punished?*

In answer to this question, I observe: . . . . .

1. The wicked are the whole of Adam's posterity as such. *There is none righteous, no not one.* Rom. iii. 10.—*There is none that doeth good, no not one.* Ibid : 12.—The principle of *wickedness*, and the principle of *human nature*, are thus obviously shewn to be one and the same.

2. The wicked, or human beings as such, are, we discern from the scriptures, capable of being punished only in two ways : 1st. By their forfeiting *natural* advantages which the originally possessed, and becoming exposed to calamities from which the were originally exempt. This happened to Adam in consequence of his one transgression ; and the punishment is shared with him by all his posterity, as being naturally one with him or partakers of his nature. He, and they in him, forfeited creature righteousness ; were banished from the garden of Eden ; were rendered liable to every species of suffering ; and became obnoxious to the stroke of death. 2ndly. Human beings are capable of being punished, by *having supernatural* benefits withheld from them. This does not happen to any of them, in consequence, properly speaking, of the original transgression committed by Adam, but in consequence of the want of the principle of faith, or the divine nature, on the part of the individual. It is a punishment, not of *loss* like that sustained by Adam when he fell, but of *want* :—he who is *destitute of faith* or the *divine nature*, not merely being involved like other men in all the *natural* consequences of Adam's transgression ; but *coming short* likewise of that enjoyment of the King-



dom of Christ and of God, which is the special portion of those who are elected from among men.

3. The punishment of the wicked, or of human beings as wicked, is in both the aforesaid respects eternal. 1st. Adam and his natural posterity were deprived of the creature advantages which he enjoyed in Eden, not *for a time*, but *for ever*. And this is not the fate of a few human beings, but of all; nay, as having been one of Adam's descendants, it is the fate of the Lord Jesus Christ himself. It never was God's intention, after the earthly paradise and human nature as it existed pure in that paradise had been forfeited, to restore them to Adam or to any of his posterity;\* and hence, *the punishment* implied in the forfeiture of these earthly blessings was to him and them *eternal*. 2ndly. What I have just adverted to, although truly *eternal punishment*, is not *the eternal punishment* chiefly intended in scripture. That is, *eternal exclusion from the Kingdom of Christ and of God*. This punishment is inflicted, not on the account of Adam's transgression,—for the effect of that crime is merely *the forfeiture of natural advantages*,—but on account of unbelief, or the non-reception by the individual himself of the testimony of God concerning His Son. Thus, instead of resulting, like suffering

\* The correctness of the remark, as applied to the Lord Jesus, is visible in this, that Adam's primitive purity was that of a *mere creature*, whereas the purity of the Lord Jesus was that of *the Creator manifest in flesh*. There was, therefore, in the case of Jesus, *no restoration of mere creature purity*, no more than there was in his case *any restoration to the earthly paradise*. By *assuming our nature*, he was involved in our forfeiture of natural blessings.

and death, from the act of another, it is personal, or connected with the state and consequent conduct of the individual. The *eternal punishment* of which I am now speaking, is undergone by every one who continues throughout life possessed of no higher principles than those of mere human nature. And it consists in *the want or destitution of supernatural advantages hereafter*: for, to no one considered *merely as a human being*, is admission into Christ's kingdom hereafter conceded. It is the declaration—the oft-repeated declaration—of holy writ, that those only, who while on earth *are born again*, and thereby become partakers as to their minds of the first fruits of the divine nature, have the inconceivably great and glorious privilege of reigning with Christ hereafter conferred upon them. *Behold*, says the Apostle John, speaking in his own name, and in that of all who are similarly circumstanced with himself, *behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God*. John iii. 1.—And yet, even such highly favoured ones do not enter into the glory of their Lord *as human beings*. The law is express, that *flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God*; from the operation of it, no descendant of Adam is exempted; nay, it is so rigidly enforced, that even the Lord Jesus Christ himself required to sacrifice, put off, and part with, the pure human nature or flesh and blood with which he appeared upon earth, before he could enter personally into the heavenly glory. *The body of believers is still dead, because of sin*: that is,

although by the entrance of Christ's righteousness they are as to their minds possessed of spiritual principle, and are thus necessarily and for ever relieved from the possibility of condemnation ; they are nevertheless as to their human nature still under the curse, and are destined to have that curse executed upon them, in so far as they are partakers of that nature, no less than upon the unbelieving portion of mankind, to the very uttermost. Rom. viii. 10.

Such and so worthless, then, is mere human nature ; and thus is it *everlastingly punished*.—It could not, even as it came from God's hands, avoid violating the most trifling of all conceivable prohibitions : thereby shewing itself to be, even in its original state, *altogether vanity, nay, lighter than vanity*. For this, it is *eternally punished*, by having been made *to forfeit for ever*, that is, *without any possibility of restoration or recovery*, all the *natural advantages* which it had.—But when, notwithstanding *the everlasting forfeiture of natural advantages* by mankind, *supernatural advantages* are proposed to them, on condition of their believing in the willingness and intention of God to bestow these ;—nay, when they are positively urged and commanded to believe in all this ;—so far from *mere human nature* having yet been able to comply with the command—although not as in the case of Adam of the nature of a threatening, but actually holding out blessings—human beings, when left to themselves and to the operation of mere earthly principles, have always and uniformly and necessarily disobeyed it. There is not upon record,

there cannot be found at the present day, an instance of a man *believing God's testimony, as such, under the influence of mere human principles*. This it is, and not the original transgression of Adam or any similar evils, which establishes the deep rooted and thorough *enmity of the carnal mind, or mere human nature, to God*; this it is which shews, that as it is *not subject to God's law*, so NEITHER INDEED CAN IT BE SO. Rom. viii. 7. That essential opposition of human nature to God which is manifested by its necessary rejection of His testimony concerning His Son, and not the opposition to Him which Adam displayed in Paradise, is the sin, evil, or criminality, which is *deservedly punished with irremediable and everlasting exclusion from all the benefits and privileges of Christ's heavenly kingdom*. This is what I conceive the Holy Ghost principally to intend by *everlasting punishment*.

Am I now understood?

If not, let me in a single sentence sum up the whole of the preceding statements.

The eternal punishment of the wicked, or of human beings as the wicked, does not consist in *their being eternally tormented*, for that would imply the confirmation by Christ of the works of the Devil; but in *their being eternally excluded from Christ's heavenly kingdom*.

It is in vain to object to the system now proposed,

First, "that little infants cannot believe, and that, therefore, my view pronounces upon all of them a sweeping sentence of exclusion from heavenly bless-

ings." I confess that, in regard to the topic of infant salvation, I was for a long time exceedingly puzzled. Faith, I clearly saw, was competent only to adults ; and if, therefore, the divine nature could exist upon earth only in connexion with the actual exercise of faith, no infant, it was obvious to me, could be saved. But after much mature deliberation, and, blessed be God's name, after much teaching from His own word, even this difficult subject was opened up to me. Faith, I had long observed, was represented as *working by love* ; but love, or the divine nature, it was not till recently given me to observe distinctly, is itself the root of faith. *Love believeth all things.* 1. Corinth. xiii. 7. 1. John iv. 19. What, then, it struck me, is essential to the possession of an interest in Christ's kingdom hereafter, on the part of any human being while here, is not, properly speaking, faith *which is merely an effect*, but love or the divine nature *which of every grace is the cause*.\* Of the former, the infant is certainly incapable ; but not of the latter. Supposing, then, God to have a purpose of special mercy and love towards any little infant, what is to prevent Him from introducing His own nature into its conscience, and thereby fitting it for admission into His kingdom ? He gave the nature which it has as Adam's descendant ; and, as He is Himself the possessor and source of the divine nature,

\* Let me not be misunderstood as disparaging the principle of faith. Wherever the divine principle exists, if the individual be an adult, I am satisfied there will be faith, or a reception on his part of the divine testimony as such, and a knowledge of his personal interest in that testimony.

what is to prevent Him, in His own time and way, from imparting it likewise? No doubt, in adults the divine nature will indicate its existence by faith; that is, by their bringing forth an effect corresponding to the principle of which they are possessed: but faith, as an effect, is merely *an accident*;\*—it is love which, as the cause, is *the essence*;—and if love be conferred, is not the divine nature, and thereby the capacity for admission into Christ's kingdom, conferred likewise?—Observe, I assert not the admission of *every infant* into Christ's kingdom; but only of *those whom he may be pleased to beget again*, in the exercise of his infinite sovereignty, by *the communication to them of his nature*. And I connect not this new birth with the sprinkling of water, or with any other external and superstitious practice; but solely with the divine purpose, and with the putting forth of that purpose in act by the implantation of the principle of love or the divine nature.—As to the text commonly quoted in proof of infant salvation, viz. *suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven*,† it is not worth a rush as evidence of the doctrine: for, our blessed Lord in this passage does not state, that His kingdom consists of *little children*, but of *such*; ‡ that is, of persons who, having been born again, are in *a spiritual point of view* what little children are in *a natural point of view*.§

\* The best proof which I can afford of this is, the xiii. chapter of the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians *throughout*, especially verse 13th.

† Matthew xix. 14.

‡ *οἷον τούτων*.

§ This becomes very plain, when we compare the words of the text quoted with Christ's words in Matthew xviii. 3.

Secondly, it is in vain to object to the system just propounded, "that the exclusion of any infants from the kingdom of heaven is inconsistent with justice, seeing that it is impossible for any of them to be guilty of the sin of unbelief." The man who starts this objection *generally* contradicts other admitted principles of his own, and *always* errs, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God. He who admits that, in the consequences of Adam's crime, even infants although personally guiltless of it are involved—and yet objects to my theory, that infants, as not being personally guilty of unbelief, cannot be excluded from Christ's kingdom—evidently contradicts himself.—But passing by the *argumentum ad hominem* to which, in reference to this point, our *soi-disant* orthodox clearly lie open, it is of more importance for me to observe, that every person who proposes the objection in question mistakes the ground of the *natural* condemnation of *all* Adam's posterity, as well as the ground upon which *any* of the human race are excluded from *supernatural* blessings. He mistakes the former : for, it is not on account of my having personally committed, or my being supposed to have personally committed, Adam's transgression, that I am from the very period of my conception in the womb obnoxious to Adam's punishment ; but my liability to death, from my very origin, is on account of my having the same nature as that which in Adam led to and was productive of his first transgression. I am liable to be punished in consequence of my having in me *the cause of evil*, not on account of *that*

*cause* having in my case been actually productive of *a certain effect*. The punishment, then, attaches to *Adam's nature* wherever that nature is found, whether in infants or in adults; the first transgression of Adam having been by divine appointment, properly speaking, merely the first indication of a nature which is essentially fleshly and earthly; and which as such, and as proved to be such by the inability of its first possessor even in a state of innocence to abstain from transgression, is fitted only to return to the dust from which it was originally taken.—And, if one transgression of our common parent was a sufficient indication of *the perfect inability of mere human nature to comply with divine prohibitions*, and consequently of *its unworthiness to retain natural blessings*;—surely the re-iterated proofs afforded by the Jewish nation of *their inability under the most favourable circumstances, when left to themselves, to believe in the declarations of God concerning benefits freely bestowed on them*, must be allowed to be likewise a sufficient indication of *the total indisposition and inability of mere human nature to credit divine testimony*, and, consequently, of *the total unworthiness of those who are possessed merely of human nature to inherit supernatural blessings*. Now, this is the very predicament in which every human being, whether infant or adult, stands. His nature as the same with that of Adam, it has been proved over and over again, has no capacity whatever to believe divine testimony. 1 Corinth: ii. 14. Belief of that testimony, it has by repeated experiments been satis-



factorily shewn—it is by the conduct of the Jewish nation shewn at the present day—can only spring from *love*, or *the divine nature*: a principle which, as Adam's descendants, human beings when they come into the world certainly have not. The ground of the exclusion of the majority of infants and others from Christ's kingdom is not, therefore, properly speaking, the fact of *their being naturally destitute of faith*, but the fact of *their being naturally destitute of the principle from which alone faith can proceed*. The majority of infants are not excluded because personally they have rejected the divine testimony, or because personally they are supposed to have rejected it; but because they possess no more than a nature which, in every case in which an opportunity is afforded for displaying what it is, necessarily and inevitably rejects that testimony; thereby incontrovertibly proving, that it is fitted only for existence in this present world.—Thus, then, is the ground of the exclusion of *all* infants from the *natural* advantages of the earthly paradise, and of *the majority* of them from the *supernatural* advantages of Christ's kingdom, exactly the same. Of the former they are *deprived*, because they have a nature which is the same with that which in Adam led to his first transgression; from the latter they are *excluded*, because they have merely a nature the same with that which in the Jews as a nation shewed itself unable to produce faith, or any other divine fruit and effect. Deprivation of the one, and exclusion from the other, thus attach, not to *offences actually committed*

*by the infant, but to the nature which it has,—a nature from which, whenever the suitable opportunity is afforded, these offences naturally proceed.*

One explanation more, and my system, in so far at least as regards the present subject, is complete.

“What” it may be asked, “is to become hereafter of the great majority of the human race, *who*, according to your sentiments, *are eternally punished, by being eternally excluded from Christ's kingdom?*”

The question is a fair one, and shall receive a fair, distinct, and scriptural answer.

The wicked or unbelieving portion of mankind, it is plain, cannot be annihilated. With *the annihilation* of any of the human race, however plausible and satisfactory to some the notion may have appeared, it is impossible to render the word of God consistent. Death is one of *the works of the Devil*: and, therefore, if a single human being were to be left for ever under the power of death—which if annihilated he would be—in his case one of the works of the Devil, instead of being *destroyed*, would be *confirmed*. Thus, the same text which overturns the doctrine of *eternal torments*, overturns likewise that of *annihilation*. But, to disprove the latter doctrine, it is unnecessary to have recourse to inferences, however correctly these may be drawn. Christ has expressly declared, that *all that are in the graves shall hear his voice*; John v. 28: and, as believers in his testimony, we require nothing farther to satisfy us of the fact.\*

\* See also 1 Corinth: xv. 22; a text which nothing but the most bare-faced impudence and sophistry can attempt to explain away.

Every human being, then, shall hereafter at one period or another live again ; and live again for ever .

“But how is this consistent with their everlasting exclusion from Christ’s kingdom ?”

To this I answer :

1. The kingdom of Christ, or the kingdom of God as Christ or reigning mediator, is not destined to last for ever. It is set up for a specific purpose ; and when that purpose shall have been accomplished, it will come to an end. *Then cometh the end, when he (Christ) shall have delivered up the kingdom to God even the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. For HE MUST REIGN TILL he hath put all enemies under his feet.—And WHEN all things shall be subdued unto him, THEN shall the Son also himself be subject unto Him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.* 1 Corinth: xv. 24, 25—28.

2. From the kingdom of Christ, or the possession of reigning power with Christ, all, except the elect, are completely and for ever excluded. See 1 Corinth: vi. 9, 10. They who upon earth possess the first fruits of the divine nature, and they only, enjoy the privilege of being *Kings and Priests unto God and\* the Lamb:†* As kings, they reign even here over sin, and self, and the world : for *this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.* 1 John v. 4. As kings, they reign over death itself : for *nothing can separate them,*

\* Even ?

† See Luke xii. 32.

not even death, from the love of God which is in Christ; Rom: viii. 38, 39: and, *they are absent from the body, to be present with the Lord.* 2 Corinth: v. 8. As kings, and as consequently having overcome with Christ, Rom: viii. 37, they *sit down with him in his throne* hereafter. Rev: iii. 21; with 2 Timothy ii. 12. And as kings, they have the honour of engaging with him in the ultimate subjugation of all things unto himself. 1 Corinth: vi. 3; Rev: ii. 26; with Psalm cxix. 5—9.

3. The wicked, or unbelieving, or merely natural, portion of the family of man, never enter into the kingdom of Christ. They are unable to do so, for several reasons; such as: 1st. They have not from everlasting been *chosen to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth.* 2 Thessal: ii. 13. 2ndly. They have in them, while on earth, nothing superior to the ordinary principles of human nature; and nothing, consequently, by which the tendencies of human nature can be reigned over or overcome.\* 3rdly. They have no interest in *the first resurrection, or resurrection of the just.* Luke xiv. 14; 1 Corinth: xv. 23; Hebrews ix. 28; xii. 22, 23; Rev: xx. 4—6. Indeed, it is expressly declared, that they *do not live again, until the thousand years, or period of Christ's reign, is finished.* Rev. xx. 5.† 4thly.

\* If it is only by being Christ's, and by possessing his spirit or the divine nature, that believers *crucify the flesh, with its affections and lusts*, Gal: v. 24, of course, those who are not Christ's, and do not possess his spirit, have in them no principle by which human nature can be subdued. See Matthew xii. 24—29.

† This is implied in the language of 1 Corinth. xv. 22, 23, compared with what follows.

The raising of the wicked or merely natural portion of mankind, is the last act of God as Christ; that is, the last act of his kingly power as Mediator: 1 Corinth. xv. 24: and as, in the very act of raising them, his kingdom as Mediator expires, of course into that kingdom they cannot, they never enter. Ibid, 28.—5thly. To be kings, implies the having subjects to reign over. This, it is clear, Christ and his people have; for, he and they reign over the world; and they have the unspeakable honour of being engaged with him in the ultimate subjugation of all things unto himself. But as, when the wicked and ungodly dead are raised, *there are none remaining to be reigned over*, it is too evident to need being dwelt on, that to the possession of kingly power, or to admission into Christ's kingdom, such wicked persons can never by any possibility attain.

In a word, into the kingdom of Christ, or the possession of kingly power with Christ, the unbelieving portion of mankind never enter: because, his kingdom *expires in the very act of their resurrection*; and because, instead of being privileged *to reign* as believers are, it is their fate, on the contrary, *to be reigned over*. They are not *kings*, but *subjects*.

And now occurs the last question:—"How, in the event of the wicked, or the unbelieving portion of the human family, being ultimately raised to the possession of everlasting life through Christ, can they be said *to be eternally punished*?"

There is no difficulty whatever in answering this, if we bear in mind the scriptural discoveries which have

been already made. From Christ's kingdom, we have seen, that the wicked, or unbelieving, or merely natural portion of the human family, are, not *for any limited period*, but *for ever excluded*. I now advance a step farther, and observe, that from life and happiness hereafter, whether in the kingdom of Christ or as subjects of that kingdom, *the wicked are, in reality, entirely and everlastingly excluded*.—Who are the wicked? The whole family of man as such, or all who are partakers of Adam's nature as such. Rom: iii. 9—19.—Now, does any one *as wicked*, or *as a partaker of Adam's nature*, attain to the possession of life and happiness hereafter? Certainly not. No one—no, not even the Lord Jesus Christ and his people—enters into glory *with flesh and blood*, or *human nature*. 1 Corinth: xv. 50. Jesus ascended to his throne with a spiritual and heavenly body: and his people enter into his kingdom hereafter, not *with flesh and blood bodies*, or *bearing the image of the earthy*; but *with bodies fashioned like to his glorious body*, or *bearing the image of the heavenly*. Rom: viii. 11; 1 Corinth: xv. 49; Philip. iii. 21; 1 John iii. 2. But if such be the case with regard even to Christ and his people—if even believers, the members of the peculiar family of God, cannot enjoy future happiness *as human beings*—how plain, that *as human beings or wicked*, no others can enjoy everlasting life. If *the first fruits of the divine nature* possessed by believers, cannot preserve *their human nature* from destruction, how absurd to suppose that those who have not *the divine nature* in

them, should have even the shadow of a right to look for such an exemption.—As *human beings* or *nicked*, then, the existence of the unbelieving must both begin and terminate with this present life. When those who now live and die *nicked*, or *possessed merely of Adam's nature*, are raised again at the second resurrection—and raised again they must be, that death in their case may be destroyed—they are not raised in *the wicked nature* which while upon earth they had;—for if so, God would do in regard to them, what he cannot do even in regard to His people; and sin and sufferings, two of the works of the devil, would in their case receive everlasting confirmation;—but by being the subjects of the omnific word, *Behold ! I make all things new*, the *wicked nature* which they had upon earth is, by their resurrection, swallowed up in another nature suitable to their now altered state and circumstances.—Thus, then, although it is true, that it is the persons who *were wicked*, or *had only Adam's nature upon earth*, who, at the consummation of all things or second resurrection, are raised up again; yet it is not true, that such persons are raised up again *as wicked*, or *as partakers of Adam's nature*. On the contrary, *their Adamic nature is destroyed*; or they *as Adam's descendants are everlastingly punished*: and yet, as having had flesh, which was the same with the flesh of the Son of God,—and as having been thus inseparably united, if not to his mind as believers are, at all events to his body,—while *their old nature* is swallowed up in *his death*, it is, that it may be ultimately exchanged for, and converted into, *that new*

*nature which, through his life, and through the life of his chosen ones, he is pleased to vouchsafe to them.*

Thus do I present an additional view of *everlasting punishment*, and *everlasting punishment of the wicked too*.—Two intelligent beings are in scripture set before us, Adam and Christ. Each of these has a nature essentially distinguished from that of the other; and in the nature of each of them immense numbers participate. The nature of the former is *creaturely and wicked*; the nature of the latter is *divine and righteous*. The nature of the former, as essentially and necessarily wicked, is *everlastingly punished*, by being *everlastingly destroyed*; the nature of the latter, as essentially and necessarily righteous, is *necessarily connected with everlasting existence*.—But those who partake of the nature of the former are, in one way or another, and at one period or another, destined also to partake of the nature of the latter.—Hence it happens, that every intelligent being, and the whole body of intelligent beings, are presented to us in the sacred writings under a twofold aspect. As Adam's descendants, they are *originally wicked*, and *as such* are subjected to *everlasting punishment*; but as Christ's descendants, they are made *partakers of the divine nature*, and *as such live for ever*. And the connection between *Adam's nature* and *Christ's nature*, through which this wonderful transformation is effected, takes place, in consequence of God himself having assumed and been made manifest in flesh; and in consequence of His communicating to the minds of a certain number of the human race, even while in flesh, the first fruits of the divine nature.



Everlasting punishment, then, is not only *everlasting exclusion from Christ's kingdom*, but it is also *the complete destruction of the nature which deserves thus to be excluded*. *The wicked*, or those who live and die possessed merely of Adam's nature, *are punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.\**

I thus sum up :—

#### ANSWER TO THE THIRD QUESTION.

There is no authority either in scripture, or in reasonings legitimately derived from scripture, for the ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter.

#### CHIEF REASON OF THE ANSWER.

The Son of God came into the world to destroy the Devil's works; and, therefore, he cannot, by perpetuating sin and sufferings for ever, confirm any of the works of his grand enemy. Jesus is the Devil's conqueror, not the Devil's ally.

#### GRAND INFERENCE FROM THE ANSWER.

The existence of Adam's nature, and consequently of sin, suffering, and death, here, is merely subservient

† For a farther explanation of my sentiments respecting the manner in which the everlasting punishment of the wicked, is rendered compatible with the ultimate bestowment on them of everlasting life, I must refer the reader to the 7th chapter of my work, entitled, *The Assurance of Faith, or Calvinism identified with Universalism*. In one or two respects my views may have undergone some modification since I composed that treatise; but the alterations are immaterial.

to the bringing out, manifestation, and conferring, of Christ's nature, and consequently of righteousness, happiness, and everlasting life, hereafter. 1 Corinth : xv. 54—58. *Sin reigns unto death, that Grace may reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord.* Rom. v. 21.



## ADDITIONAL AND EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

Strong, and clearly insurmountable by any fair process of reasoning, as are the arguments which have been adduced and insisted on, in opposition to the ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment hereafter, I am far from supposing that the conflict is at an end; for, I have nothing to expect from the advocates of that popular and profitable system, but the most virulent and uncompromising hostility. I shall be told, perhaps, that, "whatever shew of reasoning or conclusiveness the preceding statements may possess, it is altogether delusive;" and that "an appeal to a few plain and easily-understood passages of scripture is sufficient to dispel the mist, and to remove the speciousness, with which, for a while, I may have contrived to bewilder the senses of my readers."—To make farther appeals to scripture, I neither have, nor reasonably can have, any objection. I am ready to grapple with my antagonists on this field at any time: but I must be permitted to premise, in the first place, that I am very far from pretending to understand every part of the sacred writings, or to be able to remove all their difficulties. Indeed, the utmost length to which in many cases I can go, is, to perceive what a text does not signify, without being able to see clearly and positively what its signification really is.—In the second place, I observe, that the circumstance of a

passage of scripture *appearing* to be plain and intelligible, does not always and necessarily imply *that it is so*. The Jews of our Lord's time considered it to be very clear, that the numerous prophecies which represented the future Messiah as a conqueror and a king, were inconsistent with his occupying a mean and lowly station in this present world. Plain and intelligible, however, as the matter was to them, we know that this view of theirs led them into a most grievous practical mistake; and that, in adopting it, as well as in their treatment of our Lord and his apostles, they were unconsciously exemplifying the truth of one of Isaiah's prophecies, which had foretold, that *they should not see with their eyes, nor hear with their ears, nor understand with their hearts, nor be converted and healed*.\*—I must remark further, that, as in a work of this kind brevity is indispensable, it is my design, instead of launching forth into the wide ocean of scripture, and considering every petty cavil and objection drawn from that sacred source, to confine my own attention, and that of my readers, to the examination of one or two, in which the gist of the controversy seems to lie. Those who would wish to see the whole phalanx of objections to the theory propounded by me in this treatise, met and confuted, must be referred to the latter part of the seventh chapter of my work on *The Assurance of Faith*.

In what follows, then, I advert, first, to those scriptures which speak of an approaching day of judgment;

\* Isaiah vi. 10.

and, secondly, to those which have been supposed in express terms to assert the doctrine of never-ending torments in a future state of existence.

First. As to the day of judgment.

That our Lord and his apostles, in many parts of the New Testament, speak of *a future day of judgment*, with an evident reference to many passages contained in the Old Testament, is not denied, but is on the contrary expressly maintained. The only question is, concerning *the meaning* of such language.

What it *does not signify*, is to every believer of the truth perfectly obvious.

It cannot mean, as it is but too commonly understood to do, “a period still future, when the state and prospects of believers for eternity, now to themselves more or less uncertain, shall be finally and for ever determined.”\* And this, because, instead of requiring to wait till a future state of existence, before ascertaining whether they shall be acquitted or condemned, it is the

\* As a specimen of that *uncertainty respecting their future state*, in which, in common with Pagans and other infidels, ordinary professors of religion love to indulge, turn to that precious *morçeau* of Addison, beginning,

When rising from the bed of death,  
O'erwhelmed with guilt and fear,  
I see my Maker face to face,  
O! how shall I appear :—

which the established Church of Scotland has chosen to sanction, by admitting it into the collection of hymns and paraphrases which she authorises her members to make use of in public worship. Believers of the truth, filled with dread, not merely upon earth, but even *after being admitted within the precincts of heaven itself!* Astonishing delusion! And yet, in popular estimation Addison was a Christian. *Ea uno, disce omnes.*

privilege of all the people of God to be acquitted, and if come to years of maturity to know that they are acquitted, already. *Being justified by faith, they have peace with God by the Lord Jesus Christ.* Rom. v. 1. And this acquittal or justification of theirs is certain to their minds, in consequence of God's giving them to see, *that it is not by works of righteousness which they have done or are required to do, but according to His mercy that they are saved.* Titus iii. 5. Under these circumstances, how absurd the supposition that believers, while upon earth, are more or less uncertain respecting their everlasting destiny; and that, instead of being acquitted in their consciences even here, they must be content to wait for their acquittal,—if, indeed, they shall be acquitted after all,—in a future state!—They are, it is true, and while upon earth must continue to be, uncertain respecting the extent and magnitude of the blessedness to which hereafter they are to be raised: *for, it doth not yet appear what they shall be.\** But as to the fact of *their sins having been forgiven them for Christ's name's sake*, and of their having a certain and indefeasible interest in the divine love, of this they neither have, nor can have, any doubt whatever: *this we know, that when Christ shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.†* 1 John iii. 2.—In so far as respects their own consciences, then, the day of judgment has,

\* See also 1 Corinth. ii. 9.

† The doctrine of *the assurance of faith* is delightfully brought out, and established on scriptural principles, in John Barclay of Edinburgh's little treatise, entitled, *The Assurance of Faith vindicated*, third edition, 1825.

as to believers, already taken place.\* If the state of uncertainty in which the minds of *unbelievers* necessarily are with regard to their everlasting destiny, be of itself sufficient to prove that judgment *to them* is still future; how obvious on the other hand that men, the natural enmity of whose hearts to God has been slain by the manifestation to them of His character as Love, —from whose consciences all sense of guilt has been obliterated by the sprinkling on them of the blood of the atonement,—and to whom God himself has condescended to speak peace,—instead of requiring to wait for *their* trial and judgment hereafter, have had judgment or sentence of acquittal pronounced *upon them* already.†

The truth is, that all the statements concerning a future judgment contained in the New Testament Scriptures, had reference *primarily* to the approaching fate and impending destruction of the Jewish people, and to the consequences of that event. How much, alas! is lost to ordinary readers of the Sacred Writings, by their not reflecting, that the personal mission of our Lord and the greater part of his apostles was to the

\* This fact is recognised by the apostle in Rom : viii. 1, *there is now therefore no condemnation, &c.* ; and is the basis of all his subsequent reasonings in that chapter, and throughout the remainder of the epistle.

† There are many circumstances connected with this subject, which I do not now stop to discuss. This only I may remark by the way, that *judgment* in Heb. ix. 27, signifies, *the execution of the appointment* to die, spoken of in the preceding member of the sentence : the argument in verses 27th and 28th clearly being, “as there was a single appointment to die, followed after considerable delay by the carrying into effect of the appointment; so there is a single atonement for sin, followed after a similar delay by the carrying of that atonement into effect likewise.”



lost sheep of the House of Israel;—and by their not understanding or overlooking the fact of the exalted rank, and distinguished privileges, which belonged to the Jews previous to the advent of the Messiah. As the necessary result of this, the close of the former dispensation, and the exclusion of the Jewish people from the divine favour—which are, in reality, some of the most important temporal events to which the Christian dispensation has given birth—are unheeded, or passed over by them, as mere common every-day occurrences. Such, however, was not the view taken of these events, or the interest felt in them, by the Saviour himself and his immediate followers. The approaching fate of Abraham's descendants appears, from almost every page of the New Testament, to have been one of the chief topics of their concern. Knowing the rank which the Jews as a nation occupied\*—ardently desirous that they should retain it, and continue to be objects of the divine favour†—and yet satisfied, that their privileges would be forfeited, and the threatened vengeance executed upon them, unless they *hearkened to that prophet* who was Moses' superior and Lord‡—they plied them with every argument, and urged them by every motive, which might, by any possibility, have averted from them a catastrophe so awful. Hence the intimations, that their sufferings *should be less tolerable than those of Sodom and Gomorrah*;—that *their worm should not die, and their fire should not be quenched*;—and innumer-

\* Rom. iii. 1, 2; ix. 4, 5. † Matw. xxiii. 37; Rom. ix. 1, 3; x. 1.

‡ Deuter. xviii. 18, 19; Acts, iii. 22, 23.

able other predictions of a similar kind ;—all intended and calculated to forewarn them of that fate which, notwithstanding the anticipations of their own vain minds, and the delusive hopes cherished and fostered by their rulers, a perseverance in opposition to Jesus as the Messiah would inevitably bring down upon them. But all was in vain. Israel, in spite of the prophetic denunciations contained in Deuteronomy, and other parts of those writings which *were every Sabbath day read in his synagogues*—which denunciations were frequently and fearfully explained as applicable to his own case by the Lord of glory—rushed on blindfold in his infatuated career, *filling up the measure of his iniquities*, until, in due time, his destiny was accomplished. Then, in a most obvious and undeniable sense, was there to him *the day of judgment*.

Let it not be alleged, that the language of the New Testament concerning *a future judgment* is of too strong and unqualified a nature to admit of being applied, even *in a primary sense*, to any event, or series of events, which could happen in this present world. To argue thus is clearly to beg the question. It does not imply a calm and dispassionate examination of the passages of the New Testament, where the disputed phrases are to be found ; nor a comparison of them with those Old Testament prophecies, from which they have been taken ; but the mere influence of vulgar prejudices and prepossessions. Let the 66th chapter of Isaiah, where the expressions concerning *the undying worm* and *the unquenchable fire* first occur, be candidly examined,

and the calling of the Gentiles, and the rejection of the Jews, will be discovered to be the topics of which it treats *primarily* throughout. To the incredulous, the close of the 10th chapter of the epistle to the Romans is proposed, as affording a solution of all the difficulties in the 66th as well as in the preceding chapter of Isaiah. Should any enquire, in what respects was the judgment executed upon the Jewish nation more awful and intolerable, than that which Sodom and Gomorrah and the other cities of the plain underwent?—the answer is obvious:—not merely were the external sufferings of the former distinguished by peculiar intensity at the period of Jerusalem's destruction, but their punishment has been, in some respects, of a kind quite unparalleled; they have forfeited privileges such as no other nation ever possessed; Psalm cxlvii. 20; and, instead of being destroyed or blended with the inhabitants of surrounding countries as has uniformly happened in similar cases, they have, by special divine interposition, been preserved a distinct and separate people; and shall continue to be so, that their punishment may be, and may be shewn to be, coeval with time itself. Great as were the advantages which Sodom and Gomorrah, Tyre and Sidon, enjoyed, while in the height of their opulence and splendour, these advantages were merely of a secular kind: but it was from religious and spiritual privileges, so important as to occasion the Saviour to say concerning them that they *exalted their possessors to heaven*, that the Jews were thrust out. Besides, Sodom and Gomorrah, Tyre and Sidon, although

for the time signal examples of the vengeance of the Almighty, sustained the whole weight of that vengeance at once ;—the divine wrath in regard to them was speedily exhausted :—but the Jewish nation, while time rolls on, shall be kept in existence as monuments of the divine displeasure—shall continue to be *an astonishment, and a proverb, and a bye-word among all nations, whither the Lord shall lead them*. Say you, that punishment, so signal and so tremendous as this, is unworthy of being denounced in the energetic expressions of the Old Testament prophets and our blessed Lord ? Blind, indeed, must that man be, who, in the vengeance inflicted on the Jewish nation, cannot discern the *primary* sense of their accomplishment.

Still, perhaps, objectors remain unsatisfied. “As the apostle Paul,” say they, “in more than one passage of his writings speaks of *our all appearing, or standing, at the judgment seat of Christ*, how is such language to be reconciled with your theory that, in their primary sense, the judgment and punishment mentioned in the New Testament scriptures are confined to this present life ?” Nothing can be easier. If the xlvth chapter of Isaiah, from the 22d verse to the end, (which clearly appears, by consulting Rom : xiv. 10—12, and Philip : ii. 9—11, to be the passage of the Old Testament from which the expression in question is derived), be examined and carefully considered, it will be perceived, that the prophet is speaking primarily, not of what is to happen in a state of existence succeeding the present, but *of what was to occur in a then*

*future dispensation* ; that is, in New Testament times, and under the reign of the Messiah. I thus most cheerfully admit, that the words of Isaiah are expressive of *futurity* : but I deny,—and I defy any man, from what appears on the face of the record itself, to disprove my denial,—that *the futurity*, of which they *primarily* speak, lies beyond the boundaries of this present life.—The view which I have given of this Old Testament passage, completely accords with the apostolic application of it. In the first place, although Paul, in the xivth chapter of the Romans, and the vth chapter of 2d Corinthians, speaks of *standing at Christ's judgment seat* as an event which was then future, he does not, in either of the passages referred to, employ a single expression from which it is necessarily to be inferred, that the only tribunal or judgment seat to which it alludes, is one which is to be set up when this present world shall have come to an end. In the second place, he does not say, as careless and superficial readers and even *grave divines* have supposed, that *the whole human race* are to stand at Christ's judgment-seat ; but that *we*, or *all we*, that is, in the primary sense of the terms, *all of us Jews and Gentile proselytes*—for it is to such only he is writing, and of such only he is speaking—shall do so. In the third place, the nature and scope of the contexts in Romans, 2d Corinthians, and Philippians, leads us at once to the sense in which the apostle quotes and applies the words of the prophet. During the subsistence of the former dispensation or economy, Moses was the sole legislator of the Church ; or, in other words,

during the whole of that period *he occupied the judgment seat*, Mattw. xxiii. 2, and to his laws and authority the whole Israel of God was subject and amenable. The dignity thus conferred on him he was to retain, until his dispensation, which by visible and immediate divine interposition had been established, should by the same divine interposition be overturned. This latter event, however, at the time when the Apostle wrote, had not taken place;—it was then future;—and as a large proportion of the Christian communities, then in existence, were *the descendants of Abraham according to the flesh*, their outward subjection to the Mosaic Law, from which they did not find themselves yet delivered, interfered in a great measure with their freedom as New Testament believers; Acts xv, *throughout*; xxi. 20—26;—prevented the full enjoyment of those privileges, which were destined for them in common with the other members of Christ's mystical body; Hebrews *throughout*;—and caused them to groan, from the burthensome and oppressive nature of the yoke which, for a time, it behoved them to bear. Mattw. xi. 28—30; Acts xv. 10; Rom. vii. 24. To the period of their emancipation from this state of thralldom, the apostle frequently encourages Jewish believers to look forward. They were then subject *externally* to the authority of Moses; but that authority was drawing near to its termination, and they were soon to become *exclusively* the subjects of the Messiah. Jerusalem and the Jewish nation, they are often reminded, were *fast filling up the measure of their iniquities*; 1 Thessal. ii. 14—16;—the Mosaic dispen-

sation, which was the boast and the idol of that stubborn and rebellious people, was soon to pass away for ever ;—Jesus was speedily to summon them to his throne or judgment seat ;\*—and, after having pronounced the doom of his enemies, was thenceforward, independently of the Mosaic institutions altogether, to exercise by means of his *law of love* unrivalled and uncontrolled authority in his church. Whenever that event occurred, he was to be acknowledged by his church sole and exclusive *Lord*, ruler or governor, *to the glory of God the Father*.† The result of this altered state of things was to be, that *Jewish* believers who, up to that time, had rendered to Jesus a partial and divided homage,—being *externally* bound by the Mosaic law, although *internally* free from its condemning power,‡—were thenceforward, in common with their *Gentile* fellow believers, to yield no obedience except to the laws and ordinances of the Lord Jesus their spiritual head. They were thenceforward, with the rest of the church, *to stand at Christ's judgment seat*, that is to say, *to be amenable to his jurisdiction* only.—Can any one now be at a loss to know what is meant by *Christ's judgment seat* ; or plead ignorance as to the time when, in the *primary* sense of the terms, the members of the New Testament church were constrained to take their stand at it ? §

\* Mattw. xxiii. 34—36, compared with, xxiv. 30, and xxv. 31.

† Phil. ii. 11. It was to this period the Psalmist primarily referred, when he declared, that *God was to be judge* ; that *God was coming to judge the earth* ; &c. &c.

‡ Vid : Acts xvth and xxist chapters.

§ See Acts xxv. 10. *I stand at Caesar's judgment seat* ; that is, *I am amenable to Caesar's jurisdiction or authority*.

That I may ensure my being understood, let me here indulge in a little repetition. Christ's judgment seat signifies *primarily*, the authority with which, as the lawgiver of the New Testament church, he is invested, and which he exercises over its members: as well as points to the right which he had, as *the greater than Moses*, to bring the former dispensation to an end,—to visit the Jewish nation with the punishments threatened in ancient prophecy;—and to continue inflicting upon them the visible tokens of the divine displeasure.\* This judgment seat or authority, in so far as the Jews as a nation were concerned, was visibly set up at the time when Jerusalem was destroyed; and it shall last throughout every age of the church: the period of its duration, being the period of the duration of the New Testament church itself. In one word, *the judgment seat of Christ*, in the primary sense of the terms, is not, as theologians have dreamed, a tribunal *to be erected in a future state of existence*, and standing contrasted with *earthly tribunals or governments*; but is *one already erected*, and standing contrasted with *the judgment seat of Moses*: and the New Testament Israel, or body of New Testament believers, *stand at Jesus' judgment seat*, or are amenable to *his jurisdiction now*, as the members of the Old Testament Israel *stood at Moses' judgment seat*, or were amenable to *his jurisdiction formerly*. The view just hinted, and not fanciful and unwarranted notions concerning the state of believers

\* Deuteronomy xviii, 18, 19; Acts iii. 22, 23.



hereafter, gives the *primary* sense of most of those passages in the Book of Revelation which treat of a *judgment*, and a *day or time of judgment*. But upon this last subject I cannot now permit myself to enter.\*

From the care and earnestness with which I have argued, that the *future judgment* spoken of by Christ and his apostles must have had a primary reference to the then future but speedily approaching fate of the Jewish nation, it may be imagined by some, that it is my intention to limit the sense of such phraseology to that event. This would be a mistake. What I have hitherto been treating of is merely *the primary*, or if you will *the figurative*, signification of a *future judgment*. Through the medium of rewards conferred on *the believing*, and punishments inflicted on the *unbelieving*, portion of the Jews under the New Testament dispensation, our Heavenly Father points obviously to *the judgments of the future state*.—What are these? And how are they to be pronounced?

In answer to the former of these questions, I observe, the judgments in question are the reversing of human judgments respecting Christ and his people on the one hand, and worldly men and their practices on the other. By the men of this world, judging according to the only principles of which such persons can be possessed, the Lord of glory was first despised, then hated, condemn-

\* No candid and enlightened person can compare the 24th and 35th chapters of Isaiah, with the 17th, 18th, and 19th chapters of the Book of Revelation, and particularly, Isaiah xxxiv. 10, with Revelation xix. 3, without perceiving in the latter, marked and unequivocal references to the former.

ed, and crucified. *He came unto his own, but his own received him not.\** A similar fate, springing from a similar misapprehension of their character and principles, has in every age awaited his followers. The world which knew not the Head, has evinced a corresponding ignorance respecting the members; 1 John iii. 1; and, when not restrained in the course of God's good providence, has carried its opposition to them to the most outrageous lengths. Christ and his people thus have been, are, and ever will be, the objects of the world's condemnation. And the same world which has uniformly condemned them, has acting upon the same principles and under the influence of the same spirit, just as uniformly applauded the maxims and conduct of prudent and successful worldly men. The world, has not merely *hated Christ and his followers*, but *has loved its own*. John xv. 18, 19.—Now the judgment of a *future state* is, not God's satisfying Christ and his people that while upon earth they were right in opposing the spirit and practices of the world—for that they were satisfied of even during their militant state, Heb. xi, *throughout*; xii. 1, 2—but it is God's openly declaring to all, on the one hand that in the line of conduct pursued by them they were right, and on the other hand that the world in condemning them was wrong. It is God's openly advancing to the honours and glory of the *heavenly state*, those whom the world despised and persecuted; and His openly declaring, on the contrary

John i. 11.

that *the things which are highly esteemed among men are an abomination in His sight*. Luke xvi. 15. Thus, then, the future judgment is merely God's making manifest openly and to all, what, even while they were upon earth, had already been made manifest to the hearts and consciences of His own people.

And now for the answer to the other question ; viz. in what way is this future judgment pronounced ? It is by the respective fates of the believing and the unbelieving. It is by the one *being raised to life*, and the other *to shame and everlasting contempt*.—Believers are privileged to partake of *a first resurrection*, both as to their minds, and as to their bodies. By the resurrection of their minds, they enter into the possession of the first fruits of Christ's kingdom upon earth ; by the resurrection of their bodies, they enter into the full enjoyment of His kingdom hereafter. The resurrection of the one, is necessarily connected with that of the other ; Rom. viii. 10. 11 ; and when both have taken place, the judgment pronounced by God in favour of His people is complete. Ibid : 17.—Just so, on the other hand, is judgment pronounced upon an unbelieving world. The worthlessness of their highest intellectual attainments, and the vileness of their most specious moral qualities, are evinced by the fact, that, as mere human beings, *they continue under condemnation, and never see life*. *The wrath of God abideth on them*. John iii. 36. And so hereafter. These unbelieving ones are raised ultimately, through the medium of the previous resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth and his

followers; John iii. 14—17; 1 Corinth. xv. 20—23; that is, through the previous resurrection of a class of persons whom, while upon earth, they despised; and towards whom, except in so far as they were restrained, they displayed every species of enmity and dislike. While the human nature of these unbelieving ones is destroyed, and they themselves, as having no other nature upon earth, are excluded from the kingdom of Christ; and while, in this way, sentence of condemnation is pronounced upon them; they are raised ultimately, through the previous possession of the divine nature by a few despised fellow human beings. The unbelieving are thus not only indebted to, but are ultimately obliged to feel and acknowledge that they are indebted to, the present existence and operation of that very principle of faith, which, while in their earthly state, they hated, and which they endeavoured by every possible means to crush. In this consists, at one and the same time, the triumph of the righteous, and the condemnation of the wicked. As raised *to reign*, judgment of approbation is pronounced on the former; as raised *by being reigned over*, judgment of condemnation is pronounced on the latter. And the judgment is satisfactory to both.\* To the righteous, by being confirmatory to them of views entertained by them even during their earthly career; to those who here are wicked, by being to them the communication of

\* Which, upon the popular system, it cannot be to the wicked—seeing that, if satisfactory to them, it would imply their *knowing the divine character*, and thereby *being partakers of the divine nature*, John xvii. 3.—a supposition which is inconsistent with the idea of their continuing wicked.

views of the divine character, of which, while upon earth, they were totally ignorant. These latter persons then justify the righteous, and condemn themselves. Thus is *Jesus glorified in or through His saints, and admired in or through all them that believe*; 2 Thessal. i. 10: not by his saints alone ultimately understanding and glorifying his character, which would render the passage absolute nonsense; but by his saints and believing people becoming *the medium, through which he is finally glorified in the sight of all, and finally admired by all*.\*

Secondly. There may be objected to me those passages of scripture, which are supposed to represent eternal punishment as synonymous with eternal torments.

The principle upon which difficulties arising from these and similar passages are solved, has been so fully stated already in my answer to the preceding objection, that it is unnecessary for me to run any risque of wearing out the patience of my readers, by dwelling upon it at great length under this head. Everlasting punishment, although *in its highest sense* denoting the infliction of sufferings and death upon human beings as long as human nature is found to exist,—the everlasting exclusion of human beings as such from the kingdom of Christ and of God,—and the complete ultimate destruction of human nature itself,—is nevertheless applicable *in an inferior sense* to the fate of the Jews as a nation;

\* See this view farther opened up in the 7th chapter of my work on *The Assurance of Faith*.

and to the fate of those believers who, during the reign of the Messiah, are found in any respect whatever subjecting themselves to the authority of Moses, instead of yielding obedience to their spiritual head Christ Jesus. To render this intelligible, I observe,

1. That the phrases *eternal* and *everlasting*, wherever they are employed, are relative terms, having a reference to some *test or standard of existence*; and that their signification will vary *according to the test or standard which may be assumed*. If the duration of this present world or present system of things be assumed as the standard, *everlasting* in that case will signify, as long as this world lasts or endures. In this sense, the hills are spoken of as *everlasting*. Gen. xlix. 26.—If the period during which the dispensation of Moses or that of Jesus shall last or continue be assumed as the standard, then *everlasting* will signify, as long as either of these dispensations lasts or continues. In this sense, the land of Canaan was to be given to the descendants of Abraham according to the flesh *for an everlasting possession*; that is to say, they were to possess it as long as the temporary covenant made at Mount Sinai was to last, or as long as they were obedient. Gen. xvii. 8. In this sense, likewise, I understand the term *everlasting* to be applicable to the punishment of the Jews. It is to last or endure as long as the Jews shall last or subsist as a distinct nation; and as long as they shall persevere in their opposition to the claims of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. As long as there are Jews; that is, descendants of Abraham

banded together to oppose the Lord and his Christ, so long shall their punishment last; or, in this sense, it shall be *everlasting*.—I would just add, that if the existence of God himself be assumed as the standard of everlasting duration, then, and only then, *everlasting* will imply *absolute eternity*, or *everlastingness of existence absolutely considered*,—if, for the sake of perspicuity, I may be allowed to coin such modes of expression. . . .

In attaching these various senses to the word *everlasting*, I am completely borne out, both by the nature of the case, and by the meaning of the original word commonly employed in the sacred writings to denote it. By the nature of the case—for, as it is plain, that the limitation of our faculties prevents our forming any idea of *absolute duration*, except through the medium of what is *relative*, it becomes next to certain, that all the language which we apply to *eternity*, must have been language originally and properly applied to *time*. By the meaning of the original word—for αἰώνιος is derived from αἰών, which commonly signifies *age*, *æra*, or *dispensation*; and is compounded, according to grammarians, of αἰεὶ ὤν or ὄν, or *that which always lasts*; being a word which, in its primary sense and ordinary classical usage, is applied to *what may be measured by time*, and, only at the utmost in a secondary sense, to *what we commonly mean by eternity*. But enough of this.

That my meaning may if possible be still better understood, let me observe farther, that the everlasting punishment threatened in scripture, in so far as it res-

pects *the Jews*, must be strictly of a *national kind*; and since no nation, *as such*, has any existence beyond this present world, no more can national punishment extend beyond it. On the other hand it is also plain, that national existence may be commensurate with the duration of this present world, and that, therefore, national punishment may be commensurate with it likewise. As the genuine conclusion deducible from these premises, so long as the Jews shall exist as a body or in a national capacity, even though their separate existence should be protracted to the end of time, so long shall they continue exposed to the visible tokens of the divine displeasure. *His blood be on us and on our children*, said their ancestors, when clamorously demanding the life of the Messiah; and the awful imprecation has been, and in every age will be, fulfilled. This, in so far as respects the Jews as a nation, is *everlasting punishment*.

The view just presented is, I am well aware, at variance with the notions entertained by many leading religious characters at the present day. According to them, we may anticipate the speedy arrival of a period, when the Jews shall again be assembled in a national capacity in the land of Palestine, and be distinguished by many marks of the divine favour, as a preparatory step to their believing in Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. That such an expectation is without any foundation in scripture, as well as unwarranted by any appearances which have hitherto been observed, I have no hesitation in maintaining. The Supreme Being



hath pronounced upon *the rebellious and stiff-necked descendants of Abraham*, by the mouths of ancient prophets and His own Son, a sentence of righteous and everlasting exclusion from His love ; and who will venture to say that this, or any other sentence of His, can be revoked ? God forbid, that I should oppose, or attempt to depreciate, the exertions so strenuously put forth by many at the present day, with a view to induce the Jewish nation to peruse the New Testament scriptures. So far from doing so, the persons engaged in this undertaking have my best wishes, and most fervent prayers, for their success ; and many Jews, profited by their pious labours and enlightened through their instrumentality, will, I sincerely hope, be added to *the Church of the living God*. But I do oppose with all my might the idea, that the Jews as a body, or in a national capacity, while they continue the avowed enemies of the Messiah, shall be, in any respect whatever, the objects of the divine approbation ; and also the idea, that the signal vengeance denounced against them, throughout the Old Testament scriptures and by the Lord Jesus himself, shall ever be mitigated or repealed. I cannot help observing in the fact of their preservation hitherto, notwithstanding all the efforts made by princes and sovereign states to crush, destroy, and extirpate them, not a preparation or introduction to any change in their sentiments respecting Jesus *while they continue Jews*, but a part fulfilment of those prophecies, with regard to their obstinacy and punishment, which shall go on fulfilling in every succeeding age. Besides,

what evidence are those societies, which profess to have for their object *the conversion of the Jews*, able to produce, of extensive and permanent benefits resulting from their exertions? Has any long and well-authenticated list of converts ever been published? Nay, what impression have their efforts been able to make on the great bulk of the Jewish nation, except that of increasing their blasphemous and outrageous opposition to the claims of Jesus of Nazareth? Such, the supporters of these societies may depend upon it, will, while they proceed on their present principles, always be the result: for, the idea of extinguishing or even modifying Judaism, while the professors of it continue a distinct nation, and thereby testify their approbation of the deed of their forefathers, is neither more nor less than the idea that God's purposes and threatenings may be frustrated. That, when *the fulness of the Gentiles shall be brought in*, all Israel *shall be saved*,\* is clear: but is there a man, whose mental vision is not obscured by prejudice, who does not perceive, that *the fulness of believers, whether Jews or Gentiles*, is itself *the fulness of the Israel of God*. Rom: ii. 28—29. Gal: iii. 29.†

2. The phrase *eternal punishment* will become still more intelligible, if we consider two passages of the

\* Romans xi. 25. 26, quoted from Isaiah xi. 11—16, xlv. 17, and lix. 20.

† Some valuable remarks on the words *eternal* and *everlasting*, conveyed in a clear and popular form, will be found in Elhanan Winchester's *Dialogues on Universal Restoration*. Let it always be remembered by the reader, that I am far, very far indeed, from advocating *as a whole* the system of religion laid down and developed in the work referred to.

New Testament which are commonly quoted and insisted on by the supporters of the ordinary doctrine: these are, the latter part of Matthew 25th, and of Luke 16th. Both of these, when examined, will be found to give no countenance to the idea of punishment by means of torments in a state of existence succeeding the present; but, in their primary and literal sense, to refer to events then speedily approaching, the close of the Mosaic dispensation, and the ruin and desolation which were impending over the Jewish people.

No man who peruses carefully the 24th chapter of Matthew, and connects with it the latter part of the 28d, can fail to perceive, that the destruction of Jerusalem, and particular directions to the disciples relative to the line of conduct which they should pursue when that event took place, constitute the subject matter of which the Lord Jesus is treating. It is equally obvious, that the language of our Saviour, from the beginning of the xxivth chapter to the end of the xxvth, is set down and intended to be understood as one continued discourse. Should any person, then, venture to assert, that *the end of the Mosaic dispensation, and the end of this present world or visible system of things*, are separately and successively treated of, *the former* in the 24th, and *the latter* in the 25th chapter of Matthew, it will be incumbent on him to point out where *the one topic ends*, and *the other begins*; and, likewise, to satisfy us of the grounds or principles on which he contends for the distinction. This, I am well aware, any one who risks the attempt will find to be

extremely puzzling, and to involve him in difficulties absolutely insurmountable. On the contrary, a very slight degree of attention will suffice to discover, that phraseology which, in the 24th chapter, is without doubt applied primarily to the destruction of Jerusalem, is introduced, repeated, and enlarged upon, in all the parables contained in the 25th. Could this be, unless the subjects spoken of in these two chapters were, in their primary acceptation, one and the same?—To be a little more particular: *the coming of the bridegroom*,—*the return of the Lord to reckon with his servants*,—and *the sitting down of the Son of man on the throne of his Glory*,—all evidently refer to one and the same period; and unless that period synchronize, or be the same with, the one when the occurrences spoken of in the 29th, 30th, and 31st verses of the xxivth chapter were to take place, I cannot see what connection the parables in the xxvth chapter have with the contents of the preceding one; or in what respect they contribute towards the illustration of our Lord's statements and warnings. But the 29th, 30th, and 31st verses of the xxivth chapter must have referred primarily to the destruction of Jerusalem, and to the events which were to stand connected with it; because otherwise our Lord would return no answer to the query proposed to him by his disciples, *as to the time when the temple should be overthrown, and the end of the then existing age, æra, or dispensation, should take place* :\* and if so, then the

\* Matthew xxiv. 1—3.

24th chapter, and all the parables contained in the 25th, must have had a primary reference to the same events.—The truth is, that the parable in question, Mat. xxv. 31—46, admits of an application to events then about to occur, which is very obvious and scriptural. *The Son of man coming in his Glory, and sitting upon the throne of his Glory*, alludes to Jesus appearing in that full development of his character, and of the righteousness of his claims as the Messiah, which should take place when Jerusalem was destroyed and vengeance executed upon the Jewish nation. *He should be attended by his Holy Angels*; that is, by the prophets who were his angels, or messengers to announce his coming, under the Law; Heb. i. 1, *to the end*; and by the apostles who were his angels, or messengers to proclaim that he had come, under the gospel; Psalm lxxxix. 15, with Matthew xxiv. 31. *They, or these angels, should share with him in his glory*; Matthew xvii. 1—9; xix. 28; 1 Tim: v. 21; that is, the truth of all their declarations concerning him should then be made fully manifest, Rev: xix. 10; every stigma, which, during their lifetime, had attached to their characters on account of their adhesion to his cause, being then fully removed. Psalm xxxvii. 6; Rom: viii. 17. *All nations shall be gathered before him*; that is, his authority was not, like that of Moses, to be confined to the inhabitants of any particular country or district, but was to extend to men of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation. Psalm ii. 8. Still, however, Christ's kingdom upon earth ex-

tending only to those to whom the divine character had, under one form or another, been manifested ; this kingdom being the open superseding of Moses' authority by that of the Messiah ; the only persons who, in the literal sense of the parable, were to be convened at Christ's judgment seat, were to be Jews as members of the Old Testament dispensation, and believers in himself as members of the New. Here, therefore, are the only classes on whom, when his kingdom was visibly set up on earth at the period of Jerusalem's destruction, he is represented as pronouncing sentence. Compare verse 44th with 1 Corinthians xii. 3.—The principle of Christ's judgment or decision is then brought into view, in verses 35th, 36th, 40th, 42nd, 43rd, and 45th, of the chapter in Matthew now under consideration. He should pronounce judgment according to *the law of Moses* ; Deut: vi. 4. 5, with Mattw: xxii. 36—40 ; and yet, in so doing, he should pronounce judgment as Moses' superior,—as the sole fulfiller of Moses' law,—and as he who, having thereby made it *his own law*, in a sense in which it had never been the law of Moses himself, had superseded Moses' authority for ever. Deut: xviii. 15—18 ; Rom: x. 4, and xiii. 8—10 ; John xiii. 34, and xv. 12 ; and 1 John ii. 7. 8. This *law of love* which Moses himself had given forth, but which by mere external sanctions he had never been able to enforce, is *the law* which *through faith* is established and enforced by Christ and his apostles. Rom: viii. 3. 4. The Jews as having rejected him and persecuted his disciples, and as having thereby violated a law which

had been promulgated to them, and to which they acknowledged themselves to be subject,—compare Deut : vi. 5, with Luke x. 27, and both, with Deut : xviii. 15—18,—were, as a nation, to be *everlastingly* excluded from his kingdom or the enjoyment of New Testament privileges, and to be rendered obnoxious to sufferings of the most intense kind. On the contrary, such persons as believed in him, whether Jews or Gentiles, and evinced their faith by their love to himself and his followers, were to *inherit the kingdom which had been prepared for the members of the New Testament church before the foundation of the world*; and were to enjoy its privileges, not *temporarily*, as the Jews had enjoyed theirs, but *everlastingly*—there being no period, during the subsistence of this present world, at which the New Testament dispensation is to come to an end. It is to last *as long as Sun and Moon endure*, Psalm lxxii.—In one word, in the literal and primary signification of this parable, *eternal life* denotes *the privileges enjoyed upon earth by the members of the New Testament Israel, during the subsistence of that everlasting dispensation or economy, by which the dispensation of Moses has been superseded*; and *everlasting punishment*, taken in the same sense, denotes *that everlasting exclusion from these privileges, and that everlasting endurance of the divine displeasure, which, while it subsists as a separate nation, must ever be the fate of the Old Testament Israel*. The former, or eternal life, is enjoyed in connection with, and evinced through the medium of, love to Christ and his people, on the part of believing

Jews and Gentiles; the latter, or eternal punishment, is undergone by the unbelieving descendants of Israel according to the flesh, as the righteous retribution of the persecutions undergone by Christ and his disciples at their hands. 1 Thessal: ii. 14—16.—Such, understood in its primary sense, is the plain, obvious, and consistent, meaning of that much abused passage of scripture, Matthew xxv. 31—46.

The story of the rich man and Lazarus in the xvth chapter of Luke, is in the same predicament with the passage in Matthew which we have just been considering, and falls to be explained on the same principles. Strange to tell, the greater part of those who have referred to, quoted, and commented on, Luke xvi. 19—31, have overlooked the connection of this passage with what precedes and follows, and have failed to perceive that *as a parable* it cannot be *literally interpreted*. Our Lord was addressing the Jews, and warning them of of the awful events which were speedily approaching; but he did so in parabolical or figurative language, for a reason assigned by himself, Mattw: xiii. 13—15. The parable here employed is that of two men, one of whom is rich, and is the representative of the Jewish nation, abounding in religious and civil privileges during the subsistence of the Mosaic economy; Rom: iii. 1, 2; ix. 4, 5; the other of whom is poor, and is the representative of the Gentiles, who, during the existence of that economy, were entirely destitute of religious privileges *directly*, and who only *indirectly* and *occasionally*, by means of intercourse with the Jews scattered among



them, *picked up* views of the character of *the living and true God*, in like manner as *the dogs pick up crumbs falling from a rich man's table*. Mark vii. 27, 28.—In process of time both these men *die*, or their respective states come to an end: *the rich man is buried*, or the Mosaic dispensation is finally and completely overturned; while *the poor man is carried by angels into Abraham's bosom*, or Gentiles, by faith in the declarations of the prophets and apostles as Jesus' angels or messengers, become *Abraham's spiritual seed*, and partakers of the blessings promised to him. Rom: ii. 28, 29; iv. 11—17; Gal: iii. 29. The rich man, however, in his new state is *in torments*; or the Jews still adhering to the law of Moses and their ancient worship and institutions, are subjected to awful and painful marks of the divine vengeance: not the last aggravation of which is, their perceiving the Gentiles *in Abraham's bosom*; or observing the religious privileges into the possession of which the Gentiles have as partakers of Abraham's faith, been introduced. Gal: iii. 9, compared with Acts ii. 2, 3; xiii. 6—11, 50; xiv. 2, 19; xv. 1; xvi. 3; xvii. 5; &c.—The Jews solicit from Abraham, to whom they plead a natural relationship, a *very little water to cool the tip of their tongues*; that is, some mitigation of their torments: but this he declares to be impossible. *Abraham now knows them not*. Nay, he informs them, that there is now *an impassable gulph interposed between him and them*; by which he gives them to understand, that, whereas under the former dispensation it was impossible for any man to be an object of the divine

approbation who was not a Jew or a proselyte to Judaism, the tables were now so completely turned, that it was impossible for any man who continued a Jew, and rejected Jesus as the Messiah, at the same time to enjoy the slightest token of the divine favour. The parable closes by hinting, in a very broad and intelligible manner, that the great bulk of the Jewish nation, who had failed to discover from *the writings of Moses and the prophets* that Jesus was the Messiah during his personal ministry, would remain unconvinced even by the fact of his *resurrection from the dead*.—What, to the attentive and spiritually-instructed reader, can be plainer than all this? In what part of the parable, interpreted according to the genuine principles of metaphorical language, and viewed in connexion with the context, is there discoverable the slightest foundation for the ordinary doctrine of eternal punishment by means of torments in a future state of existence?—Those who are desirous to prosecute their researches into this subject farther, may peruse with profit the 49th Psalm; which, besides exposing the notions usually entertained respecting *creature immortality*, points to the fate of the Mosaic dispensation and its pertinacious supporters.

•  
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

## CONCLUSION.

Having thus completed what was originally intended, I might now bring the essay to a close, did not two or three points, intimately connected with the subject of which I have been treating, seem to demand a little passing notice.

It may be alleged, that “the scope and tendency of the preceding statements and reasonings is to do away with the existence of *evil spirits* altogether; and, indeed, with all such beings as are commonly denominated *Angels*.” To this I reply, that, in nothing advanced or insisted on by me, has it been my intention to say a single word which could be so construed as to imply a limitation of the divine power and sovereignty. I firmly believe, taught by the scriptures themselves, that God may, whenever and in whatever way He pleases, create any intelligent being or order of intelligent beings, whether good or evil, and employ them in the execution of His purposes, whatever these may be. The man who after perusing the foregoing work has not perceived my belief in the doctrine of the existence of angels there expressed, as well as numerous hints of what I conceive these superior intelligences to be, has, I am sorry to say, read it to very little purpose.\* At the same time,

\* Do not believers of the truth, as possessed of immortal principle and as consequently surviving the stroke of natural death, constitute the glorious and ever-increasing company of the angelic hosts? Compare Matthew xxii. 30—32, and the parallel passage in Luke, with Hebrews xii. 22, 23.

I certainly deny, and that without the slightest vestige of doubt or hesitation, that it is possible for God to invest *a wicked being as such, or the acts of a wicked being*, with his own essential attributes and perfections; such as *infinity, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence*: and this simply, because His so doing would be *inconsistent with His revealed character*.\*

It may be alleged farther, that, "according to the views advanced and insisted on throughout the preceding part of the essay, *the future life* is not properly speaking *a resurrection*, but *a new creation*." This, so far from constituting a valid objection to my theory, is, in reality, one of its strongest recommendations. For *the future state of existence* is represented in scripture *as both*. To illustrate what I mean, be it observed, that the existence of intelligent beings hereafter may be viewed under two distinct aspects: first, as the resumption of their bodies by those who had previously laid them down; secondly, as the possession of the divine nature by that which had previously been possessed of human nature only. Viewed in the former light,

\* Although it must be apparent to those who have studied the writings of Baron Swedenborg and his followers, that my sentiments are very far indeed from quadrating with theirs, I am nevertheless free to admit, that, in regard to the angelic intelligences and some kindred topics, I have derived many valuable views and suggestions from the perusal of Swedenborg's treatise *De coele et de inferno*, and Hindmarsh's letters to Priestley,—the only two leading works of the sect, excepting Noble's Appeal, and D. G. Goyder's two discourses, with which I am at present acquainted. One of the grand defects of the New Jerusalem scheme,—a defect which it shares in common with many others,—is its investing *sin*, which is merely a *negative or privative*, with *eternal existence* and *other qualities* which can belong only to a *positive*.

those who enjoy eternal life *have risen again* ; viewed in the latter, they *have been created anew*. The bodies with which they live hereafter, being bodies in which they had lived while here, they are said *to have risen again* ; but the bodies with which they live hereafter having undergone a complete transformation, and being thereby possessed of qualities essentially different from those which distinguish them here, they are also said *to have been created anew*. Thus a system which represents intelligent beings as *rising again*, by means of being *created anew*, possesses the advantage of coinciding both with scripture and fact.—That the explanation just given is no fetch or quirk of my own, had recourse to merely for the purpose of getting rid of a difficulty, is obvious from this, that scripture, speaking of *the minds* of believers, represents them sometimes as *risen with Christ*, sometimes as *created anew in him* ; and, speaking of *their bodies*, represents them, sometimes as *rising again*, and sometimes as being *quickened, fashioned, or created, anew*.—Besides, there is a very curious scriptural fact, connected with the present subject, which I cannot help adverting to. It is this : that a *resurrection* is much more frequently predicated concerning *believers* than *unbelievers*. In the fifteenth chapter of 1st Corinthians from verse 35th to the end, and in the 4th chapter of 1st Thessalonians from verse 13th to the end, the inspired writer treats of *the resurrection of believers only*, whom he divides into two classes : those who die *previous to a certain event*, and those who are preserved alive *until it take place*. Now how is this exclusiveness

to be accounted for? Why, upon principles the most obvious. Believers here have the first fruits of the same divine nature which they are to enjoy thoroughly hereafter; whereas unbelievers have upon earth nothing but human nature. This being the case, a moment's consideration shows us that, although there is a sense in which both *rise again* and in which both *are created anew*, yet a *resurrection* is more properly the fate of him *who lives hereafter with a nature possessed by him partially even here*; and *new creation* is more fitly applied to him *who becomes possessed of properties and qualities hereafter totally different from those which he possessed while upon earth*.

It might be deemed an unwarrantable piece of neglect on my part, were I not to take some notice, in connection with the subject of which I have been treating, of the doctrine of the *second coming of the Lord Jesus*. The period when this event typically happened has been but rarely understood. Notwithstanding our Lord's oft-repeated warning, *Behold I come quickly*, and his numerous exhortations to his followers, *to be prepared for his approach*, they did not *watch*; *the son of man came as a thief in the night*, and his coming was not perceived. The professed disciples of Jesus, ignorant of these important facts, that the end of the world signifies, taken literally, the end of the Mosaic economy; Hebrews ix. 26; and that Christ's design was, at his literal second coming, to set aside that economy visibly and entirely, and thereby to *take to himself his great power and reign*; have feigned to themselves the notion,

that "the second coming of Jesus for the purpose of reigning upon earth has not yet happened ; and consequently that his earthly reign is to take place at some period still future, previous to the termination of this present visible system of things." To support them in their delusions, and give to these a plausible sort of colouring, the Book of Revelation has been pressed into the service ; and a work which, taken in its literal sense, more clearly than almost any other part of scripture points to the destruction of Jerusalem there denominated Babylon, and the full introduction of New Testament privileges, beautifully described in the 21st and 22d chapters,—prophecies which, literally understood, long since received their accomplishment,—has had senses the most chimerical, incongruous, and unwarranted, assigned to it by Mede and a host of subsequent commentators ; and is supposed to be yet, as respects its literal sense, in a great measure unfulfilled. Alas ! little are such persons aware that, were their theories correct, scripture would be untrue. Our blessed Lord has declared, Matthew v. 17, 18, that *he came not to destroy the Law or the Prophets, but to fulfil ; and that till Heaven and Earth (figurative language for the Old Testament economy) passed, one jot, or one tittle, should in no wise pass from the law, till all was fulfilled.* But the law having passed away, heaven and earth or the Mosaic economy has of course passed away or come to an end likewise ; and as it thus appears that the law and the prophets, by which expression we are to understand all that is contained in the Old Testament scrip-



tures, received a literal fulfilment when Jesus executed the divine vengeance upon the Jewish nation,—brought to a close the Mosaic dispensation,—and set up, although not in its full lustre and glory, his long promised and long expected kingdom,—how can the accomplishment of those scriptures, which respected the typical second coming of Christ and the setting up of his kingdom upon earth, remain to be looked for? The law has passed away :—it must, then, in so far as respects the setting up of Christ's kingdom upon earth, be fulfilled.—It is true, that, in common with all my fellow believers, I am looking for the anti-typical or real second coming of the Lord Jesus, when he *shall appear in the clouds of Heaven*—when he *shall take to himself his great power*—and when, in a higher state of existence than the present, he *shall reign before his ancients gloriously* :—but this implies, that I am not looking for *the type* of that second coming; nor for that setting up of the reign of the Messiah upon earth, by which it was to be accompanied—both of these events having long since taken place. Let it not be said, that the fact of the Book of Revelation speaking of the second coming of Christ as future derogates from the force of my remarks; for, whatever may be advanced to the contrary from the dreaming and inconsistent works of the Fathers, it can easily be proved, and that *from the very terms in which they are couched*, that all the Books of the New Testament, without a single exception, were written previous to the destruction of Jerusalem. But on this subject I cannot enlarge.

*Sat verbum sapienti.*

In conclusion,—after the ample, and I hope satisfactory, manner in which the topics proposed for consideration have been discussed, little or nothing remains to be added. I have shewn that, as, on the one hand, it was impossible for Adam to forfeit *more* than he possessed—so, on the other, the forfeiture incurred by him extended to *all* that he possessed. I have shewn, that this forfeiture of his was no unforeseen or accidental matter; but was introductory to, and the means of developing, the ulterior designs of the Supreme Being: or, in other words, that the forfeiture of this present life by Adam, opened up the way for God's bestowing immortality and eternal life through Jesus; and that the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, was both the pledge and the medium of this blessing being bestowed. I have also shewn, on the one hand, that the ordinary doctrine of the everlasting punishment of unbelieving and wicked men in a future state of existence, is a mere chimera or fiction of the human mind; deriving its origin from mistaken views of scripture, and from ignorance of the nature and consequences of sin: and yet, on the other hand, that the wicked, or Adam's posterity as such, are everlastingly punished, by their being everlastingly excluded from Christ's kingdom, and by the compleat and everlasting destruction of all that as Adam's descendants they possess. To sum up the whole in a few sentences:—my design in this essay has been, by combating and refuting a few closely connected errors, to shew that, although God applies, and consistently with his revealed

character can apply, no *remedy* to the original transgression of man ; nay, allows it to take full effect in the destruction of *human nature* ;—He nevertheless renders that transgression, and its results, the means of accomplishing His purposes, in *the development of His character and the communication of His nature*. There is no *restoration* or *recovery* of what Adam forfeited, announced in scripture ; for what he forfeited, he forfeited for ever : but the substance of the divine declaration is, that through Christ Jesus, as *the second man, the Lord from Heaven, all things are made new*. *This is the record*, not that God gives back to us pure natural or Adamic life, but *that God hath given to us, originally possessed of natural life, eternal life ; and that THIS life is*, not in or through Adam, but *in or through his Son*.\* In the course of the preceding remarks I have shewn particularly, that sin, being merely one of the means, agents, or instruments, which God employs for effectuating His purposes, necessarily comes to an end, or is annihilated, along with this present world, as soon as these purposes have been accomplished. How much more pleasing and glorious, as well as scriptural, is this view of things, than that which represents sin as having *an eternal and necessary existence* ; and which thus, besides *denying the efficacy of the atonement*, represents that which God hates, as being either *one with Him*, or *His everlasting rival* !

\* 1 John v. 11. See also 1 Peter i. 23.

May the great Head of the Church, in whose name, and for the advancement of whose glory, this work was undertaken, condescend to make it the vehicle of exciting in some, attention to His own most blessed word ; and, not of rendering them sceptical in regard to revealed truth, but of emancipating them from anti-christian and anti-scriptural errors and prejudices, by which even the followers of Jesus, either from neglect or an undue deference to the opinions of others, have for a long course of ages been enslaved.

1

## APPENDIX.

The reader of the preceding work may be anxious to know the opinions of critics respecting the former edition. With a view to the gratification of this feeling, the following selections have been made.

### I. From the Gospel Magazine.

“The conception of the above work before us, denotes a mind of no ordinary capacity, and evinces that the writer is anxious to render his powers and attainments useful and beneficial to mankind.—These are reasons which should powerfully sway the breast of a reader to exercise the utmost candour, and even lenity, in forming his judgment. And, if the rigid dictates of that duty which we owe the public, compel us to pronounce a sentence unfavourable, we would not depreciate from the integrity of the writer, in supposing that his motives were not sincere.”—*June, 1828.*

### II. From the Monthly Repository and Review.

Another pamphlet was reviewed along with the Three Questions. After having remarked concerning both: “we have here an example from both the Established Churches of this island, of the tendency of educated and active minds to throw off the trammels of established authority, and to search for truth fearlessly and in the use of the proper means. We are happy that in both these pamphlets the appeal is made to scripture rather than to any articles, professedly drawn up from them by mere human authority. What, after diligent and faithful investigation, may be esteemed to be the truth inculcated by the sacred writers? *That is the Question.*” I say, after these remarks on the two pamphlets in common, and a very interesting criticism on the former of them, the writer thus speaks of the former edition of the preceding work:—

"The second of these pamphlets is the production of a young, but vigorous mind, not long since bound in Calvinistic thralldom, but now exercising its private judgment in the interpretation of the sacred volume, with much ingenuity, and with some success. The Three Questions involve a large portion of curious and important enquiry, which we doubt not will lead many of the readers of this treatise to cultivate the habit of personal investigation. Our limits will not at present allow of a detailed account of our author's speculations. We were struck with the considerable resemblances between some of his interpretations, and those of the late Mr. Cappe, the more remarkable since the writer has been trained in a very different school. The writer is minister of a Scotch Church at Liverpool, and was lately obliged to undergo a sort of persecution, at the instance of a synod of his church, for alleged heterodoxy."—*June, 1828.*

I may here remark, that I have never read any of Mr. Cappe's works; nor do I know what are the resemblances to which the reviewer alludes."

### III. From the Christian Pioneer.

"This pamphlet is the production of an original and thinking mind. It evinces an ardent desire for the knowledge of Christian truth. It shews an individual, regardless of the systems of man's devising, pursuing his enquiries with an eye steadfastly fixed on the acquisition of scriptural information; and desirous of deriving the doctrines of faith from the pure and sacred fountain of the Bible: Mr. Thom is a native of Glasgow. Educated in the belief of the Assembly's catechism, and being from his youth of exemplary character, he was early destined to the Church of Scotland. Of that Church, he was a regularly ordained minister. Some years since, he settled with the Scots Church in Liverpool, as successor, we believe, to the Rev. Dr. Barr, now of Port-Glasgow, an individual who, during Mr. Harris' residence in Liverpool, distinguished himself by publishing a pamphlet in vindication of the existence and agency of the Devil. Contentions having arisen between Mr. Thom and the proprietors of the church, a considerable number of the congregation left with him, and built a very

handsome chapel in Rodney Street. Here, after a short time, Mr. Thom was charged with holding tenets deemed to be inimical to the doctrines of the Confession of Faith. For this supposed heresy, which seemed to us to consist partly of truth, and partly to be Calvinism in most rank luxuriance—Calvinism carried out to its legitimate consequences—Mr. Thom was cited before the Presbytery of Glasgow. Long and various were the discussions which ensued, on the supposed perversions of the creed of his forefathers. A verdict of guilty was however pronounced, and Mr. Thom was deposed from his situation. Still numbers of his people adhered to him, and worship was conducted in the Music Hall, Bold Street. Once set free from the trammels of the Established Church, the scales of prejudice appear to have gradually fallen from the mental vision of this excellent individual. His present pamphlet is dedicated to several persons by name, and to “the other friends of *free discussion in matters of religion*, by whom he was supported in his late arduous struggle with the Presbytery of Glasgow.”—

—“For the arguments which he adduces in support of his views, we must refer our readers to the pamphlet. We think it will amply repay the perusal. That all at once the mind which has been bound up in error and unused to intellectual freedom, should arrive at uniformly consistent ideas, is not to be expected. We unfeignedly rejoice that so much light has beamed on this gifted individual, as is manifested in these pages. We earnestly pray, that he may be blessed with more and more. We hail him as a coadjutor in the holy work of Christian Reformation. Differ we may on minor topics, but shall, we hope, agree to differ. On the essential doctrine of the unbounded benevolence of the Almighty, we are united, and that is the sentiment before which all others vanish into comparative insignificancy.”—*April*, 1828.

It is due to myself to correct a trifling mistake, committed unintentionally by the author of the foregoing very friendly critique. I was not elected Dr. Barr's successor. Although a candidate for Oldham Street Kirk after the Dr.'s departure, and supported by about five-sixths of the congregation,—as appears by a strong memorial in my behalf addressed to the thirteen proprietors in whom the



right of voting was vested,—a bare majority of the body alluded to saw meet to elect another candidate, thereby of course disregarding the wishes of the people.\* It was the provocation given to the majority of the Oldham Street congregation by this act of the proprietors, and not any personal dispute between the proprietors and myself, that occasioned my being called to preside over a new congregation, and the building of Rodney Street Kirk. It is true, that the then leading individuals of the Rodney Street congregation, after having made use of me as an instrument to organise their new concern, and caused me to bear the brunt of the malice and opposition engendered by their separation from their old associates, chose to turn round on me and quarrel with me. But this is the only personal dispute which since my coming to Liverpool I have had. And in this dispute, I was not active, but passive; having been assailed by men, who, if had they judged calmly and impartially, would have charged on their own dulness of spiritual understanding, and not on the unhappy victim of their caprice, the fact of his merely *continuing* to preach doctrines, which *from the very first he had avowed*.†

#### IV. From the Christian Reflector.

“Our readers, on referring to the Christian Reflector, vol. 1, p. 101 of the new series, will find that Mr. Thom was condemned by some learned, not to say *liberal*, members of the Presbytery of Glasgow, for honestly advocating the real doctrines of the Kirk of Scotland: and which Mr. Thom at that time believed to be doctrines of Christianity. Since that, it is evident from the publication before us, these doctrines have appeared to him very differently; and following the convictions of his own mind, and the farther light he has obtained from the perusal of the Scriptures, he has abandoned that system which he before defended. We congratulate Mr. T. on his escape from the regions of horror and death, through which is distilled a poison far more baneful than that said to proceed from the *Upas Tree* of Java. We regard the situation of every one as

\* This happened in March, 1823.

† It was not until some time after I had quitted Rodney Street, that my mind opened to many of the truths brought out in the foregoing work.

happy, who rejects the pestilential doctrines of a system, which represents God without mercy, and leaves man without hope. Twice happy is he who escapes with the preservation of his mental powers, and is saved from the dreary abodes prepared for the most afflictive state to which human beings can be reduced.—

We have made the above extracts to the extent of the room we can afford. We had intended to add some remarks on the contents, but they must be deferred till our next. In the meantime, we strongly recommend the careful perusal of this pamphlet to our readers. Whether the orthodox phalanx in Liverpool will have the courage to attack Mr. T. is yet to be seen ; we fear they will not.”—*April*, 1828.

“To Mr. Thom in his generous and noble undertaking we give both hand and heart, and say, ‘the Lord, even our God, prosper thy undertaking’ ”—*May*, 1828.

“The horrible consequences which religious men,—men interested in upholding a craft by which they get their wealth,—have attributed to the fall of our first parents, are sufficient to shock the minds of all who think properly on the government of God, and the goodness of His character. The marrow of this *scriptural* doctrine, as it is called, may be found in the Confession of the Church of Scotland, where it is said, that “mankind are made subject to death, with all its miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal.” It is supposed, that Adam by his transgression incurred spiritual and eternal death. To this Mr. Thom replies,” &c.

“We apprehend that Mr. Thom’s opponents will find it no easy matter to answer these questions.”—*June*, 1828.

Frequent allusions having been made in the preceding criticisms, to prosecutions before Ecclesiastical judicatories which I have been compelled to undergo, it may be proper to take this opportunity of recording the sentences, first, of the Presbytery of Glasgow, in 1825, when I was tried upon nine charges of heresy ; and, secondly, of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1828, pronounced in absence, in consequence of my refusal to appear before them to answer for the sentiments avowed in the former edition of my *Three questions*.

## I. "Glasgow, 22nd September, 1825.

"The Presbytery having deliberated on the case of the Rev. David Thom at great length, and given their opinion thereon, Find, *with the deepest concern*, that Mr. Thom has, during his ministry at Liverpool, in his discourses from the pulpit, asserted, maintained, and inculcated, several gross errors, which strike at the vitals of Religion, are contrary to, and inconsistent with, the Word of God, *the Confession of Faith, and Catechisms of this National Church*,\* as said errors are set forth in the Petition of John M'Culloch and others, and referred by parties to the decision of this Presbytery. That the Petitioners have proved each article of charge in their petition; and that Mr. Thom has failed in his exculpation: wherefore the Presbytery, after full and mature consideration of this very important reference, did, and hereby do, find and declare, that Mr. Thom has contravened his solemn engagements as a licensed Probationer, and ordained Minister of the Church of Scotland, failed to perform his part of the stipulations in the the Bond to him by the Trustees of the Scotch, or St. Andrew's Church, Rodney Street, Liverpool, of date 18th April 1823, on the faith of which he was ordained by this Presbytery to be their minister, and forfeited the provisions and stipulations made by said Bond in his favour. The Presbytery therefore did, and hereby do, declare the said Mr. David Thom to be deprived of the ministry of said Church from this date."—

"JAMES MARSHALL, Moderator."

From this sentence two clergymen dissented.

II. "At Edinburgh, Monday, June 2nd, 1828. *Sess. ult.*

"Report of the Committee of the General Assembly on the case of Mr. David Thom, with a reference from the Presbytery of Glasgow on the subject, called for, given in, and read by Dr. Brunton the convener, as follows: 'The Committee beg leave to report, that having considered the papers connected with this

\* Amusingly enough, raised to a footing of equality with *the Word of God*! It is Wolsey's *Ego et Rex meus*.—Strange infatuation of the human mind!

reference, and having heard the Presbytery of Glasgow in explanation of it, they unanimously and most respectfully recommend, that the finding of the General Assembly should be of the following tenor: that the Presbytery of Glasgow having felt it their duty to enquire of Mr. David Thom, (who had received from them licence as a Probationer, and ordination as a Minister of this Church), whether he were the author of a pamphlet bearing his name on the title page, and containing opinions *inconsistent with the standards of this Church*;\* and the said Mr. David Thom having, in his official answer, addressed to their Moderator, declared, that he “accounts the government of this Church to be unscriptural,” and that he “objects to all and every species of Church Government, (as it is called),” and concludes by stating in express terms: “you will of course understand, that the import of this letter is to intimate to you, that my connection with you *as a body* is henceforth at an end;” and having made no compareance before this Assembly, although the intention of the Presbytery to make this reference was duly intimated to him; the General Assembly find and declare, that the said Mr. David Thom is no longer to be considered as a Minister or Licentiate of this Church, and that he is incapable of receiving or accepting a presentation or call to any Parish or Chapel of Ease in this Church, without the special allowance of some future General Assembly; and the Assembly prohibit all Ministers of this Church from employing him to preach or perform any ministerial offices for them, or from being so employed by him, unless some future Assembly shall see cause to take off this prohibition.’ The General Assembly approved of the Report of the Committee in all respects, and found and decerned accordingly.”

“Extracted by

“JOHN LEE, *Cl. Eccl. Scot.*”

\* A curious admission; not *inconsistent with the Word of God*.

FINIS.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".



Works by the Author, to be procured from SIMPKIN and MARSHALL, London,  
W. GRAPEL, Liverpool, and the other Booksellers.

---

1. REMARKS, by the Rev. DAVID THOM, Minister of the Scotch Church, Rodney-street, Liverpool, on a series of charges recently preferred against him, before the Reverend the Presbytery of Glasgow, by certain individuals connected with the management of the said Church. With a copious Appendix.—1825. 1s. 6d.

2. MEMORIAL submitted by the Rev. DAVID THOM, to the Presbytery of Glasgow, regarding the theological points of his case. Second edition.—1825. 8d.

3. A LETTER to the Rev. RICHARD T. P. POPE, adverting to some important mistakes committed by him in his recent Controversy with the Rev. THOMAS MAGUIRE. By OBSERVER.—1827. 1s. 6d.

4. THREE QUESTIONS PROPOSED AND ANSWERED, concerning the Life forfeited by Adam, the Resurrection of the Dead, and Eternal Punishment.—1828. 2s. 6d. (*Of this edition scarcely half a dozen copies remain.*)

5. RECENT CORRESPONDENCE between the Presbytery of Glasgow, and the Rev. DAVID THOM, occasioned by a second interference on their part with him.—1828. 8d.

6. The MIRACLES of the IRVING SCHOOL shewn to be unworthy of serious examination.—1832. 1s.

7. The ASSURANCE OF FAITH, or CALVINISM identified with UNIVERSALISM.—1833. 2 volumes octavo. 21s.

---

The Author intends submitting to the public, at an early period, a work on the scriptural distinction between SOUL and SPIRIT.

















*Acme*  
Bookbinding Co., Inc.  
100 Cambridge St.  
Charlestown, MA 02129



3 2044 069 629 814

